



CPRN Discussion Paper

Shifting the Paradigm: Knowledge and Learning for Canada's Future

By
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Foreword

In this paper, Jane Jenson challenges us to consider personal and societal choices that will shape the kind of country Canada will become. She argues that our current approach to work, to family and to urban life is based on patterns and associations developed in an earlier time. Much of our social knowledge is out of date and does not reflect the real experiences of Canadians in the 2000s. It presumes that the most important spaces are national ones and downplays the significance of urban ones; that the public and private domains are water-tight compartments; that social policy is needed only when families or markets “fail”; that a typical home shelters a family composed of two parents, several children, and perhaps an elderly relative; and that only one of those adults will be working outside the home.

The paper reveals by an overview of patterns in homes, workplaces and cities that the times when such assumptions adequately represented the circumstances of most Canadian have gone. But the thinking embedded in public policy, in employers’ strategies, and in our notions of the role of the city has not progressed. We are caught in a time warp, Jenson says. The time has come to update our assumptions and make some core choices around the roles and responsibilities of market, family and state that respond more directly to the lived experience of Canadian citizens.

Jenson argues that “part of the reason it has been so difficult to identify alternatives is because we have tended to hold on to the key premises of the earlier paradigm and have attempted to work on the margins.” She then outlines four stark choices that we must confront – for work-life balance, the responsibility of families, the prospect of life “without work,” and acting as if cities matter. The choices we make, she says, have major societal consequences.

This paper was commissioned by the Policy Research Initiative of the Government of Canada as part of a set of four papers prepared for a Futures Forum convened in November 2001. It provided an overview, drawing on some of the findings of three others, which focused on: (1) homes and families, by Professor Neena Chappell of the University of Victoria; (2) workplaces and new ways of working, by Professor Diane-Gabrielle Tremblay of the Téléuniversité, Université du Québec; and (3) the economy and society of cities by Professor Meric Gertler of the University of Toronto. These three papers are on the Policy Research Initiative Web site (<http://www.policyresearch.gc.ca>).

The goal of a Futures Forum is to provoke participants to imagine future possibilities and thus help them anticipate and shape their own futures. I would encourage readers to use the choices set out in Part IV of the paper to frame their own deliberations about how Canadians can actualize their core social values in the current and future context.

Jane Jenson holds a Canada Research Chair in Citizenship and Governance and is professor of political science at the Université de Montréal, and is the Director of the Family Network at CPRN. I wish to thank her for a paper that takes us all “out of the box” and encourages us to face up to the challenges presented by the new patterns of our lives. I also wish to thank the Policy Research Initiative, led by Laura Chapman, for giving CPRN and the authors of the Futures Forum papers the opportunity to participate in this intellectual journey.

Judith Maxwell
November 2001

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I. Introduction

Change is always with us. Children grow and leave home, but sometimes they return. Companies restructure and lay-offs sweep through a community, while other firms gobble up all available skilled employees in the city and region. Political leaders burst onto the national scene, and then slide away. Historic communities disappear in municipal amalgamations, and new communities of interest find themselves in cafés and on the Web.

Change is always with us and, yet, it is so hard to understand. Given that nothing stands still for families, firms, individuals, communities and countries, it is difficult to sort through the meaning of events. Globalization and new technologies seem to have swept away so much of the familiar. Do firms, governments, the voluntary sector and families need to find new roles and responsibilities? How might and how should our homes, workplaces and cities adapt? Is technology and a global economy simply remaking familiar patterns, or have existing structures given way and are being replaced by new social, economic and political forms? When is the new simply the old in a new guise, and when is the new truly new?

Change is hard to understand. How much of the future is already given in advance, dependent on past decisions and historical experience? What is the room for maneuver? Must we continue along the same path or can citizens make careful and strategic *choices* in workplaces, homes and cities that will put them on a better path to the future?

Such questions worry families as they make decisions about their children and their own futures. They are also conundrums for firms trying to keep up with the competition and face up to globalization and rapidly changing technology. The voluntary sector must constantly scan and scope the environment in order to determine whether existing ways of doing still pay off or if new circumstances are so different that they demand a whole new blueprint. Whether federal, provincial or local, governments also face such dilemmas as they seek appropriate policy interventions and struggle with the fact that past practice just does not seem to be working any more.

It is not just an academic question whether we face a situation of more of the same or whether history is punctuated by breakpoints, although this is a question that has vexed many academics.¹ Nor is it simply a question for “policy wonks” whether we are locked-in to path dependency and there is little room to maneuver simply, or if choices exist.²

1 The thorny theoretical question raised here is that of the nature of history. For some, such as the Regulation Approach in political economy, history is punctuated by moments of stability, when regimes stabilize (Boyer, 1990). A notion of “punctuated equilibrium” is also found in the new institutionalism, prevalent in political sociology and political economy (Thelen and Steimo, 1992: 15). A third, and increasingly popular vision of change and innovation is a Schumpeterian one, usually termed “creative destruction.” Schumpeter, writing in the inter-war years, traced cycles in which the disruptive power of bursts of innovation and technological change destroyed established firms and their practices. The current revival of interest in Schumpeterian views of history is found in, for example, Foster and Kaplan (2001). However, an alternative, and equally prevalent view, is one of history as evolutionary change, shaped by incremental change and dominated by path dependency.

2 The notion of path dependency has been used in a wide variety of studies. It has been applied to the technical dimensions of technological change, to account for the “stickiness” of some technologies and to the analysis of “innovation systems” by social scientists (for an overview, and some critiques, see Wolfe, 2000). It has also

No one paper could ever provide a full answer to such large questions, of course. Nonetheless, some things can be said. In this paper, I will argue that Canada and its citizens are faced with a situation that is significantly different from what we knew in the years that have been termed the *trente glorieuses* after 1945 and the years dominated by neo-liberalism and fiscal austerity that followed. The paradigm that shaped the post-war social contract has crumbled in the face of both structural changes, including new technologies and shifts in social structures, and in the recognition that decisions made for a previous paradigm may require updating. Now is the time to seek the social knowledge necessary to making good *choices* about the social, economic and political roads we wish to build into this new future. This *Futures Forum* can be seen as part of the process of social learning that will help Canadians identify the directions for the future and understand the actions necessary to get there.

Knowledge and Learning in Moments of Paradigm Shift

Throughout, the paper treats the issue of change and learning in a simple way. The core notion is that in some historical moments, there is a certain stability in basic social, economic and political relations, which allows us to say that a societal paradigm exists, one that encompasses ongoing social knowledge about social structures and relations as well as about the relationships between technology, production and culture. This paradigm is not constructed by policy-makers waking up each day to “work on their paradigm today”. Rather, they act, as do firms and individuals and families, in order to achieve more precise goals. However, as observers we can – by relying on a large dose of hind-sight - describe the existence of shared social knowledge that gives rise to habitual ways of doing, or practices that organize social life across a wide range of locations, including homes, workplaces and urban spaces.

Sometimes, albeit infrequently, there is a break.³ With turbulence comes a recognition that practice no longer “works.” At these times, social and political debate is often very wide ranging and intense.⁴ At such historical moments, profound redirection may result – one that has been termed “third-order social learning” by Peter A. Hall (1993) and which we label “paradigm change.” Organizing and legitimating principles can break with one model and give rise to new knowledge and other choices. Old social knowledge is replaced by new knowledge within public policy communities.⁵

been used by students of social policy to understand, for example, why welfare spending persists despite politicians’ promise to eliminate the welfare state (for a classic example, see Pierson, 1994). Another example comes from Robert Putnam (1993), who used perhaps the most exaggerated notion of path dependency when he claimed to find the roots of democratic well-being of contemporary Italian regions in the social capital developed in Italian city-states of early modern Europe. Critiques of the notion of path dependency also exist, of course, and they tend to suggest the possibility of regime or paradigm shifts. For the political economy tradition that has contributed most to the notion of regime shift, see Boyer (1990). For examples that speak of paradigm shifts, see one focused on macro-economic policy (Hall, 1993), and one focused on social policy and governance (Jenson, 1989).

- 3 Traditionally, the break-points identified have been the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, the decades of the 1930s and 1940s, and from the mid-1970s through the mid-1990s.
- 4 For those interested in the theoretical, these notions build on both the Regulation Approach to political economy and historical institutionalism in the social sciences. For further discussion, in addition to Jenson (1989) and Jenson and Phillips (1996), see Bradford (1998).
- 5 By *social knowledge* we mean interpretations of and strategies for managing transactions linking state and market, and state and citizen. These concerns, which touch on the relationships among states, markets, families

Simultaneously, firms and other economic decision-makers are involved in their own social processes of learning about how to innovate.⁶ As we will see, there is often spillover from one sector to another. For example, during the heyday of mass (sometimes termed Fordist) production models, the social knowledge of the Keynesian welfare state favoured large and hierarchical bureaucracies with clear distinctions among tasks. Now, however, there is a search for ways to organize “just-in-time” production models in services as well as in industry, and to install flatter “cross-silo” transversal policy-making.

One premise of this paper is that we are at a moment of paradigm shift now, and therefore we need to look carefully at flows and structures to identify our current location. We also need to pay attention to ideas, to social knowledge, and to processes of social learning that will enable us to make sense of this moment and intervene to divert costly trends and to encourage positive ones, such that we can design our futures.

We are not hostages to the present. Nothing is already set in stone. Current trends are the expressions of past practice, but they can be altered. This is a second premise of this paper, and this *Futures Forum* as a whole. There is a need, to be sure, to chronicle structural change related to economic globalization, information technology and forms of work organization, to migrations of populations and of capital, and to major demographic changes all affecting homes, workplaces and cities. But this is not enough. We must also appreciate that behind these changes lie *choices* made by real actors such as employers, families, associations and governments.⁷ It is, moreover, choices (including choices *not* to act) made now that will mediate the impacts of the structural changes due to globalization, technology and demography. These choices open some options and close off others. The future is, in other words, being chosen now.

The paper proceeds according to the following logic, then. In order to set out some of the public policy implications of current trends and the choices that currently confront Canadians, it is necessary to step back *two* steps. Before we can consider our choices, we need to identify the options and the room to maneuver. But even before we can know those, we need to map the social knowledge in place and the structural changes that are challenging it.

and communities (the welfare diamond) are long-standing and fundamentally reinforced by the idea that policy could be used to manage those relationships. The producers of social knowledge have traditionally been individuals and groups working in institutionalized settings such as universities, research institutes, political parties, organizations with policy goals, and governmental bureaucracies. Sometimes these producers are termed policy intellectuals. For an historical discussion, see, for example, Reuschmeyer and Skocpol (1996).

