

Social Citizenship in 21st Century Canada: Challenges and Options

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I am very pleased to be here this evening at the University of Saskatchewan and to speak at a lecture series that bears the name of Mabel Timlin. As a woman and an academic I am proud of those who went before, who struggled to break down the barriers to inclusion of women in academe. She was a fine scholar and a beloved teacher and colleague, a fact to which you testify each time you honour her name with this lecture.

But I am also pleased to be here at the University of Saskatchewan for another reason. It is an institution with a long and noble history not only of academic excellence but also connection to the communities in which it lives. As you all know, the university was established almost simultaneously with the founding of the province, and from the beginning its academic leadership sought ways to develop ties and relevance for the farming communities among which it lived.¹ As someone who teaches, but also works directly in the world of “policy wonks”, through my job with the Canadian Policy Research Networks, Inc., I recognise the difficulty of bridging the two communities. It is hard to get academics to speak to those beyond the “ivory tower”, at the same time that it is absolutely crucial that the ivory tower exist. It is hard to convince non-academics to accept the importance of theoretical reflection and seeing the larger picture. Too often they want “the facts, ma’am, just the facts”.

Therefore, tonight I am going to try – yet again and in the tradition of this University – to reflect on the real challenges which we all face as Canadians entering the 21st century. And, I will do so in a way that builds on a theoretical concept, but with the goal of going well beyond the theoretical to a description and analysis of the real challenges now and in the next decades. These are, in other words, challenges particularly for the young and the students here this evening.

The concept I want to address is that of citizenship, and particularly citizenship regime.

In recent years there has been a proliferation of claims framed in terms of citizenship. For example, Latin American movements for democracy and civil rights as well as mobilisations of the poor make claims to full citizenship. Women's movements, especially ones in which mothers bear witness to their "disappeared" children and grandchildren, frame their opposition in terms of citizenship. In France, *le mouvement social*, which is a broad based aggregation of associations and actors seeking to address social inequalities and exclusion, agitates for improved citizenship for those who are socially excluded. In Belgium, *le mouvement blanc*, which arose out of governmental scandals and accusations of police complicity with the paedophile Marc Dutroux, names itself a movement for citizenship. Citizenship has also become a central concept in debates about Aboriginal rights in several Central American countries as well as here in Canada.² These varied movements, speaking in the name of "citizens", making claims in the name of "citizenship", all have one thing in common. They are all addressing the relationship between the state and the individuals who find themselves living within its borders.

But it is not only movements that are active here. In Quebec, the concept of citizenship is central to the notion of the "new nationalism" and descriptions of societal pluralism which parts of the government and civil society promote. And the Throne Speech last week called on Canadians to work on citizenship.

This is so because citizenship does not exist without states. The notion of "citizens of the world" is nothing more than a metaphor as yet. Growing preoccupation with the condition of social cohesion and democratic politics has led many in government and policy circles to express concern about citizenship. In diverse and fragmented societies, marked by profound restructuring of the economic and social order, there are challenges to the capacity of state institutions to ensure inclusion and participation for all who are formally members of the political community. Moreover, the immigration and refugee flows associated with globalisation, as well as movements of persons within areas of economic free trade, all raise fundamental issues about who is in and who is out, that is, precisely where the boundaries of citizenship are. There is concern about social cohesion as well as efforts to remake democratic practices, re-knit social solidarity, and re-think the rights and responsibilities of citizens and denizens. These all suggest that states are engaged in surveying the borders of citizenship.

What are these borders? Most obviously they involve the borders of the country, and are a matter of passports, of who can enjoy the benefits of being a Canadian or a European, for example. Indeed, in the latter case the formal boundaries are changing dramatically. The European Union is becoming a single space, as everyone moves freely within its borders. But the boundaries of citizenship go well beyond the matter of passports.³ Citizenship is also – and has always been – about nation-building. Therefore, it is about defining who we are. As Prime Minister Chrétien said in June 2000, speaking to the heads of "Third Way" governments in Berlin:

[Canada] contains the globe within its borders, and Canadians have learned that their two international languages and their diversity are a comparative advantage and a source of continuing creativity and innovation.

This description was, of course, by no means his invention. He did not create this vision of who we are simply because he needed to make a speech in Berlin. Let's look at another – and quite similar – quote:

Canada is a miniature world. It has problems of geography, climate, resources, language and religion. Yet out of a diversity of racial groups scattered over half a continent, the builders of Canada have moulded a nation with a spirit strong and distinctly its own. But Canadianism is a blend – the very diversity has softened, and at the same time broadened it, but not detracted from its inherent worth.

Who is speaking in this quote? It was W.J. Lindal in his book *Canadian Citizenship and Our Wider Loyalties* published by the Press Club of Winnipeg in 1947. He was speaking in the context of the 1946 *Citizenship Act*. Canada was the first country in the Commonwealth to create a separate citizenship, and thereby to break with the alternate myth of the imperial subject, as both a legal and subjective identity.⁴

The author of this Act, Paul Martin Senior recalled that he became convinced of the need for such legislation after visiting a battlefield cemetery in France in 1945. He said: “Nothing has since epitomized the concept of our nation more poignantly for me than that cemetery. Of whatever origin, these men were all Canadian.”⁵

Discussion of citizenship long pre-dated 1946, however. A half-century before John Millar, the Deputy Minister of Education for Ontario, wrote a book for the new century, *Canadian Citizenship. A Treatise on Civil Government* (1899). It opened with the statement: “The end of all government is the cultivation of good citizenship”. His words might serve equally well for those at the beginning of the 21st century concerned about matters of social cohesion, social capital and citizen engagement, not to mention civic education:

Good citizens are those who have mastered self, and the institutions of the state should aid in this object. ... The cost of administration would be greatly lessened if people were at all times anxious to do right. If all citizens were law-abiding the large sums now expended to pay policemen and to erect and maintain prisons would be saved. The problem of government would be simple if the family and school were sufficiently powerful to form character to a high order, before people enter upon the active duties of life.⁶

Here we see two different but not unrelated ways of thinking about citizenship. For Paul Martin, it was a matter of recognition, of identity, and of status. Passports and nationality were important, but of even greater importance was the symbolic recognition of *belonging*, expressed in part through the sacrifices of war that forged “Canadians” out of men of many origins. For his part, John Millar described citizenship in terms of *responsibilities* and some *rights*. His notion of citizenship was of the ties that bind the society together, allowing it to function with basic levels of civility. Public institutions were important because they could aid in that functioning.

The concept of citizenship regime is useful in order to capture this legitimate definitional range. By citizenship regime, we mean the institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape concurrent policy decisions and expenditures of states, problem definitions by states and citizens, and claims-making by citizens. There are four elements of a citizenship regime, and each contributes to setting its boundaries.

- One is the expression of basic values about the *responsibility mix*, defining the boundaries of state responsibilities and differentiating them from those of markets, of families and of communities.
- Through formal recognition of particular *rights* (civil, political, social, and cultural; individual and collective) a citizenship regime establishes the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of a political community. In doing so, it identifies those entitled to full citizenship status and those who only, in effect, hold second-class status.
- A citizenship regime also prescribes the democratic rules of the game for a polity. Among these democratic rules, we include the institutional mechanisms giving *access* to the state, the modes of participation in civic life and public debates and the legitimacy of specific types of claims-making.
- A citizenship regime also contributes to the definition of nation, in both the narrow passport-holding sense of nationality and the more complicated notion of national identity and its geography. It thereby establishes the boundaries of *belonging*.⁷

A regime is never fixed once and for all in time. Indeed, the central theme running through my analysis is one of choice. Canadians and their governments choose how they will live together, and they continue to make significant and consequential choices about responsibility, community, governing and inclusion in their actions every day.

The location of these choices is sometimes democratic institutions, sometimes families, sometimes in markets and sometimes in communities. Therefore, it is always important to pay attention to the space for choice and the mix of responsibilities in analysing any citizenship regime. Its own boundaries will expand or contract in relationship to the space given to other locations for choice. More space for markets or families means less for democracy, and therefore for citizenship.

Citizenship regimes are thus subject to redefinition and transformation in accordance with the ideas and ideologies of the times. For the last four centuries disputes of the boundaries of citizenship have provoked political mobilisation and action. From the *Magna Carta* to Meech Lake, from the English *Bill of Rights* of 1689 to the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, citizens have contested, debated and redesigned the boundaries of their relationship to political authority and democratic decision-making.

It is not surprising, then, that challenges to the boundaries of citizenship occupy such an important place today.

Before looking at these challenges in some detail, we need to describe what is being challenged. I will argue here that the citizenship regime which is currently undergoing change only began to take shape in the 1930s and 1940s. This post-war citizenship regime tried to be pan-Canadian and was based simultaneously on values of individualism and social solidarity.

Pan-Canadian nationalism had been mounting during the 1930s, born by a generation of intellectuals and activists who sought to remake their country in another image. One of their number, the pre-eminent – and poetic – journalist Bruce Hutchison wrote in 1942:

“No one knows my country, neither the stranger nor its own sons. My country is hidden in the dark and teeming brain of youth upon the eve of its manhood. My country has not found itself nor felt its power nor learned its true place. ... But no longer are we children. Now our time is come, and if not grasped will be for ever lost.”⁸

This was the generation that would fashion the post-war world with a different discourse of nation-building. At war’s end, Canadian policy communities were unusually aware of the impact that their decisions would have for the future. They were consciously and conscientiously building a new citizenship regime to reflect the lessons learned both in the inter-war period and the war years.⁹ They spoke frequently of the need to represent Canadians to themselves as part of a single, autonomous country, stretching from sea to sea, and open to exercising its international responsibilities in emerging international organisations.