6 *Social knowledge* and *social learning* are not quite the same thing. One difference is that social knowledge, as described in Note 5, involves knowledge about the policy and social interventions that can be used to alter patterned relations and interactions among states, markets and communities. Thus, Keynesian economics was a classic example of social knowledge. It had clear notions of the utility and benefits of demand management by governments that would create both economic and social well-being and, particularly, stability. So too are public health and population health perspectives examples of social knowledge. In contrast, “social processes of learning” are generally used to mean *knowledge generation*. This might be about how to use technology and innovate in production. It might also be about how to be a “learning organization,” generally one in which innovation and initiative can flower.

7 While all three authors emphasize the space for choice, especially about public policy, Tremblay (2001) makes the most explicit statement of this position by documenting the literature on firm strategies for managing labour.

Therefore, this paper has three main sections after this introduction. The first sketches the paradigm, societal knowledge, and practices of citizenship and governance that have structured relations among sectors and policy thinking for a number of decades. Then, drawing in part and extending the three papers written for this *Futures Forum* by Neena Chappell, Meric Gertler, and Diane-Gabrielle Tremblay, Section II briefly recounts the shifts in economic and social structures that are remaking Canadian society. Lastly, and by way of conclusion, Section III identifies some of the choices Canadians face.

II. Social Knowledge for an Earlier Time

In 1945, Canadians and their governments, as in almost all other liberal democratic countries, feared a repeat of the 1930s and 1940s. Both worldwide depression and world war were to be avoided at all costs. But it was not only fear that guided choices. There was also a vision shared by many. Policy-makers saw themselves as building a country, one that for the first time in its history would achieve all the potential of its immense space and resources, its diverse population, and its hard-won place as an independent player in the modern world.

With its *Citizenship Act* in 1946, Canada was the first country in the Commonwealth to create a separate citizenship, and thereby to break with the alternate myth of the imperial subject, as both a legal and subjective identity.

As its author, Paul Martin, said, the *Citizenship Act* was more than a technical fix. Martin recalled that he became convinced of the need for such legislation after visiting the battlefield cemeteries of post-war Western Europe. “Nothing has since epitomized the concept of our nation more poignantly for me than that cemetery. Of whatever origin, these men were all Canadian.”⁸

At war’s end, many in Canadian policy communities were unusually aware of the impact that their decisions would have for the future. They were consciously and conscientiously building a new societal paradigm to reflect the lessons learned both in the inter-war period and the war years. They spoke frequently of the need to represent Canadians to themselves as part of a single, autonomous country stretching from sea to sea, and open to exercising its international responsibilities in emerging international organizations such as the United Nations and through the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (GATT).

The 1946 *Citizenship Act* was part of this construction of post-war citizenship, but only part. Alongside it were the important country-spanning institutions of the CBC (which began television broadcasting after the war), the Massey Commission on the Arts and, by the mid-1950s, huge construction and transportation projects such as the Trans-Canada Highway, the St. Lawrence Seaway, Air Canada and the pipelines. All of these actions were expressed concretely in tons of cement, miles of wire, and the many public buildings built at the time.

8 Paul Martin, “Citizenship and the People’s World,” in Kaplan (1993: 66).

But they went far beyond such material expressions. They were also the infrastructure of a modern industrial economy, infrastructure needed by companies and corporate actors to communicate, to move their export goods, and to import their components. In addition, they were clear assertions of a belief in a pan-Canadian project to link Canadians, one that would allow them to recognize themselves as citizens of a single country, proven in war and facing a future of economic boom.

Part of the post-war story, albeit quite a controversial one, involved a new role for the federal government as an active representative of all Canadians. While many policy-makers in Ottawa adhered to this position, the provincial governments were not unanimous in their support of this vision. Nonetheless, the federal government's financial clout and willingness to spend, especially through conditional grants, meant that its vision could take shape. It sought to construct tighter social bonds among individual Canadians.

In their ideas as well as their actions, decision-makers in both the private and public sectors were, in essence, designing a set of rules for the division of responsibilities among states and markets. The private sector had the responsibility to create well-being by going about its business profitably, while governments would provide a social safety net for those left behind by the rising tide of post-war economic boom and well-being.

Any or all of these projects, from television and radio networks to airlines, canals, pipelines and concert halls *might have* been left totally to the initiative of philanthropy or private enterprise and market forces. This was what the neighbour to the south chose to do in the same years, building three huge private television networks, many airlines, and so on.⁹ Canada made other choices about how to use the state in the economy, drawing closer to the mixed economies of Western Europe and Australasia, all of which used government authority to *shape* markets and *influence* market forces.

Central to the vision of citizenship were social programs that expressed a commitment to the collective good, being a representation of what Canadians owed to each other. Part of this was the willingness to share the costs of unevenly distributed life risks, both those associated with moments of the life-cycle (childhood, youth, and old age) and those associated with the "bad luck" of illness, disability, poverty and job loss.¹⁰ Therefore, from the 1940s to the end of the 1960s, Canadian governments created the social infrastructure of the societal paradigm. These were the now-familiar programs of unemployment insurance, pensions, family allowances, post-secondary education, and universal health care, as well social assistance for those living in poverty.

9 Of course, there was a huge exception in two areas: (1) highways, and (2) research and development. The decision to build the network of superhighways (many heading north) and the investment in state-of-the-art high technology aerospace and other industries built on the United State's needs in the Cold War years as one of two superpowers. President Eisenhower was the first to term this core of the American economy the "military-industrial complex."

10 As Gøsta Esping-Andersen reminds us, "The welfare state is one among three sources of managing social risks, the other two being family and market" (2000: 33). We add a fourth, the community, through private redistribution. This addition creates the welfare diamond proposed by Adalbert Evers, Marja Pilj, and Clare Ungerson (1994).

The result was again a mixed pattern. Canada never went as far as those European countries that were building generous welfare states to cushion citizens from many of the effects of market society. Canadians chose to define the social rights of citizenship as *safety nets* in most cases, rather than seeking to promote greater equality of condition or actively structure labour markets. Our universal programs were limited to education, health care, family allowances and pensions.¹¹

What was the social knowledge that informed these choices? It was, of course, a product of the times, of the challenges to which policy communities in post-1945 Canada responded, as well as of their understanding of social structural norms. Therefore, we see embedded in this societal paradigm the assumptions and social knowledge that policy intellectuals used at the time about what the state could and should do. What were their interpretations of and strategies for managing transactions linking state and market, and state and citizen? What kind of society did they imagine when they considered action?

Two values underpinned social knowledge in these decades – those of liberalism and of social equity.¹² The combination generated a position that might be termed “social liberalism.” These two values led to several key premises. First was the notion, dominant in the liberal internationalism of the time, that space was “national.” In the years after World War II, anti-colonialism and the internationalism of the United Nations generated a vision of the globe as carved into national spaces. Canada was not alone, then, in seeking to firm up its borders by clearly distinguishing “us” from “them,” both in the British Empire and on the other side of the 49th parallel. Within that national space, there were sub-national spaces. Most important were the provinces, defined by constitutional criteria. While there was a notion of “regions” – such as the Maritimes or the Prairies, the East and the West – they tended to be represented as combinations of provinces.

A second premise, also imported from liberalism, is that the “public” and “private” were clearly distinct. This meant not only that the public and private sectors would be autonomous, albeit interdependent, it also meant that the workplace and the home were two distinct locales. Workers were to arrive at the factory or office door “unencumbered” by their family ties. Any employer responsibility was expressed through the wage package and employment contract to the individual worker – his or her family situation was not relevant.

In addition to markets and state, the family and the voluntary sector were key actors, although less visible. Families were assigned responsibility for distributing well-being for current and future generations.¹³ Parents were assumed to have complete responsibility for ensuring that their preschool children would thrive and be prepared to enter school. Schools had responsibility for overseeing the education of older children, but the rest of their development remained in the hands of their parents. Only if parents “failed” would the state step in and take children into protection. The elderly were also assumed to be the responsibility of their kin, cared for by them unless they were unable to do so. At that point, the elderly could make a claim on public funds, either for home care or to be transferred into an institution.

11 For a comparison of Canada with other countries, see Goodin *et al.* (1999: Chapter 1).

12 Esping-Andersen (2000: 26).

13 This description and an argument about its history and future are developed further in Beauvais and Jenson (2001).

While the voluntary sector was actively involved in the social policy of this paradigm, little attention was actually devoted to its role or contribution. The exception was in Quebec, where the relatively tardy development of public spending led, in the 1960s, to a lively debate about public and private roles. Elsewhere, however, the fact that the Children's Aid Society was delivering virtually all child protection services in some provinces, that the Victorian Order of Nurses provided publicly financed home care, or that the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) required that non-profit associations deliver much of publicly subsidized child care did not attract a great deal of attention.

The second key premise was that, to the extent possible, markets and families should and would distribute well-being. Therefore, social policy spending was necessary for precise purposes. It was to fill gaps, to weave the net of social programs for those who *could not participate* in the labour market so that they would not be excluded from other markets (such as those for housing, consumer goods, and so on). There was also a certain amount of help available to *provide market access*, whether in the case of housing (low-cost mortgages through CMHC for example) or child care (the Child Care Expense deduction, for example). But labour markets remained key to the distribution of many benefits that, in other countries, were provided by the state. Labour markets, via collective agreements, distributed supplements to basic public pensions, parental leaves, health and dental benefits, and so on, as well as distributing jobs and income.

In many ways, then, the post-war social contract was not that different from the years of neo-liberal dominance in the 1980 and 1990s, when the so-called "return of the market" occurred.¹⁴ The notion of equity was never banished completely, and the belief (although conviction was declining) that markets would distribute sufficient income, absorb all available labour, and guarantee positive outcomes was present in both time periods. What does distinguish the two moments were the definition of *how* equity should be achieved and *who* in the population deserved to be recipients of state spending. There was, in the neo-liberal years, a significant reduction in the willingness to incur costs to achieve better results.