Individuals - as citizens, as consumers, as producers - began to gain greater discursive visibility. So too did “Canada”, which was meant to subsume more than recognise its regions. The break with the past was clearly understood by one of the architects of the new regime. As Paul Martin, Senior said when he presented the new Citizenship Act to the House of Commons in 1946:

It is not good enough to be a good “bluenose” or a good Ontarian or a good Albertan. Sectional differences and sectional interests must be overcome if we are to do our best for Canada. The only way this can be done is through encouragement of the feeling of legitimate Canadianism...¹⁰

A pan-Canadian regime was constructed over the next decades. It was anchored around a federal government, which fashioned itself as a “senior” government. It was also a vision of individual Canadians linked by pan-Canadian social programmes organised, if not delivered, by Ottawa. The party system was key to it. Finally the citizenship regime included an autonomous position in world affairs, expressed through Canada’s contribution to the UN and commitment to the Bretton Woods system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

In other words, the citizenship regime depended on a great many more institutions than the *Citizenship Act*. There were the important country-spanning institutions such as the CBC (which began television broadcasting after the war) and the huge construction projects such as the Trans-Canada Highway, the St-Lawrence Seaway, Air Canada and the pipelines. All of these actions were expressed concretely in tons of cement, miles of wire and the many public buildings built at the time. But they went far beyond such material expressions. They were also the infrastructure of a modern industrial economy, infrastructure needed by companies and corporate actors to communicate, to move their export goods and import their components. In addition, they were clear assertions of a belief in a pan-Canadian project to link Canadians, one that would allow them to recognise themselves as citizens of a single country, proven in war and facing a future of economic boom. This was nation-building as well as a new way of seeing the respective roles of states, markets, or communities.¹¹

Any or all of these projects, from television and radio networks to airlines, canals, pipelines and concert halls *might have* been left totally to the initiative of philanthropy or private enterprise and market forces. This was what the neighbour to the south chose to do in the same years, building three huge private television networks, many airlines, and so on.¹² Canada made other choices about how to use the state in the economy, drawing closer to the mixed economies of Western Europe and Australasia, all of which used government authority to shape markets and influence market forces.

Canada's post-war citizenship regime included country-wide institutions which addressed citizens as individual "Canadians", thereby mapping the whole of Canada as a single political space with which its citizens might identify. Practices within the party system altered as campaigns became moments for leaders to speak to all voters directly, employing the new radio and television technologies and thereby bypassing the regional chiefs who had dominated politics in the inter-war years. At the same time, other important institutions of representation began to span the country. The creation of the Canadian Labour Congress in 1956 is one example among several. It located its headquarters in Ottawa, despite the fact that provincial governments regulate labour relations.

Simultaneously, there was an emerging recognition that if modern politics were to function properly and ensure fairness, some attention to the rules of the game would be needed. By the 1970s federal elections were regulated by legislation setting expenditure limits, organising access to communication media, and ensuring transparency in contributions, all in the name of equity. Elections, important as they are, were also understood to be only one possible route to representation. There was also symbolic and programmatic acknowledgement of particular *categories* of citizens, thereby granting legitimacy to the intermediary associations of civil society representing those particular interests. Initially, intermediary associations had been recognised as vital aspects of the citizenship regime because, by organising more marginal groups, they reinforced a fledgling national identity and built loyalty to it. By the 1970s they were accepted as important in helping citizens construct diverse identities, advocate for social rights and enhance the fairness of the democratic process by giving a voice to disadvantaged segments of the population.

The activities of the citizenship branch of the Secretary of State provide one example here. That agency amplified its identity-building activities in the first years of the 1970s. It extended its funding of those associations which organised citizens whose identity state policy sought to affirm, in particular multicultural groups, official language minorities and Aboriginal political organisations. In 1974, a separate Women's Program was created to foster collective activities by providing both core and project funding to women's groups. As Bernard Ostry, former Assistant Under Secretary in charge of citizenship said, the goal of the branch was to "develop and strengthen a sense of Canadian citizenship, chiefly through programs that would aid participation and assuage feelings of social injustice".¹³

The categorical identities thereby fostered and recognised in public policy as well as the 1982 Constitution, were “space-less”. They focussed on individuals more than communities, and communities of interest rather than those of location. Founded on the characteristics of individuals, they were not determined by the locale in which those individuals lived. Gays and lesbians in Toronto could easily make common cause with those in Vancouver, while urban centres became home to a rich multicultural life that built representational ties spanning the globe.

This vision of citizenship was based on *individualisation*. There was support for women’s rights, social programmes delivered through the tax system, multiculturalism’s recognition of the importance of individual identity and diversity, Official Languages creation of the Anglophone and Francophone. But this individualisation was tempered by another vision. There was continued acceptance and even celebration of a more community-oriented and less individualist vision.

Central to the notion of citizenship were social programmes that expressed a commitment to the collective good, being a representation of what Canadians owed to each other. These commitments were most visible in two types of public action.

One was the willingness to share the costs of unevenly distributed *life risks*, both those associated with moments of the life-cycle (childhood, youth, old age) and those associated with the “bad luck” of illness, disability, poverty and job loss.¹⁴ Therefore, from the 1940s to the end of the 1960s Canadian governments created the social infrastructure of the citizenship regime. These were the now-familiar social programmes of unemployment insurance, pensions, family allowances, post-secondary education, and universal health care, as well social assistance for those living in poverty.