In the later decades, social programs were cut back and clawed back. Instead of being directed to a large number of Canadians, they were targeted such that only those who were considered *truly* to need them would have access. In this way, ideas of universality, and the commitment to equality thereby implied, were removed from the societal paradigm. The safety net became thinner and ragged, such that the holes through which one might fall became larger.

In addition to the values of liberalism and equity, the social knowledge underpinning such program design rested on certain visions of *typical* homes, workplaces, and urban spaces. For the most part, these visions corresponded to the realities of demography, employment, and settlement in the first post-war decades.

14 This similarity is not surprising, given that Canada has been a "liberal welfare state" according to the usual classification system since 1945 and, therefore, one in which the rules of markets have also taken precedence.

Typical homes were composed of two parents, several children and perhaps an elderly relative. The baby boom after World War II meant that many families had three or more children. The divorce rate was low, and births to unmarried women rare (see the Annex, Table 1). Therefore, if 10 percent of families with children were lone-parent ones through the 1940s and 1960s, these families were largely created by death of a spouse rather than by “illegitimate births” or divorce. Moreover, in these homes, the male breadwinner predominated through the 1970s. Women’s labour force participation rates were low, because they tended to stay home to care for their children, the house, and perhaps their elderly kin.

By the 1970s, these patterns were changing, some quickly and some more slowly (as Table 1 documents). Women’s labour force participation and divorce rates were climbing, while fertility was falling. These patterns accelerated into the 1980s and 1990s. However, in the 1940s and then the 1960s and 1970s, when the basic social protection programs were being designed, lone parents were still overwhelmingly widowed wives. Therefore, most provinces designed social assistance benefits with them in mind, and permitted them to substitute child care for employment. Other routes to lone parenthood were assimilated to a model that had been under construction since the time of mothers’ allowances for deserving widows.

From the 1940s to the 1980s, the age structure of the population was one in which youth predominated. The segment of the population that was older than 65 remained below 10 percent. Although it was growing, the increase was slow, rising less than 5 percentage points in the eight decades between 1921 and 1981, and less than 2 percent between 1951 and 1981.¹⁵

However, Canadian women born in the first two decades of the 20th century had unusually high rates of childlessness and low rates of fertility, as well as little labour force participation (Martin-Matthews, 2001: Introduction, p. 3). In addition, this generation was likely to have husbands or sons who died in one of the world wars, and to have been married to men whose life expectancy was considerably shorter than women’s.¹⁶ Therefore, by the 1960s, a social problem had become visible. Elderly women were significantly at risk of poverty in old age. Of course, elderly men were also at risk because private pension plans were by no means universally in place, and even those developed in the post-war years were limited. Nonetheless, the pensioner imagined by those designing the system was very often a woman living alone, and the system met what were considered to be her needs well.¹⁷

Typical patterns of employment also shaped social knowledge and the social programs to which it gave rise. The male breadwinner model was strong, given the low rates of labour force participation by women. But beyond that, the post-war boom created a labour market in which employment provided protection against poverty. Wages were sufficiently high that having a job brought the capacity to support oneself and one’s family.

15 In 1921, 4.8 percent of the population was older than 65.

16 The gap between Canadian women’s and men’s life expectancy is now narrowing but remained large for a number of decades.

17 It is worth noting that, in jurisdictions where pensioners were *imagined* to be retired *male workers*, the programs tended to be designed to provide *replacement* rates and to be based on insurance rather than on public flat-rate entitlements.

Therefore, those at risk of low income were men temporarily without work, that is, those who were unemployed because of job turnover or for structural reasons such as seasonal work. The categories of the population at risk of poverty or low income were those unable to work, because they were disabled or considered otherwise occupied by raising children.

Such patterns of social knowledge led policy intellectuals to design social and employment programs that maintained a clear distinction between being “in” and being “out” of the labour force, and with different programs for each group. The recipient of social assistance imagined by policy communities deploying this social knowledge was a citizen “unable” to seek work, while unemployment insurance was for the rest, including everyone from people fishing seasonally to new mothers and parents. Thus, access to social protection was clearly organized according to one’s relationship to the labour force, while the labour market functioned as the best safety net of all.

Policy communities also deployed particular social knowledge about space. Post-war Canada was urbanizing, as agriculture and other primary production gave up its economic primacy to industry and then services. At the same time, however, suburbanization was relocating much of economic and social life to the edges of major cities. As transportation possibilities shifted with the building of autoroutes and high-speed highways, housing spread over space, creating new demand for services – everything from sewers to schools – in municipalities that had been, until then, rural. The availability of land meant that suburban municipalities were appealing locations for mass production and assembly as well, and therefore they could themselves begin to construct development strategies and plans that competed with those of the traditional cities.

At the time, “space” seemed important primarily in the material sense, that is, as land and for land use, whether for industry, housing or leisure. Social programs concentrated on promoting access to the market for new housing and on filling gaps with social housing. The social dimensions, that is, the synergies of location and proximity attracted less attention. Cultural activities and production in cities – which did attract public support, especially from the federal government – tended to be seen as local manifestations of a pan-Canadian or even cosmopolitan culture, more than expressions of local or spatially anchored culture. The emphasis on the “local” was, in these years, on the “regionalized” cultures of Canada, while the major cities reflected “Canadian culture” in general.¹⁸

All the assumptions and understandings embedded in social knowledge about homes, workplaces and cities (summarized in Box 1) have been called into question in recent years, as we see in Section II. Operation of markets in the face of economic restructuring due to globalization, new technologies, and other factors have all had to be rethought, as labour markets as much as markets for goods and services have been restructured in the last decade. Their capacities and their functioning are no longer the same. Nor are the demographic practices and the role of space the same. Social learning has obviously been taking place in the private and voluntary sectors as much as in the public sector. Nonetheless, challenges remain. The next section explores some of the changes leading to these challenges.

18 Of course, this description needs to be nuanced to take into account differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada but, for the moment, this is not needed.

Box 1
A Schematic Summary of the Social Knowledge
Underpinning the Post-1945 Societal Paradigm

Key Values

- Liberalism and social equity

Key Premises

- Space was defined by national borders, in an international world. Within Canada, the sub-national spaces were provincial or regional, defined constitutionally by the divisions of jurisdictions.
- The public and the private were distinct. The state and the market are autonomous but interdependent. Therefore, the public and private sectors were different, and the public sector supported the private sector.
- Workplace and home were two distinct locales. Therefore, workers arrived at work “unencumbered” by family ties.
- Families were responsible for intergenerational well-being. Therefore, the state would intervene only when there was a “breakdown” of provision.
- The voluntary sector was the helpmate of the state, as needed. Therefore, primary responsibility for setting policy direction came from the state.
- To the extent possible, markets and families would distribute well-being. Therefore, the state’s role was to:
 - Ensure market access to those blocked because of family background or other characteristics, and
 - Support those who were excluded from the market.

Visions of Typical Homes, Workplaces and Cities

Homes

- The typical home contained two parents, several children, perhaps an elderly relative, and a stay-at-home wife.
- The typical home provided its own child care, at least until children were preschool age.
- A few homes contained only one parent, and these were usually widowed or single mothers who deserved social assistance to allow them to care for their children.
- A few homes contained elderly women living alone, and they deserved a pension.

Workplaces

- The typical workplace employed people to work in it and therefore people left home to work.
- The typical workplace was made up of full-time workers who earned enough to keep themselves and their families above the poverty line.
- The typical workplace employed full-time male workers whose wives stayed home to care for children, elderly kin and the house.
- The typical workplace sometimes laid people off and, therefore, they deserved to receive Unemployment Insurance benefits.
- The typical worker was one who was “in work” and, therefore, he or she could be clearly distinguished from those who were “out of work,” those who were “not workers,” students, and so on.

Cities

- Cities were dots on the map of Canada. The most important space was “Canada” because pan-Canadian conditions would determine the well-being of citizens.
- Cities were places where economic activity and family life “happened.” Therefore, they were less important in and of themselves than were either economic activity or family life.
- Cities were surrounded by suburbs, and suburbs were places where much that was new occurred.

III. Trends in Three Domains

In his paper, Meric Gertler (2001) tells us that “neither prosperity nor poverty takes place ‘just anywhere,’” This observation can be extended to the notion that “neither prosperity nor poverty happens to ‘just anyone.’” Where and to whom are the new patterns of work, of demography, and the use of space bringing prosperity? Where and for whom are they a threat to well-being and security, either new or ongoing? This information is needed before we can appreciate the challenges to our paradigm and develop social knowledge appropriate to updating it.

We will look at three places or domains where change is occurring in Canada – the home, the workplace, and the city.¹⁹ Despite the varying details of each of these three places, we observe a commonality – the direction of change is towards increased variety in circumstances and situations.

The Home and Family

As Neena Chappell’s (2001) paper makes clear, the family is a basic social unit and it is in no danger of disappearing as a place for intimacy, child rearing and socialization, and care for those who are dependent. Nonetheless, our homes are changing. In part, such modifications are the result of the tendency for the home to again become a place where paid work occurs. In part, such changes also occur because of alterations to family forms. The occupants of homes are less likely to be the traditional nuclear family or the extended family of the post-war years.

Home is no longer only the supposedly “private space” of unpaid work and informal care that it briefly became over the 20th century. Instead, we find that homes are again becoming workplaces, as the patterns of labour force participation change.²⁰ The picture that emerges from the statistical portrait of those working at home has two faces. One is of young women, perhaps to juggle work and family responsibilities. The other is of older men, who work at home as they prepare to exit the labour force.²¹ In both cases, homes are serving varied and novel functions, and providing their inhabitants with relationships to both work and living space that have not been seen for decades.²²

19 These are three places among several that might have been chosen as entry points to this project. By choosing them, we will not discuss in detail matters relating to rural Canada, for example.

20 In 1996, 6 percent of Canadians usually worked at home, and more than half of these were self-employed. In a survey conducted in 2000, more than two-thirds of self-employed workers reported having a home-based business, and almost four-fifths of the self-employed who worked alone did so from home (Lowe and Schellenberg, 2001: 18). As we will see below, the numbers of self-employed in the labour force is on the rise. Between the 1991 and 1996 censuses, there was a jump of 28 percent. This description of working at home and self-employment is from *The Daily* (Statistics Canada, 1998b). Those working at home but on a farm are excluded from this calculation. With them included, the self-employed make up 8 percent of the working population.

21 Although working at home is still relatively rare, among the women who do it, more than half (54 percent) are aged 25 to 44. Almost half the women working at home were doing so part-time. Among men who work at home, it is those aged 35 to 54 who make up half the group.

22 In earlier centuries, this distinction between workplace and home was much less clear, of course. Artisans, shopkeepers, farmers and agricultural workers, among others, made their living by working in the home, while the family economy depended on the labour of virtually all family members, including children. The creation of factories during industrialization in the 19th century then brought a separation of work and home, although

If all is well, home is a place of security, comfort and familiarity, with a caring commitment, privacy, closeness among members, and shared responsibility.²³ Many types of families might make a home, and demographers tell us that the current situation is one of increasing heterogeneity.

We look first at the homes of those living alone, a category that has been increasing over time.²⁴ The number of one-person households has been rising steadily over the last decades and, in 1996, accounted for one-quarter of all households. Therefore, homes are less often “family homes” than in the past. Of persons living alone, almost two in five were older than 65, and half of those were women. There is a clear downside to this trend toward living alone. Those at greatest risk of finding themselves with housing affordability problems are those who live alone.²⁵ Therefore, the homes that protect us may also make us poorer.

Family homes are also changing. For example, they are more likely to have young adult children still at home. Between 1981 and 1996, the percentage of children aged 15 to 29 living with their parents rose a full 5 percent.²⁶ The reasons for this are complex, but at least in part are related to their lack of capacity to enter and stay in the labour market, as we will see below. The family consequences are not only that they stay in the parental home, but also that they are postponing living as couples and forming their own families, some of the results of which emerge when we examine the reproductive behaviour of young women in this age group.²⁷

The structure of families is also changing. A family may be composed of a single generation (a couple with no children), two generations (the “traditional” nuclear family or a lone parent with children), or several generations (an extended family). It may be composed of same-sex or heterosexual partners. Because of such varied situations – examples of which are familiar to all of us from own experience or by reflection on recent public debates – studies find a significant increase in certain family forms, and the decline of others. Some of these changes in the structure of Canadian families over time are documented in Tables 1 and 2 in the Annex.

There has been a waning of the multigenerational extended family home. In the decade and a half before 1996, the percentage of seniors living in an extended family dropped by more than half. However, this change did not, by any means, reflect a convergence to the traditional nuclear family. Several trends contribute to variation across homes.

the family economy still often depended on several members’ earnings (child labour laws are only 125 years old, at best, in Western Europe), and many women continued to produce their incomes *in the home*. Women took in laundry, cared for (and even nursed) other women’s children, rented rooms, and sewed piece work. At the same time, small shopkeepers and farmers continued to “work at home.” These patterns prevailed well into the 20th century. Therefore, the decades in which home was *not* a place for earning money were few in number indeed. The separation of home and earning applied primarily to the homes of the urban middle and upper classes, and to the situation of adult men. See the classic analysis of Tilly and Scott (1978).

23 This is from Chappell (2001: 5), quoting others.

24 See *The Daily* (Statistics Canada, 1998c), which reports on the 1996 census.

25 They are the largest group in the 26 percent of Canadian households with affordability problems, and the percentage of the group in this situation went up 1 percent a year between 1991 and 1996, from 37 to 42 percent. In other words, more than two of every five one-person households are considered to be paying too much for their housing, and are forced to skimp elsewhere.

26 See *The Daily* (Statistics Canada, 1998c: 4).

27 In 1996, women aged 15 to 19 and 20 to 24 alike made their smallest contribution to the total number of births in the last three decades (Beaujot, 2000: Table 5).

Some families have no children. Reconstituted families create complex and intersecting kinship ties in a home.²⁸ Lone-parent families have both increased in number and become socially legitimate.²⁹ Same-sex families, with or without children, are now formally recognized in Canadian law. Indeed, same-sex couples may now create families through joint adoption.³⁰

Another important change affecting homes and families is that there has been a verticalization of family ties, producing what some people call the “bean pole” family. The typical kinship group in the past consisted of four or five siblings in each generation, and two or three generations of kin. In other words, this meant that children lived with several brothers and sisters, as well as their parents. As the second panel of Table 1 shows, the greatest modifications in family size are the growth of two-person families (linked to both an increase in lone-parent families and a declining birth rate), and the precipitous decline of families composed of five or more persons.

Two big demographic changes have stretched and narrowed the kinship structure, with consequences for patterns of informal caring across generations, and the distribution of wealth and well-being. These are the fertility and life expectancy rates, and they work together to structure the Canadian population.

The currently quite low fertility rate means that the number of siblings in a typical family ranges from 0 (that is, there is only one child) to 1, while an extended life expectancy means that many children will know their great-grandparents, and even perhaps their great-great-grandparents.

While life expectancy can vary significantly over relatively short periods of time (Beaujot, 2000: 8-9), we can nonetheless assume that it is now well over 80 for both women and men. Therefore, it would be normal for a child born to a 32-year-old mother today to have a 50-something grandmother, and a great-grandmother in her mid-70s. Not only would a great-great-grandmother in her 90s not be totally unusual, but the newborn could also expect to grow up knowing her grandparents and great-grandparents, but with at most one sibling, and perhaps only one or two cousins (because her mother probably had only one sibling).

28 In 1996, 17 percent of children lived with a lone parent, while 82 percent lived with two parents. Of course, these were not necessarily both their birth parents, since 37 percent of marriages in 1996 were also expected to end in divorce, and many of those would involve families with children (Vanier Institute of the Family, 2001b).

29 In the 1950s, 60 percent of lone parents were widows or widowers. By the 1990s, only one in five lone-parent families were created by the death of a spouse. Divorce, separation and out-of-wedlock childbearing accounted for the vast majority. Families created by teenage “unwed mothers” are relatively few. Every year, 5 percent of teenage girls become pregnant and about half of those carry to term. See Vanier Institute of the Family (2001b). However, births to non-married women have shot up, from 4 percent in 1941 and 1951, to fully 36 percent of all births in 1996. See Beaujot (2000: Table 4).

30 Debates about the recognition of same-sex families has gone on for several decades, with consequences for societal definitions of this basic social unit as well as social policy. Homosexual couples may now claim spousal benefits. In at least two provinces (Ontario and Nova Scotia), same sex couples may, as a couple, adopt a child. In 2001, Statistics Canada modified the census meaning of *family* by altering the definition of common-law couples to include two persons of the opposite sex or of the same sex who live together as a couple but who are not legally married to each other.

The fertility rate of the 1940s through the 1960s, along with rising life expectancy, explains a second major demographic change we are now seeing – the ageing population. It took eight decades for the percentage of the population over 65 years old to rise even 5 percentage points, and the increase for the first three post-war decades was less than 2 percent. Then, in the three decades from 1991 to 2021, the percentage of seniors in the population is projected to increase by more than 6 points, and there will then be almost as many seniors as children under 18 in the population.³¹ Moreover, the rate of increase is highest among seniors over 85, whose numbers are expected to increase more than four-fold in the next half century.

Beyond work patterns, family structure, and demography, another factor contributes to increased variety among homes and families. This is the *polarization of family incomes* that has taken place. There are emerging trends that profoundly effect who prospers and who is at risk in current economic circumstances.

Beginning at the end of the 1980s, the gap between market incomes of the lowest and highest income earners widened. At first, the final effect of this important change was significantly mitigated by the tax and transfer regime, which kept the differences in disposable income stable. Then, in 1995, inequality started to grow markedly, even in after-tax incomes. The share of total family income after taxes that went to the lowest quintile shrank from 7.6 percent to 7.1 percent between 1989 and 1998, while the wealthiest 20 percent of families increased their income share from 37.0 percent to 39.8 percent. Moreover, what the Vanier Institute of the Family calls the “really bad news” affected the bottom three quintiles, whose after tax incomes all fell over that decade, while the top two quintiles saw their incomes rise (2001a: 8-9).

Family poverty affects some types of families more than others, of course. In 1997, 14 percent of Canadian families were poor but, as Table 2 documents, Canadian families with children are significantly more likely to live in poverty. The level of poverty, as well as this pattern of income insecurity, led UNICEF to locate Canada near the bottom of its ranking of child poverty rates in industrialized countries.³² We will also see below, when we examine the conjunction of poverty and place, that poverty has a clear spatial dimension.

Given such shifting patterns of income distribution, it is not surprising that one way in which divergence among families has *decreased* in the last decades is in their labour force participation rates. The slight increase in family incomes observed over the last few years has been achieved by putting more family members into employment, both adults and young people still at home (Vanier Institute of the Family, 2001a: 2).³³ Whether families have children or not, whether children are in school or not, and whether the family has one or two parents, the differences are not great.

31 The projections are from Health Canada (2000): for the over 65’s, from “Snapshot No. 1” and, for the over 85’s, from “Snapshot No. 2.”

32 Child poverty rates are higher in Canada than in 16 of the 23 richest countries in the world (UNICEF, 2000).

33 As Tables 1 and 3 in the Annex reveal, women’s labour force participation climbed rapidly over the last five decades of the 20th century. Moreover, in families with children, female participation rates are even higher than the overall rate, as the second panel of Table 3 documents.

These changes in family structures and the homes that such families are now creating clearly pose challenges for public policies designed for an earlier era, as well as for Canadians' assumptions about the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. The old patterns have disappeared, replaced by working at home, increasingly varied family experiences, the rise of the one-person household, the decline of the extended family that lives together, adult children living at home, bean-pole families, a rapidly ageing population, and the polarization of income. All these changes send signals that social knowledge – about labour markets and housing markets, about who cares and who provides, about responsibility and solidarity – may have to be reconsidered.

The Workplace and Employment

For at least the last decade, economic gurus, researchers, and policy-makers have homed in on the changes that new technologies and new patterns of global competition are bringing to workplaces. For some, computerization of everything from sales to industrial design has brought a brave new world of creativity and worker involvement. The move towards less rigid models for work and the rise in flexible working schedules and arrangements has also been hailed as the solution to some of the problems raised by changes in families and their behaviour.