Another type of public action, in place by the mid-1950s, involved smoothing out the effects of geography and unequal resource distribution. Equalisation payments that redistribute income *from* those areas luckily endowed by nature or history with close proximity to the American economy *to* the less lucky, were also part of the pledge to share risk. By 1957 the federal government had made a commitment to a mechanism for expressions of solidarity across space. The equalisation transfers would allow “have-not” provincial governments to match the educational, social and health services available to Canadians living in the “have” provinces.

The result was a mixed pattern of responsibility shared by the state, market, families and communities. Canada *never* went as far as many smaller European countries, which were building generous welfare states to protect citizens from many of the negative effects of market society. Canadians chose to define the social rights of citizenship as *safety nets* in most cases, rather than seeking to promote greater equality of condition or actively structure labour markets.¹⁵ Our universal programmes were limited to education, health care, family allowances and pensions.

Yet again we see the effect of conscious choice. Canada *chose* a universal and publicly financed health care system later than many European countries, but at the same moment that its neighbour was choosing public support only for the poor and the elderly through Medicaid and Medicare. Canada *chose* to finance the explosion of post-secondary education in the 1960s with a public, albeit not free, system, while the United States continued on the road of requiring families to absorb the high costs of the prestigious university education.¹⁶

The result of these choices was that Canada sat in a middle position on many measures. We are familiar with our country being a “middle power” in international relations. This was the value and self-understanding that permitted the country to play its role as honest broker, conscientiously to pay its share for international organisations and so on.

But beyond that, we can see the same notion of “middleness”, or what is perhaps better termed a desire to combine several values, in patterns of social citizenship.

Here we will locate Canada in comparison to the full range of OECD countries, as part of an effort to classify what have been termed regimes of *welfare capitalism*.¹⁷ This is the name given to the mixed economies constructed after the Second World War throughout Western Europe and to a much more limited degree in Asia.

On some measures of state involvement, the post-war Canadian citizenship regime was ranked very low. While we now sometimes refer to the 1970s and 1980s as years of government profligacy, producing deficits and debts that were “out of control”, Canada in 1985 actually distinguished itself in the OECD by being very far below the mean of social spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).¹⁸ Whereas the mean for all member countries that year was 16.2, Canada was at 10.3, with only 3 of the 18 members of the Organisation below it.

More than a single number is of course needed to understand the shape of the Canadian citizenship regime and especially the social dimensions of its welfare capitalism. Another indicator is provided by an index of “decommodification” for delivering welfare, measuring the extent which social benefits are both generous and public. Here Canada draws much closer to the European countries and is quite distant from the US, New Zealand, and Australia.¹⁹ Thus, in 1980 Canada was in the middle of the pack, above the set of countries relying on private benefits, while also distinct from those that had made the greatest commitment to public forms of design and delivery of welfare.

Even a better indicator of this midway position is provided by the effort to cluster countries according to welfare regime types, as liberal, social democratic, or corporatist. The measures take into account whether programmes are universal or targeted and whether the system mixes private with public provision. Targeted and mixed programmes generate classification as the liberal type. Those regimes that have higher population coverage and greater equality in benefit levels are classified as social democratic. This more complicated assignment process, using several dimensions and measures, permits a more nuanced classification, ... and allows us to see graphically the way that citizenship regimes are combinations of principles, much more than they are pure types.

Classifying this way, Canada shares the highest score on liberalism, *at the same time as it* appears in the moderate group on the social democratic score. *Only* the United States has simultaneously the highest score on liberalism *and* the lowest score on social democracy, while only Japan and the US appear both in the high liberal category and the low social democratic category.²⁰

As did many other countries, we inscribed a mix of values into the welfare components of the post-war citizenship regime, seeking *simultaneously* to promote the values associated with choice and individual responsibility and those associated with equity.²¹ Just as Canada chose to intervene in certain markets so as to ensure the infrastructure needed by companies as well as by ordinary citizens, it selected a mixed strategy to express its post-war commitments to social citizenship, combining liberal and social democratic values in the details of programme design.

The combinatory strategy goes beyond the social. The invention of equalization payments so early in the post-war citizenship regime signalled an egalitarian way of thinking about space to be sure. But it also was a sign that the creators of the citizenship regime valued rooted communities. It would have been possible for decision-makers, especially at a time when Ottawa was so much stronger than its inter-governmental partners, to have chosen to impose a forced choice on individuals living in the “have not provinces”. It might have left provinces, and communities within them, on their own, to wither away as their youth all went “down the road”. Alternatively, in perhaps a more a generous fashion, it might have helped the process along, by instituting incentives to facilitate mobility; this is what the Nordic countries’ active labour market policies were doing.