The more skeptical see change too, but not necessarily everywhere and for everyone, nor are all such changes positive. When we ask our question of where and for whom “prosperity or poverty happens,” we see that it is not ‘just anyone’ whose work life and situation in general is improved by new technologies or by current employment patterns. As Diane-Gabrielle Tremblay (2001) says, “a diversity of employment situations – good, bad and indifferent – will continue to prevail.” The state of affairs that prevails varies considerably by the gender, ethnicity and age of the employee, by a firm’s strategic choices about work organization and scheduling, and by the environment of public policies.

One form of this diversity is in employment status. The increase in atypical working hours and non-standard employment both move employees away from what had become in earlier decades the “standard” type of work, that is, full-time, full-year and long-term contracts.³⁴ *Self-employment* has gone from 12 percent of total employment in 1976 to 18 percent in 1997.³⁵ Between 1992 and 1996, *part-time jobs* nearly doubled.³⁶ Since then, as the economy has strengthened, more full-time jobs have been generated, but their place in the employment structure only increased marginally from 81 percent of jobs in 1996 to 82 percent in 2000.

Such changes are reinforcing, if not generating, patterns of social inequality in and across workplaces. Differences among categories – between the situations of women and men, as well as between younger and older workers – is a second type of diversity, one that distinguishes *among* Canadian workplaces.

34 Indeed, as these forms of employment proliferate and become more common, innovations in practice make it difficult to distinguish clearly between standard and non-standard statuses (Lowe and Schellenberg, 2001).

35 The majority are “own account” workers, which means they employ no one.

36 In 1998, there were more than twice as many part-time as full-time jobs created (Hadley, 2001: 18).

Young people take longer to make the transition from school to work. Whereas on average in the 1980s, it took six years to go from a first job to the end of schooling, this same transition now takes fully 8 years, with time being added at both ends. Work starts earlier and schooling ends later (Beauvais *et al.*, 2001: 35).

Workplaces are ageing, as young people confront a series of barriers to entry, especially to “good jobs.” The labour force participation rate of youth rose steadily between 1966 and 1989, reaching a peak of 71 percent. However, the youth participation rate has recently dropped dramatically, falling to 63 percent. Analysts attribute about half of the drop in the participation rate to poor employment prospects. One result is that young people can no longer accumulate the work experience that might have helped them obtain more work in the past.³⁷

Moreover, even though the size of the cohort and the participation rate of youth have declined substantially in recent years, the unemployment rate for young people has increased, as has the wage gap between younger and older workers. Finally, young people’s net worth has declined, reflecting high debt loads and little purchasing capacity.³⁸ Today’s young workers are falling well behind their parents’ generation on the earnings and wealth curve, and it is not clear that they will catch up.

The lengthening of the transition from school to work as well as the shape of the labour market have significant consequences for homes and families. Young people stay longer in the parental home, or they may leave it and then return as their capacity to support themselves falls due to unemployment or poor jobs. In addition, as we saw above, young women’s choices about when to have a child, when they are confident that the family can support children, is being put off to a later age.

The *experiences* of women and men in work are also divergent (see Table 4), although their *participation rates* are converging (see Table 3). For example, among the self-employed, women are more likely to be own account workers (three-quarters), while 41 percent of self-employed men are employers. This pattern has significant consequences for their incomes.³⁹ The gender gap in part-time and full-time work is also large and stable.⁴⁰

37 For those aged 17 to 19, the incidence of having no work experience tripled between 1989 and 1998, going from 9 to 27 percent. It also tripled for those aged 20 to 24, rising from 2 to 8 percent. The information in this paragraph is from Beauvais, McKay, and Seddon (2001: 31; 40-41).

38 This is not merely a reflection of location in the lifecycle. It is normal that, on average, young people will have less accumulated wealth than their elders. What matters is the decline over time. The median net worth of households under 25 plunged by 95 percent between 1984 and 1999, and that of households aged 25 to 34 tumbled by one third. This happened at a time when the median income of all households rose by 11 percent. The big gains in wealth went to those between 55 and 64, who saw an increase of 19 percent, and those over 65, whose wealth skyrocketed by more than 50 percent (Vanier Institute of the Family, 2001c). For a discussion of the debt load of young people, see Beauvais, McKay, and Seddon (2001: 40-41; 77; 80).

39 In 1995, over 56 percent of own account workers made less \$20,000 a year, whereas only 31 percent of employers did the same. Almost half (46 percent) of own-account self-employed women work part-time, whereas less than one-fifth (17 percent) of men do so, a factor which no doubts helps to explain why the gender gap in income is greater among self-employed than salaried workers. This information about self-employment is from Hughes (1999).

40 In 1996, 69 percent of part-time workers were female and, in 2000, the statistic was the same. However, within the category, there are significant age differences. Women of childbearing age (25 to 44) *reduced* their rate of part-time employment between 1996 and 2000. These data are from Statistics Canada (2001).

Such patterns caution us to take a more careful look at one of the most important social changes in the workplace in the last three decades, that is, the dramatic increase in women's labour force participation. Many analysts, quite correctly, point to this as a structural change that ranks in importance, for our homes as well as our workplaces, with new technologies.⁴¹ Indeed, the two are not unrelated. Shifts in the service economy, prompted by new technologies, have often meant an increased demand for women workers, as well as job openings that have been filled by women. Thus, labour force participation rates overall have risen slightly, despite the decline in men's participation from 78 percent in 1976 to 73 percent in 2000, precisely because of the increase in women's participation, which has gone from 46 to 60 percent over the same years.⁴²

This said, however, one can by no means conclude that women's labour force experience is the same as men's. Care is needed in interpreting the real consequences for women's incomes, and for their future, as well as for work and workplaces in general. Where women work alongside men in standard jobs and unionized workplaces, the wage gap is relatively small and wages are substantially higher than the average for all women.⁴³ However, not all women are employed in such workplaces. Many work part-time, at home, and are self-employed.

Nor have these structural changes in work brought equality in family responsibilities. Time budgets document that, on average, women spend 2.8 hours per day in paid work and 4.4 hours per day on unpaid work, while men do the opposite at 2.7 hours of unpaid work 4.5 hours of paid work. In 1996, 15 percent of all women aged 25 to 54 were providing care to a child or a dependent relative, while only 9 percent of men were doing the same (Status of Women Canada, 2001). The consequence for workplaces of these patterns of work may be significantly increased stress levels, as parents struggle to balance work and family responsibilities to do the best for their children, while also fulfilling their duty to their employer (Duxbury, Higgins and Associations, 1999).

There are also consequences for workers' health, whether or not they are caring for family members, as work loads become heavier, working hours longer, and the boundaries between working time and non-working time less easy to discern. Restructured labour force participation also has consequences for homes, which may now be offices – a mix of uses that may help to solve certain dilemmas about caring work but may also contribute to levels of stress as parents juggle multiple tasks in a single space.

41 It is worth noting that, despite this increase, Canada does not yet exhibit the reverse-U participation rate that analysts associate with labour force participation that mimics men's. When the reverse-U is in place (as it is in some of the Nordic countries, the United States, Germany and France, for example), women enter the labour force in their 20s and stay in until retirement age. In Canada, the participation rates are high in the age cohorts 25 to 34, but then they tail off (Jenson and Jacobzone, 2000: 57-64). This helps to explain the fact the income gap is greatest between women and men aged 45 to 64, where women's income is only 51 percent that of men in the same age group (Hadley, 2001: 14).

42 The decline in male participation rates has "been greatly influenced by the downward trend in the age of retirement." Close to age 65, until the early 1980s, it has steadily declined and reached 61.3 in 1997 (Sunter, 2001).

43 In such circumstances, women earn 82 percent of the salary their male co-workers do, and have access to many of the benefit packages that bring parental and family leave, good pensions, and so on (Hadley, 2001: 17). Overall, however, the gender wage gap remains 61 percent.

A second key change in workplaces is the attention to new management practices and the creation of learning organizations. Such practices are significantly altering the hierarchical structures of employment in some workplaces. Therefore, heterogeneity is entering the system, albeit by no means as quickly or as widely as certain gurus predicted.⁴⁴

Government bureaucracies are being redesigned to break down hierarchical structures of chains of command and to become more effective, as well as more appealing to knowledge workers who might otherwise be tempted to seek employment elsewhere. At the same time, however, work is also intensifying, as the actual technique most often used to revamp public workplaces is downsizing (Verma and Lonti, 2001).

However, challenges are also evident. Not all workers are able or wish to consecrate their lives to the firm. Most seek to balance work with family and other responsibilities in life, such as citizenship or health and so on. Not all workers can check their family responsibilities at the door. The myth of the “unencumbered worker” has been revealed to be just that, a myth.

As firms were challenged to better understand how “work happens,” especially how innovation happens, they have been simultaneously challenged to better understand and help manage the interconnections across all dimensions of their employees’ lives. As firms (and governments) have been challenged to better understand how “learning happens,” they have been simultaneously challenged to better understand and help foster learning, well before workers appear at the door of the office or on the floor of the shop. They have had to ask what responsibility they share with parents for ensuring positive child rearing and preparation for life-long learning. Homes and workplaces are thus even more tightly interconnected.

Cities and Urban Life

The third space examined in detail in this *Futures Forum* is that of cities. As Meric Gertler’s (2001) paper documents, cities are absolutely key to economic well-being, as globalization and new technologies give new meaning to proximity and the social learning that it can bring. Cities are the places where most homes and workplaces are located.⁴⁵ Yet initial analysis of globalization’s effects led some people to predict the end of the city or the irrelevance of “distance” when communications made “virtual” work, life, commerce and learning so easy. Without denying the existence and structuring effects of such processes, we also observe that cities have become more, and not less, important as places for production, distribution, innovation and, therefore, for discovering the bases for social cohesion into the future. This marks, in some ways, the “return of the local.”

44 Briefly put, studies of workplace relations have found that, despite a high level of continuity, one in three Canadian firms had adopted either a “participation-based model” of human resource management (18 percent) or a “compensation-based model” (12 percent). Moreover, studies consistently find that workers appreciate work situations which allow participation, commitment and communication. The data reported by Tremblay are drawn from Betcherman *et al.* (1994) and Lowe and Schellenberg (2001).

45 In 1996, 78 percent of the Canadian population lived in “urban areas,” defined by the census and Statistics Canada as a community with at least a population of 1,000 and a density of 400 persons per square kilometre. Using a definition that corresponds somewhat better to everyday notions of “urban,” 62 percent live in the 25 city-regions that have populations greater than 100,000.