Canada chose differently, however. Its governments actively sought to preserve and even to develop community in the peripheries, a task seen by many people as sticking a finger in the dike of the inevitable decline of those regions. And yet, that was our choice, in the name of community. This vision of communities in space existed alongside the communities of interest described above and *also* recognised in public policy.

This choice of community was soon again confirmed by the rejection of the assimilation strategy for dealing with the multitude of difficulties faced by Aboriginal peoples living in Canada. Whereas the 1969 *White Paper on Indian Affairs* suggested treating indigenous people as a category of Canadians with particular needs best addressed through services delivered to them as individuals, the subsequent uproar forced another view. By the time of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, there was finally full recognition of the importance of community to the very survival of individual members of Aboriginal nations.

Even these community-focused policies, however, involved a combinatory, or mixed, strategy. While community was recognised and protected, whether in Newfoundland outports or among Aboriginal people, there was also a commitment to giving any individual who wished to take it, the opportunity to move out and move up.

The first years of the 1970s were also ones proposing two policies much more positively received by Canadians than the *White Paper on Indian Affairs*. The Official Languages Act and policy of multiculturalism both are clear expressions that an official value would be given to cultural diversity. The melting-pot model was explicitly rejected.

The bilingualism of the Official Languages law was most obviously a guarantee to individual Canadians that they had a right, as citizens, to services in the language of their choice. But the Act also contained a clear recognition that languages were a cultural good that depended on the welfare of the community using them. It therefore provided support for Official Language Minority communities that would help them to survive in the sea of voices speaking the other official language. Multiculturalism funding of community groups and representative agencies was equally a statement that Canadians understood communities were be more than the simple sum of the individuals who composed them. Communities are made up of institutions and practices that have to be nurtured, even as the individuals living within them must also be guaranteed the freedom to choose whether to embrace their cultural heritage and their mother tongue or to abandon it.

Another choice could have been made, of course. In the case of both official languages and multiculturalism, the policies might have *stopped short* of recognising the community dimension. The first might have simply provided individuals the right to government services in either language. The second might have simply sought to guarantee protection from discrimination and the right to cultural difference. But the choice was to do *more*. Just as with the economic and social policies of Canada's welfare capitalism, the cultural and language policies that were also part of its citizenship regime through the 1970s sought to balance individual freedom - the pre-eminent liberal value - with support for another good, that is the recognition of the community dimension of diversity.

Still a mixed strategy?

The post-1945 citizenship regime developed an individualistic (or at least family-based) perspective. In part, this was the result of triumphant liberalism and in part it was a function of technological and institutional possibilities. Television and polling rendered local organisers less relevant to political parties, while Ottawa's muscle-flexing put it in direct contact with individual Canadians through taxes and spending. In the cultural realm, it became possible for Canadians from sea to sea to share cultural experiences on radio and television, and to know themselves through the books, plays and other forms of expression supported by pan-Canadian institutions such as the Canada Council.

Nonetheless, Canada did build some social rights on universal principles, constructing a health care system which became symbolic of "citizenship" in the face of comparisons with the neighbour to the south's insistence on *only* markets and safety nets. Canada's universal health system could easily be compared to the US choice of medicare for the elderly and the poor and of private insurance for the well-employed.

The mixed strategy for Canada's welfare capitalism, of state intervention in economic and social infrastructure in the name of a particular vision of citizenship and in accordance with particular practices of liberal democracy, underwent profound questioning in the 1980s and 1990s. So too did the practice of combining respect for individual diversity with some recognition of cultural and other communities. The questioning was intense enough and serious enough that Canadians face new choices about what their citizenship might look like in the future. They again must decide how to combine – if they wish to do so – the values of liberalism **with** a commitment to collective values and the values of individualism **with** a recognition of the importance of community. Is the mixed – or middle – strategy still the one to be followed. The answer depends how we face up to the new challenges.

This last section will again take up the four basic dimensions of the citizenship regime and identify the challenges that are faced in these first decades of the 21st century and some of the choices available.

Who's responsible?

The challenge on this dimension is to identify the role of the major institutions in which decisions can be taken, and to whom the decision-makers within those institutions are responsible. Canadian citizenship has always recognised that the state is only partially responsible for assuring well-being. Equality of political and civil rights has been combined with much more limited commitment to equality of social rights. The private and third sectors, along with families, have maintained significant responsibilities for the distribution of well-being.

In recent decades, however, many have argued for an even greater role for these three. They seek to rein in the state. Markets have become a significantly more important locale for choices. Families and communities have regained greater responsibility for delivering social well-being. The space for citizenship is thereby reduced.

With this reassignment come concerns about accountability. Delivery of benefits and services by markets assigns responsibility for choices to companies and their share-holders. Delivery of benefits and services by the voluntary sector grants responsibility for choices to the leaders of those organisations who must respect the organisation's mandate and their board of directors. They must act in accordance with their own principles, whether of charity, foundation-building, or whatever. The space for citizenship is thereby reduced.

Certain new analyses of societal needs have begun to point to the real advantages of publicly organised provision and collective forms of decision-making, however. The attention to children and the need to invest in their futures is expressed through the National Children's Agenda and new investments in Early Childhood Initiatives. There is also new knowledge coming from population health studies about the superior performance of societies with flatter distributional gradients. Both of these imply that the state will be used as a mechanism for redistribution to achieve better childhood outcomes and/or greater inequality.

Whether to maintain democratic control over decisions about the future of the healthcare system (and not allow markets to make the choices for us) is another example of where there is concern about the citizenship portion in the mix of responsibilities of states, markets, communities and families. The challenge is, in other words, to identify a point of equilibrium among the four points of state, market, communities and families.

What rights, what responsibilities?

Increasing attention is now going to the responsibilities of citizenship. Since its beginning with the Greeks, only those able to exercise responsibility have been able to exercise rights of citizenship. Thus, for years women were excluded from citizenship, especially voting, because they were judged incapable of exercising the major citizens' responsibility, that is to bear arms. In 19th century Britain as well as the United States, males were denied civil rights (and secluded in the poor house), if they could not responsibly support themselves, while "protective legislation" was applied to women and children precisely because they were *not* citizens. Even today, many countries now make voting compulsory, on the grounds that the exercise of the franchise is a citizen's primary responsibility.

In many of the post-1945 welfare states, a citizen's responsibility was to work. This was the case in Nordic Europe in particular, but also in other countries.²² Women finally began to achieve full citizenship in the 1950s and 1960s as they took up jobs; they became citizen-workers. As such, they were also entitled to public policy designed to enable them to fulfil their family and their citizen (ie, employment) responsibilities. At the same time, however, and as part of the expression of social citizenship, citizens could legitimately claim an income sufficient to meet their needs,²³ if they temporarily withdrew from the labour force to care for a child, re-train and so on.²⁴

In the liberal welfare states, such as Canada, however, where social citizenship was of the safety-net sort rather than universal and rights-based, social assistance was generally limited to those considered, for one reason or another, unable to hold a job. In recent years in this "residual" type of welfare state there has been much rethinking about the strict distinction between citizens who are "responsible for themselves" and hold jobs, and those who are the responsibility of the community, because their incomes, whether from wages or maintenance by another adult, are insufficient. Increasingly, the notion has taken hold that virtually all citizens have a responsibility to work. The challenge is to determine the extent to which they can also expect a guarantee of sufficient income if their jobs disappear, if they can not work, or if they need help with training and other mechanisms for insertion into the labour force.

In some jurisdictions, social assistance is simply cut. For example the United States has ended "welfare as we knew it", and made all citizens responsible for earning market income. The latter, however, can be "topped up" in a number of ways. Both tax regimes and services are used. In particular, the US relies on a huge redistribution of income by a unique "feeding program" for low income persons, that is food stamps. In Canada, each province is experimenting with its own mix of compulsion and supports for self-sufficiency, but they all agree that all citizens should be employed. The sole exemption are the young, the elderly and those who can count on another adult whose market income is sufficiently high to support a family with a single salary.

Because these changes mark a significant move away from “residualism”, the very principles of social citizenship are changing. It is crucial that we have a public debate about the new ones should be, about what we owe to each other, as well as what each citizen owes to the collectivity.

Concretely, this raises the matter of commitment to public schools versus privatisation, about support for self-sufficiency versus compulsory workfare, and about differential treatment. The agenda is a large one, and merits serious discussion in democratic politics, rather than being settled by the “stealth” of backroom policy-making.

Which routes to representation?

Doing so means, however, having functioning institutions of representation. In both the pre and post-1945 citizenship regimes, two main institutions provided citizens access to the instruments of collective choice. Both federalism and party systems are traditional ways of organising access and democratic representation. And both face significant challenges in the years ahead.

The parties and the system within which they operate, perhaps for the first time in Canadian history, are organised around ideological differences. Real choices are offered to citizens in elections. Canada’s brokerage parties face competitors in the Alliance and the Bloc québécois that stand for principles different from their own. Therefore, an emerging challenge is how to organise and exercise political citizenship in ways that respect the legitimacy of political diversity and conflict. Our party systems have served a range of purposes, but organising debate about real alternatives is not one of them. Therefore, it will be necessary to develop in Canada the practices and forms of civil debate that many other countries take for granted because of long use.

Such changes will have to be made at the same time that citizens themselves are disenchanted with politicians and clamouring for more involvement. Technological innovations generated most of the difference between the forms of electoral competition in the pre-war and post-1945 citizenship regimes. Again technological change and the e-revolution generate new challenges for the institutions of collective choice. But such adaptations are in their infancy. How should we or can we institute e-democracy, for example? What forms of public consultation will be the most useful?

Change has already been experienced within federalism. The post-1995 anger of the provinces towards Ottawa’s unilateralism and the development of a – more or less – common front, has produced a Social Union Framework Agreement setting out new rules of engagement and ways of doing. The challenge is to assure citizens the promised access, both directly and through workable intergovernmental institutions.