The globalization of the last two decades has also relocated the production of goods to the edges of cities, if not abroad. Nonetheless, the foundations of economic success in globalization remain the capacity to capitalize on and seize the advantages of the three flows analyzed by Gertler, those of capital, people and ideas. Canadian cities are the places where most of the forces of globalization come together, as well as being the places in which threats to several of the dimensions of social cohesion are located. Feelings of belonging, therefore, need to be cultivated, as do guarantees of social inclusion, the capacity to participate, and the recognition of each group's contribution to well-being.⁴⁶ With attention to these dimensions, cities can become generators of social and economic well-being as well as prosperity.

Flows of people are making Canadian cities increasingly socially and culturally diverse. Many of these people are economic immigrants (that is, skilled workers and entrepreneurs), fully 77 percent of whom went to the three cities of Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal. Overall, immigration and settlement patterns in these and other Canadian cities and suburbs have created social and cultural diversity in residential patterns. Rather than concentrating in space so that immigrants of the same national origin congregate together and in isolation from other immigrants, the flows of people into Canadian cities, along with residential mixing, have created what has been described as "cosmopolitan landscapes and widespread multiethnic neighbourhoods" (Ley and Germain, 2000, quoted in Gertler).

The other major flow of people, one that is remaking many cities in Western Canada, is created by large numbers of Aboriginal people moving into cities. Many come for schooling and in search of work, others to escape difficulties on their often rural reserves. Such flows raise significant challenges for thinking about governance. How can individuals maintain their ties to their home communities? How can they sustain their cultural knowledge and values in urban settings?

Flows of capital are also complex, such that it is difficult to say precisely whether there is a net loss to a region such as Toronto due to NAFTA and other processes of globalization, or whether the region is holding its own in the face of greater mobility of capital. When the third flow – that of ideas – is considered, it provides some of the reasons why Canadian cities might dream of being successful competitors in the era of globalization. Ideas are key to innovation. They develop and bloom in situations of contact, where social learning can be maximized and social capital used to advantage. Therefore, talent must be attracted.

Studies of flows of people have mapped the poles of attraction and found them to be places that offer a richness of opportunity, a high quality of life, and social and cultural diversity – that is, low barriers to entry for newcomers (Florida and Gates, 2001). In other words, there must be dynamic firms and other employers in place; the built and natural environment must be attractive; cultural institutions, including schools, must be excellent; and there must be safety. It is the concentration in space of collective amenities, as much if not more than individual circumstances (such as levels of after-tax income), that structure the flows of people, and the ideas which swirl about with them, as well as their capacity to generate capital.

46 These are four of the five dimensions of social cohesion identified in, *inter alia*, Jenson (1998: 15).

Such analyses of flows help us to understand the importance of place for social and economic outcomes. This knowledge first emerged from attention to factories in innovative regional economies. Early work on restructuring workplaces recognized that workers had immense amounts of tacit knowledge that was going to waste when they were forced to perform routine tasks, whether on assembly lines or in offices. Long-time experience with releasing skills and knowledge was fingered as the primary reason for economic booms in “the third Italy” and in certain other regions of the European Union (Piore and Sabel, 1984). The discovery was that regional concentrations of workers in small businesses who were interfacing with larger firms could generate regional growth that far outstripped the norm.

Management practices that had been originally developed to profit from workers’ tacit knowledge on the shop floor were then applied to knowledge workers and next to the decision-making structures of groups of firms. With this thinking about social learning and knowledge in workplaces, the importance of place became very visible. Shop-floor workers who could take over greater responsibility for organizing the workplace could do so because they had gained experience over time, not only in doing their own job but also in observing the production process close-up while standing next to their work mates. This in-depth knowledge acquired in a particular place could be put to use for innovation in that workplace. Observations of social learning in factories was then applied to the examination of regional concentrations of other economic activities, whether in Silicon Valley or in Europe.

Ultimately, such arguments, first applied to industrial production, have been extended to encompass almost all types of organizations which seek to profit from “social learning” in order to unleash innovation. Firms and employees were identified as more capable of social learning when they were spatially proximate. In other words, city-regions seek to become places for proximity and clustering innovation.

But while all these synergies are possible, and a virtual circle of attraction and retention can be constructed, there are also danger points. For example, diversity is a factor not so much in and of itself, but because of the openness to difference that may be fostered. If, however, those who are “different” are poor, struggling to avoid homelessness, and at risk of turning to crime, then the “diversity advantage” is not great. Indeed, careful studies of urban spaces have uncovered spaces of hardship, in which problems accumulate on top of each other. Poverty, lone-parent families, crime, and school failure are tending to concentrate more tightly in some neighbourhoods, just as individuals tend to accumulate multiple disadvantages in their own lives. This is the downside of spatial concentration, and social knowledge is needed to think how to unravel the tangled skein of disadvantage.

IV. Challenges and Options: What is the Room for Maneuver?

The overview just completed provides a shared evidence base for thinking about the future. Box 2 is a summary of both the *patterns of variation* that have taken hold in the three locations and lists some of the *challenges* that have been identified.

Box 2
Patterns of Structural Change: New Challenges

- ◆ **Homes** have become more varied, with:
 - Homes becoming workplaces for many Canadians
 - A wider range of socially accepted family structures
 - Growing numbers of one-person households, and
 - Growing income inequality.

- ◆ **Homes** face new challenges, as:
 - “Bean-pole families” emerge with stretched and narrowed kinship ties and fewer family members available to care for dependent kin.
 - Families must dedicate more time to earning income, whether by working outside the home or in it. Less time is available for family responsibilities.
 - One-person households, renting families, and others have difficulty meeting their housing costs.
 - Young people stay with their parents longer and are significantly later in establishing their own homes, couples, and families.

- ❖ **Workplaces** have become more varied, with:
 - The increase in non-standard work, often accompanied by low incomes
 - The low earning capacities of categories of workers, such as young people and women, and
 - A range of new management strategies, including those that restructure and flatten hierarchies of authority.

- ❖ **Workplaces** face new challenges, as:
 - Some non-standard workers cannot earn enough to stay out of poverty or to establish families, have children, buy homes and save for the future.
 - Workers’ stress levels climb as they strive to balance work and family responsibilities, and experience challenges to their own health.
 - Employers and employees seek to foster learning organizations and make use of employees’ knowledge.

- **Cities** have become more varied, with:
 - Flows of immigrants into urban areas, and cosmopolitan and multi-ethnic settlement patterns
 - The emergence of a variety of cultural expressions in the arts and service sectors, and
 - Spatial concentration of insecurity and the absence of well-being.

- **Cities** face new challenges, as:
 - New immigrant populations encounter barriers to economic and social integration
 - Greater social and economic distance emerges as incomes polarize, and
 - Globalization and regional trading agreements cause capital to flow out perhaps as much as to flow in.

The social structural patterns described in Section II are important to understand. But knowing that something *has happened* does not tell us what it *means*. There are no obvious, taken-for-granted policy conclusions to draw from such observations, nor from the new patterns of demography, income distribution, employment, and innovation. Nothing in any policy or plan of action is automatically determined by the fact that heterogeneity is on the increase in homes, workplaces and cities.

These new patterns show that social, economic, and spatial structures are changing. But structural changes are no more than a base point, from which to identify the room for maneuver for the future and from which to make choices. They do create constraints, of course, and they are challenges. But they also open opportunities, for doing things better and more fairly, for achieving more, and so on.

Some patterns of structural change are *challenges* for the future because they cannot be incorporated into the paradigm that shaped our thinking about homes, workplaces and cities in earlier decades. Therefore, we do not have the social knowledge that would allow us to address these challenges with high hopes of success.

What initially began, for example, as a *puzzle* about whether to provide for all lone parents with policies developed for *small numbers* of widows, eventually led to a need for major rethinking, as it became clear that the numbers of lone parents were climbing and that social assistance policy was actually building a welfare wall that discouraged them from making a transition into the labour force. But such observations never led automatically to the identification of a policy response. Was the best idea to threaten them into employment by cutting off their social assistance benefits after five years, as the United States chose to do? Or was it to develop self-sufficiency programs to help them over the hump of the first job, as the Social Research and Demonstration Corporation, Human Resources Development Canada, and some provinces have tried? Or was it to introduce transition benefits and services, and thereby remove the disincentives to take low-paying work, as much of the reinvestment undertaken under the National Child Benefit does? Or was it to focus on their children's human capital? Or what?

While it was clear that the notion embedded in the post-war societal paradigm – that child rearing could substitute for labour force participation – was abandoned a while ago, no adequate social knowledge has replaced it. I will argue here that part of the reason it has been so difficult to identify alternatives is because we have tended to hold on to the key premises of the earlier paradigm and have attempted to work on the margins by adjusting policy. The new information continued to be treated as a puzzle to be solved, rather than recognizing the need for an alternative paradigm with clearly defined values and appropriate premises. There is now, however, a large gap between current realities and the visions of typical homes, workplaces, and urban spaces as they were.

My proposition is that we now have to move beyond puzzling in policy behaviour. By directly considering the key premises and their fit (or lack of fit) with the new structural circumstances, it will be possible to find the route into the future.

There is a good deal of information about the present, about the practices already occurring in homes, workplaces and cities. We know that we need to engage in social learning and update our social knowledge. Doing so requires a good fit between premises and visions, ensuring that they are well founded on good observations of the present. It also requires an understanding of the places where adaptations are occurring, places where they might occur, and places that are still blind spots.

To provide some order in this process for purposes of discussion, I will take another look at the categories used in Section I and Box 1, speculating on the range of possible future responses. For the moment, I will not question the assumption that, for the majority, Canadian *values* remain a combination of liberalism and social equity. There is, as yet, no reason to alter this assumption. Data about values confirm it, policy still seems to reflect it, and most political leaders (and most certainly the Prime Minister) affirm it.

This said, however, the *key premises* that follow from this combination of values have been challenged by structural changes. In particular, it is no longer possible to sustain the following as premises for social knowledge:

- That the public and private realms can proceed as if they are distinct
- That markets and families will successfully and sufficiently distribute well-being, including intergenerational well-being, with the state stepping in only to provide a safety net, and
- That national borders alone capture the most important spaces of economic, social, and political life.

Therefore, we might well ask and speculate about the range of possible replacement premises. Such premises will never reflect the “absolute truth,” of course. They will never cover all circumstances. However, they are worth examining because each alternative chosen will serve as a *norm*, a vision of the normal. As a premise, it will become a guide for policy choices.

Choices, of course, can be passive or active. The state and employers, for example, could be passive and wait for families to make choices in response to their own needs and the pressures they face. Or, they could more actively identify and structure options that have societal benefits, allowing families and communities to select those that best fit their situations. Choices about public policy create and limit options for private choices, just as those made in private action may create new needs or reduce the need for public policy.

The range of possible choices is long, and there are numerous versions and possibilities. For purposes of discussion here, however, the rest of the paper will consider four sets of choices. While they are presented here as stark contrasts, the reality of the situations in which such choices are made is that there is often an effort to balance the two ends of the continuum. Nonetheless, it is useful for purposes of comparison to treat them as sharp alternatives.

The four sets of choices presented here are:

- Work-life balance *or* life is only at work.
- Sharing responsibility with families *or* back to the family.
- Life “without work” is valuable *or* everybody must work.
- Acting as if “space matters.”

Work-Life Balance *or* Life is Only at Work

Social structural changes and behaviours in homes and workplaces mean that employers can no longer assume that employees arrive at the workplace “unencumbered.” Neither employers nor employees can count on having an adult at home with time available to provide care for young children and elderly kin, as well as to care for the house and maintain a rich tissue of connections with neighbours and friends.

The distinction between the “private” world of home and the “public” world of work has broken down in several ways:

- Homes are becoming workplaces.
- Many women have entered the workforce but still have responsibility for care.
- Stress about balancing work and other dimensions of life is undermining employees’ health and happiness.
- The time crunch is endemic – for parents and children; for people who must hold several jobs to make ends meet; for young people who must attend school and work; and for those who must commute hours every day in order to have affordable housing.

This blurring of the distinction between the world of work and the rest of life is one of the most challenging areas for policy-makers because it involves a big shift in thinking. Can employers accept a new premise that ensuring well-being in an employee’s extra-work situations – whether family, health, or citizenship-related – is in part the employers’ responsibility? Once such a shift in thinking were made, there would be plenty of room for imagining new and innovative solutions, as those few employers who have made the plunge have discovered. There is room to do more than simply provide new collective benefits, although they still remain necessary. There is also a need to adjust ways of working, as well as the hours and locations of work, so employees can bring all parts of their lives into balance.

Currently, many employers are beginning to provide policies that allow workers to create a better work-life balance. If such adjustments often began out of concern for employees’ care responsibilities for other family members, it has become much more than that. Now employers and employees also seek healthy workplaces and a better balance between paid employment and unpaid activities such as volunteerism and political activity. There is a need for a better work-life balance for everyone.

However, employers and employees *might* respond to the new circumstances differently. Indeed, we already see the beginnings of such responses in the climbing hours of work. This alternative vision is simply that employees must demonstrate their loyalty to the firm by spending long hours and almost all their energy on the job.

In exchange, some earn high salaries. This allows them to purchase many services from others, such as domestic services (housekeepers), food preparation (restaurants), child care (nannies), and so on. In other cases, such as in the high technology field, for example, work life simply absorbs private life. There are reports about working conditions in some firms that cocoon their employees with meals and informality in the workplace so they have little desire – or time – to “go home.” In other words, employers seek employees who satisfy all almost all their needs for sociability in the workplace and, in exchange, make few claims for attention to their non-work lives, such as time for family, children, or leisure.

Consequences: Of course, choosing to encourage such a workplace-centred culture would have consequences beyond the individual firms, just as would the efforts to seek work-life balance. Some likely effects would be observed in the following ways:

- In labour markets for domestic service workers, child-minders, indeed all kinds of services. Will demand increase sharply and a return of a “servant class” occur or will people provide for more of their own needs?
- In gender relations and family formation. Will child rearing become easier to combine with employment or will childbearing be shelved in favour of work, and therefore the birth rate will fall even more?
- In communities. Will available time for voluntary work increase or shrivel up?
- In pension and disability schemes and the distribution of the costs of these. Who will pay for burnout? Who will absorb the costs of reducing working time?

Therefore, the future shape of homes, workplaces and urban spaces, as well as public finances, will depend on which of these alternatives prevails as a *premise*. The model for how the future will be organized will be different if we choose the norm of work-life balance versus the norm that life is only at work.

Sharing Responsibility with Families *or* Back to the Family

The post-war vision of the typical home and family structure has been faulty for some time. Given all we have seen about changing family and workplace structures, as well as about income distribution, access to housing, and so on, the premise that families are solely responsible for intergenerational well-being needs some serious scrutiny. Do families have all the necessary resources to raise their children, to care for vulnerable family members, and to ready children for labour market participation and the school-work transition? There are alternative positions at all these questions, and the ones that are chosen by families, governments, employers and communities will shape the patterns of intergenerational well-being differently.

With respect to *families with young children*, some governments are inching towards the position that intergenerational equity is a responsibility they share with families. If families will always have the primary responsibility for fostering well-being, governments also must act. Given the modifications in labour markets and workplaces already described, public policy-makers are shelving the belief that parents have the time or the resources to provide for all their young children's developmental needs. This has led to the notion that the state's role should be proactive and not simply reactive to family "failure." Investments in children are increasingly talked about as way of expressing this shared involvement. Early childhood education and other developmental initiatives, support for parenting and parenting time, quality child care, and so on all fall under this rubric.

Yet, there is another choice. Selecting it would redistribute resources of money (by tax cuts or parenting grants, for example) and time (by, for example, extended parenting leaves or tax breaks for one-income families) to allow families to reassert their exclusive role in child-rearing. This position is also popular among some families and governments who feel that families, because of the need for both parents to work, are losing their capacity to provide their own care and invest their own time in their children.

With respect to *families providing care for vulnerable and dependent adult kin*, Canadian governments have not moved significantly away from the older vision of the typical family, and have maintained their assumption that families will provide care. Therefore, as the population ages and family structures narrow intergenerationally, pressures on people with dependent relatives have increased. Women have been particularly affected. They are sometimes women caught in the "sandwich" between child care and elder care, and sometimes elderly women and men are called upon in their retirement years to suddenly provide substantial amounts of nursing and home care to even older relatives or to a frail spouse.

A third area in which matters of intergenerational equity have arisen is with respect to launching children into adult life. Families and young adults themselves have been assigned greater responsibility for paying for university education and gaining access to housing. Here, the back to the family movement is strong, as tuition has increased significantly and as access to affordable housing has declined dramatically.

Consequences: It is clear that labour markets alone will not sustain the vision of the typical home with a stay-at-home parent or caregiver. A single income is rarely sufficient to meet the needs of families. Patterns of inequality in the present and the future are deepening. Therefore, what might be the consequences of choosing either shared responsibility or pushing back to the family?

- There will be consequences for labour supply. In recent years, the greatest demand for labour has been in areas and forms of work that have been traditionally filled by women. If this source were to dry up, there might be labour shortages.

- There will be consequences for gender equity. Although men are more involved in parenting than in the past and they often have responsibility for elderly kin, it remains the case that women and men do not equally share caring tasks with the immediate and extended family. Therefore, when governments accept that they share responsibility for intergenerational well-being with families and put into place programs for quality child and home care, the indirect effect is to allow women to take paid jobs and gain some measure of economic independence. They are not forced to choose between providing good care and earning their way. A return-to-the-family strategy, in contrast, is likely to reinforce women's economic dependence in some cases, or force them to choose between having children and having a career, or between caring for parents and paying into their own pension plan.
- There will be consequences for pension programs in the future. If workers are encouraged to withdraw from the labour force in whole or in part to provide care in the present, longer-term consequences will arise (which are near-future consequences in the case of late middle-age workers withdrawing to care for elderly kin). Reduced contributions will affect the sustainability of pension regimes, as well as patterns of poverty.
- There will be consequences for the labour force of the future. A commitment to shared responsibility has been expressed in the form of public investments in early childhood education to foster development and school success, beyond what parents already provide. Reinforcing family responsibility leaves the future in the hands of current families.
- There will be consequences for the distribution of wealth and resources, if the resources of the family of origin become the major factor affecting young people's access to higher education and the housing market. Sharing responsibility with families would imply levelling the effects of original endowments via public investment in education and affordable housing.

In the future, homes, workplaces and urban spaces as well as public finances will depend on whether we treat intergenerational equity as a shared public, community and family responsibility, or whether the *premise* is that all such responsibility should be given back to the family.

Life “Without Work” is Valuable *or* Everybody Must Work

The boundaries between working life and life “without work” are blurring in at least two ways that deserve mention. Youth “transitions” are less smooth and less coordinated than in the past, and the process of “retiring” from employment is also extended and complicated.

In earlier decades, young people made a transition from school to work that was relatively short and that implied the conjunction of a set of changes and life circumstances that occurred simultaneously. School came to an end, a job was found, one left the parental home and soon started a family. As we saw in Part II, this pattern of simultaneous transitions no longer holds, and even the notion of “transition” can be questioned. Young people come and go from the parental home, live with room mates, live as “temporary couples” that may or may not become permanent, and so on.

At the same time, they start work now at a younger age than previously, taking up part-time jobs while still in school. This shift often involves a response to wage structures, so that families must mobilize more labour in order to generate sufficient income. One result is that young people are often doing a job and a half – in full-time schooling and working a significant number of hours in paid employment.

At the other end of the life cycle, there have also been significant changes. On one hand, employers and sometimes governments have solved their problems by reducing their wage bills. This has frequently meant encouraging early retirement. Of course, alternative responses, in the face of high costs for pensions, have been to encourage a later age for retirement.

At the same time, demographic changes and the extension of life expectancy has meant that “retirement” is likely to be a long period of one’s life. Even if one retires at 67, there are many years ahead “without work,” while for those retiring at 55, there are several decades.

One question that arises is how to treat this period of life “without work.” Is it to be reduced, as it has been for young people and for many older workers encouraged to stay in the labour force? Or is it to be valued, such that there are institutions available and expectations developed about the possibilities of being without paid work, while still participating in other ways.

Consequences: The choices made about whether to value life without work will have a number of consequences.