Probably the fundamental challenge on the access dimension is none of the above, however. It is, rather, developing a more workable public/private mix between governments and associations representing civil society. As described above, partnerships have long existed in Canada, which has an established tradition of “thick” civil society. Indeed, support for intermediary associations as a key way station on the route to representation was a hallmark of the previous citizenship regime.

The recognition of the importance of intermediary institutions and a healthy tissue of group life in civil society virtually disappeared in the 1990s. Governments significantly reduced their financial support for such organisations, when they eliminated core funding and made project-based funding more difficult to obtain. Advocacy groups representing everyone from Canadians with disabilities to environmental activists were instructed to prove their worth by demonstrating their ability to raise funds. Moreover, as notions of “governance” have taken hold, the institutions of civil society are called upon to play an ever-increasing role in delivering services. Governments seek partners for everything from labour market training to parental training. As social assistance budgets are cut and programmes redesigned, social citizenship rights are squeezed down. Private food banks feed the hungry, but they also decide who is truly needy and deserving of their limited resources.

The decisions to tie support for such associations to their capacity for service delivery, rather than democratic representation, has made somewhat more problematic the maintenance of well-functioning intermediary democratic institutions such as advocacy groups, unions, and so on. Therefore, a challenge for the future is to identify ways in which citizens without major individual resources can be assured of access to the points of decision-making. These ways involve thinking about protection of equitable access in everything from electoral law and advocacy to ensuring markets do not crowd out alternative decision-making sites.

Belonging to ...?

Nation-building was central to the post-war citizenship regime. The issue remains on the agenda, and it still has the two components it has always had, that is maintaining cohesion from sea to sea to sea and distinguishing Canada from the rest of the world, especially the country to the south.

Respect for diversity can be the only foundation for a cohesive future; differences of culture, language and national identity are not going to disappear. Therefore, the challenge is to find a stable mix of recognition practices. First, they must acknowledge not all differences are equivalent. Differences based on ethnicity or “race” are not the same as those of national minorities such as Aboriginal peoples or Quebeckers.

The challenge is also to make visible and legitimate the link between community well-being and cultural survival, whether as a national minority or another cultural community. For national minorities, institutional asymmetry may ultimately be the only solution. But all communities, whether they are located in space or are communities of interest, will thrive only if we continue to moderate liberal individualism in the name of community.

And finally there is the matter Canada’s place in the world. The post-1945 citizenship regime marked a break from the British Empire. It was based on nation-building pride about Canada’s contributions in World War Two and after. Thus, independence meant a break with the imperial centre. But as we also know from high school Canadian history, change since 1867 has always also been prompted by events in the United States.

At first these were the international realignments associated with the end of the Second World War and the launch of the Cold War, in which the USA was one of the two contending superpowers. Now it is globalisation, the end of the Cold War in 1989, and the emergence of new economies, both in the European Union and the e-world. They are all shaping the international and transnational scene. Just as in the past, the choices made now will determine the representations of “Canadianness” that the citizenship regime will reflect back to the citizens of the country. Will they belong to their world city, their local community, their region, their province, their country, North America, the Americas or the world... or all of the above?

Endnotes

- ¹ See Shirley Spafford, *No Ordinary Academics. Economics and Political Science at the University of Saskatchewan, 1910-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
- ² See, for example, Deborah Yashar, “Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America”, *World Politics*, vol. 52:1, 1999 and Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon, “Challenging the Citizenship Regime : The James Bay Cree and Transnational Action”, *Politics and Society*, June 2000.
- ³ For further details on the historicity of the concept of citizenship, using a similar framework to the one used in this paper, see Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon, “The Changing Boundaries of Citizenship. A Review and Research Agenda,” in Canadian Centre for Management Development, *Modernizing Governance: A Preliminary Exploration* (Ottawa: CCMD, 2000). Available at <http://www.ccmd-ccg.gc.ca/research>.
- ⁴ William Kaplan (ed.), *Belonging. The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 1993), p. 7. However, despite the hopes of many who originally proposed a new law, controversy surrounding the Act resulted in retaining the status of British subject for more than a generation. Some understanding of why that status was popular, beyond the ranks of imperialists, is seen in an intriguing vision of the “wider” post-war world. For example, enthusiasts of keeping the category British subject often described membership in the Commonwealth as a way that Canadians could embrace pluralism. After describing the loyalty to Canada inherent in Canadian citizenship, W.J. Lindal wrote: “But this man of Manitoba is also a British subject. ...It is relatively easy to be loyal to your native land, to be nothing but a Canadian, a Greek or a Belgian. The wider the outlook the more adjusting has to be done in our thinking. From that point of view and in that sense it is more difficult to be a British subject than a Canadian citizen.” A few paragraphs later he says: “If the people of Canada succeed in properly correlating their diverse loyalties, they have reason to feel that Canada is providing a pattern which other nations may well follow.” W.J. Lindal, *Canadian Citizenship and our Wider Loyalties* (Winnipeg: Canada Press Club, 1947), pp. 153-54; 157.
- ⁵ Paul Martin, “Citizenship and the People’s World” in Kaplan, *Belonging*, p.66.
- ⁶ John Millar, *Canadian Citizenship. A Treatise on Civil Government* (Toronto: William Briggs, 1899), pp. 11-12.
- ⁷ These are the dimensions of rights and responsibilities, access and belonging, first developed in Jane Jenson and Susan D. Phillips, “Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada”, *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, vol. 14, fall 1996.
- ⁸ Bruce Hutchison, *Canada and Her People* (London: Herbert Jenkins, Ltd., 1942), pp. 9-10.
- ⁹ In the war years there had been concerns about the loyalty of immigrants, in particular those from combatant countries. By the late 1940s, concerns about identity replaced those about loyalty. In introducing the Citizenship Act, the Secretary of State said that bill would “provide an underlying community of status for all our people in this country that will bind them together as Canadians”. But the state did not have exclusive responsibility for fostering this identity or even organising training for citizenship. It was to be shared, indeed “contracted out”.

As early as 1951 the branch was providing funds to voluntary organisations for programmes in the area of citizenship. Leslie Pal, *The Interests of State* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), pp. 79, 85.

¹⁰ Paul Martin quoting himself in "Citizenship and the People's World", p. 73.

¹¹ For an excellent description of these processes see Neil Bradford, *Commissioning Ideas* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹² Of course, there was a huge exception in two areas - highways and research and development. The decision to build the network of superhighways (many heading north) and the investment in state-of-the-art high technology aerospace and other industries built on the United State's needs in the Cold War years as one of two super-powers. President Eisenhower was first to term this core of the American economy the "military-industrial complex".

¹³ Quoted in Pal, *Interests of State*, p. 109.

¹⁴ As Gøsta Esping-Andersen reminds us, "The welfare state is one among three sources of managing social risks, the other two being family and market". *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 33. We add a fourth, the community, through private redistribution. This addition creates the welfare diamond proposed by Adalbert Evers, Marja Pilj and Clare Ungerson (eds), *Payments for Care* (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1994).

¹⁵ For example, the Nordic countries were innovators in active labour market policy, with unions and employers agreeing to smooth out the effects of industry restructuring and retraining, well before the OECD began to promote this for everyone.

¹⁶ Many European countries expanded their free post-secondary systems in these decades. Of course, the US also had a parallel public system, reflecting the 19th century values of equality, that provided low cost access to excellent public institutions in several states *for residents of that state*. Students from other states, as well as those attending the many private institutions, paid high fees.

¹⁷ For one description of the notion of welfare capitalism, see Robert Goodin, *et al.*, *The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 5. The authors, who are sociologists, economists and philosophers write: "Welfare regimes also bundle together programmes and policies which transcend the 'welfare state' narrowly conceived. They are indeed worlds of 'welfare capitalism'. Welfare regimes represent different ways of organizing not only the transfer sector, represented by social welfare policy, but also the productive sector of the capitalist economy. ... The term 'welfare regime' refers to that larger constellation of socio-economic institutions, policies and programmes all oriented toward promoting people's welfare quite generally. It certainly includes the transfer-oriented 'welfare state' sector narrowly conceived. But it also includes the tax as much as the transfer sector of the public economy. And it also includes, alongside both, the productive sector of the economy."

¹⁸ This is the mean for all state spending, exclusive of health spending. See Goodin, *et al.*, *The Real Worlds*, Table 4.4, p. 81. The original measures, as well as the theoretical development, is in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

¹⁹ The index includes pension, sickness and unemployment benefits. The year is 1980. On a cumulative index, Canada is 8 points higher than the US, and five points behind Germany and France, and 1.5 behind the UK and Ireland. Goodin *et al.*, *The Real Worlds*, Table 4.5, p. 83.

²⁰ Goodin *et al.*, *The Real Worlds*, Table 4.6, p. 85.

²¹ This discussion ignores the third regime type identified by Esping-Andersen and his followers (as well as the others proposed, such as a "Latin type") because there is a general consensus, confirmed by the indicators, that Canada is low on corporatism.

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- ²² In France, for example, the *revenu minimum d'insertion* was established by the Socialist government in the 1980s. It is a minimum income programme for those who do not have other sources of income either from the market or government benefits. But note the name. It is a programme intended to “insert” people, first into society (ie, it is an anti-exclusion measure) and then into work.
- ²³ This principle is clearly embedded in the much vaunted replacement-level paid parental leaves in Sweden, for example. Parental leaves are *not* universal. Only workers (or students) who have an established relationship to the labour force can claim them. Women not in the labour force before giving birth or not in long enough do receive a benefit, but is it a small fixed rate allowance, basically an anti-poverty measure more than a citizenship right.
- ²⁴ Social citizenship rights did permit certain choices about “decommodification”, but policies actually focused much more on labour market strategies of education and training that would help adaptation to the vagaries of market-led restructuring. The classic example here are the Nordic countries that by the 1970s were leading the OECD with labour market strategies of adjustment, in which unions and employers co-operated to facilitate employment generating restructuring.