- If young people continue their early participation in the labour force, there will be consequences for the way we think about school and schooling. The notion that high school or university is a “full-time” occupation may have to give way. How should education be designed?
- If access to schooling that is not combined with employment is only available to those young people whose families do not need their contribution to the family income, there will be consequences for equitable access to recreation and other extra-curricular activities. Will less well-off young people suffer more from time crunch and develop less healthy life-styles?
- Given the importance attributed to recreation and extra-curricular activities, including volunteering, in building citizenship, there may be consequences for citizenship capacity in the next generation. Will young people learn to engage?
- If older people have longer retirement lives, there will be consequences for the voluntary sector. More volunteering hours may be available. However, voluntary work may become a “job ghetto” for seniors and there may be disengagement by other age groups. How can their contributions be recognized and encouraged, without leaving all the responsibility for volunteering to seniors?
- If people are living longer and healthier lives and not constrained by the need for a job, there will be consequences for living arrangements, whether in age-specific retirement communities or in certain regions of the country. What kinds of communities will maximize well-being, not only of seniors but also of the larger society?

Acting as if “Space Matters”

There is really only one alternative here. Policies always have spatial effects. The issue is whether and how we recognize them, treat them as spatial, and do so in ways that achieve the desired ends.

One of the most significant challenges to the vision of the typical city embedded in the post-war societal paradigm has been the knowledge accumulating about the community effects of both disadvantage and innovation. In particular, communities of disadvantage can arise that make it more difficult to move forward, even from a position of relative advantage. Poor people live in poor neighbourhoods with poor access to recreation and poor quality schools. Poverty builds on poverty, in more than an additive way.

At the same time, communities of advantage can help spring those at risk into a better life and turn urban areas into global cities. Environments that cluster networks and respect social and cultural diversity may generate social learning and innovation at an exponential, and not simply a linear, rate.

In the post-war societal paradigm, there was ambivalence about space. National boundaries and internal borders of advantage and disadvantage received a lot of attention. Policy-makers sought to foster a pan-Canadian identity and they worked to ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth and access to services across the country via social policy, regional development strategies, equalization payments, and so on.

However, beyond that, the paradigm was often “locationless.” Criteria other than space were important. Most important to the provinces was the Constitution that defined their powers. While there was some concern to protect linguistic or ethnic or national communities, these too were not defined in spatial terms. Culture gave them their form. Therefore, the contribution of physical location, and of concentrations of populations in particular places, faded into the background of policy attention, except for regional disparities.

It is ironic then, that it is globalization – with its emphasis on virtual communication and invisible flows – that has also made us sensitive to the importance of the local and the fact that *where* things are located matters. The big processes of globalization have helped uncover the fact that neither prosperity nor poverty takes place “just anywhere.” That space has a dynamic of its own, which could be incorporated into policy thinking. Or we could choose simply to continue treating cities as places where “things happen,” refusing to understand the interconnectedness of social advantage – and disadvantage.

Consequences: Cities prosper by being connected to the global economy and having the transportation, communication and financial links that allow their residents to participate fully in that economy. But we also know that the greatest innovators are those with personal networks of knowledge and recognition, and the healthiest cities are those that have a supportive and active community life. Therefore, although this section argues that there is really no choice but to act as if space matters, there are still alternative ways of making sure that happens.

As a result, there are consequences to be assessed:

For choices we make about how much to spend on physical infrastructure. It can function so that people can move around the city, having access to its cultural and recreational amenities and in order to get to work. Or it can make mobility within the urban area tremendously time-consuming, if not impossible. The absence of public transportation makes many jobs inaccessible to people who do not own cars, while long and frustrating commutes generate unhealthy stress, slice into parenting time, and eat up hours that might have gone to recreation or citizen engagement.

- For choices we make about how much to invest in public services. Rich possibilities for recreation, education, and cultural activities turn urban regions into magnets. There are choices to be made about whether to ensure that such activities become available by spending and investing public funds, by leaving their development to private initiative, or by fostering a mixed responsibility.
- For decisions we take about land use and housing. Urban populations are always diverse, socially and culturally. They may, however, be quite culturally homogenous in their living arrangements, with ethnocultural and socioeconomic groups clustered tightly together and isolated from others. Or neighbourhoods may be mixed, both socioeconomically and culturally. Land use and housing have consequences for which outcome occurs.
- For ideas we generate for redesigning governance. Current divisions of political authority were intended for a rural society in which some powers were devolved to local authorities for administrative reasons. In the 21st century, some Canadian cities have budgets and resources larger than some provinces, and the future well-being of the whole country depends on them working well. Yet, their hands are still tied by 19th century governance and being the “children” of their provinces. For their part, as well, the provincial and federal governments need to work out ways of cooperating in urban spaces over which they have joint responsibility. Only hard thinking about real choices will enable all governments to accomplish their work.
- For the commitments we make to enabling democracy. Democratically elected municipal authorities do not have the political space to carry through on pledges made to their voters. Beyond that, the democracy in communities needs to be taken into account in the design of everything from citizen involvement in community development projects to the scale of municipal governments and the size of electoral ridings. Even beyond these obvious governmental institutions, there is a need for attention to the consequences – positive or negative – for citizens’ capacity for involvement in the design of new communities (are there public spaces and locations to meet, for example?), transportation (will there be any time left for meetings?), and building (can schools, for example, have multiple uses?).

In the future, the shape of homes, workplaces and urban spaces, as well as public finances, will depend on whether there is a *premise* underlying policy choices that space matters.

Such observations of the importance of place, and the fact that communities live in space may inch Canadians toward thinking again about the particular ways that they want to combine the two underlying values, those of liberalism and social equity. If we observe that, important as they are, individuals are not the only social units, and that the conditions of communities also affect the distribution of well-being, there may be a need for more attention to the social as a grounding for economic well-being than there has been in the years of the collapsing paradigm. With such knowledge, then, perhaps the rebuilding can begin anew. Via a process of social learning, we can answer the call for a different vision of our own roles and responsibilities.

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Annex – Reference Tables

Table 1
Patterns of Structural Change over Time

Indicator	Year						
	1941	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	1996
Total fertility rate ¹	2.8	3.5	3.8	2.1	1.7	1.7	1.6
Divorces per 100,000 married couples ¹	-	180	180	600	1180	1235	1222
Births to non-married women, as a percent of all births ¹	4.0	3.8	4.5	9.0	16.7	28.6	36.3
Lone-parent families, as a percent of all families with children ¹	9.8	9.8	11.4	13.2	16.6	20.0	22.3
Women's labour force participation, as a percent of women over 15 ²	20.7	24.1	29.5	38.7	51.9	58.4	57.6
Population over 65 as a percent of total population ³	6.7	7.8	7.6	8.0	9.6	11.4	12.1
Population over 85 as a percent of the population over 65 ³	4.7	4.8	5.8	7.9	8.2	9.8	10.4
Persons over 65 living with their extended family, as a percent of those over 65 ³	-	-	-	16	11	8	7
Persons over 65 living alone, as a percent of those over 65 ³	-	-	12.4	18.3	26	28.2	27.3
Urban population	54.3	61.6	69.6	76.0	75.7	76.6	77.9

Notes: 1 Beaujot (2000: Table 4).
2 Statistics Canada (1999).
3 Health Canada (2000).

Table 2
Family Structure over Time

Statistics Canada defines a family as:

A now-married couple (with or without never-married sons or daughters of either spouse), a couple living in a common law relationship (with or without never-married sons or daughters of either spouse), or a lone parent of any marital status, with at least one never-married child living in the same dwelling.

Indicator	Percent, by Year			
	1971	1981	1991	1996
Total number of families: ¹	5.0 million	6.3 million	7.4 million	7.8 million
• Married couple families, as a percent of all families	91*	83	77	74
• Common-law families, as a percent of all families	*	6	10	12
• Lone parent families, as a percent of all families	9	11	13	15
Size of families: ²				
• 2 persons, as a percent of all families	31	38	43	43
• 3 persons, as a percent of all families	21	22	23	23
• 4 persons, as a percent of all families	21	24	23	23
• 5 or more persons, as a percent of all families	27	16	11	11

Notes: 1 Statistics Canada (1994).

2 Statistics Canada (1998a).

* Prior to 1981, common-law families were included in the same category as married-couple families.

Table 3
Patterns of Family and Child Poverty, 1997

Description	Magnitude (%)
Percent of Canadian families that are poor	14
• Percent of elderly families that are poor	7
• Percent of families with no children at home that are poor	11
• Percent of couples with children at home that are poor	12
• Percent of male lone-parent families that are poor	24
• Percent female lone-parent families that are poor	56
Percent of Canadian children that live in poor families	20
• Percent of these that live with a lone mother	40
• Percent of these that live with two parents	54

Source: Vanier Institute of the Family (2001b).

Table 4
Labour Force Participation Patterns

Table 4a
Labour Force Participation, by Sex

Year	Labour Force Participation, by Sex (%)		
	Women	Men	Both Sexes
1976	47.7	77.6	61.5
1980	50.4	78.3	64.2
1990	58.5	76.1	67.1
2000	59.5	72.5	65.9

Source: Statistics Canada (1999).

Table 4b
Labour Force Participation of Parents with Children under Age 15

	Percent in Labour Force
Lone-parent fathers	85
Lone-parent mothers, with preschool children	55
Lone-parent mothers, with school-age children	75
Men in couples	94
Wives, with preschool children	69
Wives, with school-age children	79

Source: Vanier Institute of the Family (2000: 87).

Table 5
Some Gender Patterns in Work and Workplaces

Table 5a
Type of Employment, by Sex

	Percent	
	Women	Men
<i>Non-standard</i> employment arrangement – 1999	41	29
<i>Non-standard</i> employment arrangement – 1989	35	-
<i>Part-time</i> employment (working less than 30 hours per week) – 1999	28	10
<i>Self-employed</i> – 1999	13	20
<i>Self-employed</i> – 1990	10	17

Source: Statistics Canada (2001).

Table 5b
Part-time Work and Benefits, by Sex

	Percent	
	Women	Men
Share of <i>part-time</i> employment – 2000 ¹	69	31
Share of regular <i>Employment Insurance</i> benefits	40	60
Share of <i>parental benefits</i> under <i>Employment Insurance</i>	98	2

Notes: 1 Status of Women Canada (2001).

Source: Statistics Canada (2001).

CPRN Funding Sources

Core Funders

Canadian International Development Agency
Citizenship and Immigration
Fisheries and Oceans
Health Canada
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