

KALININGRAD: its internal and external issues

Institute of Political Science
University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn

KALININGRAD: its internal and external issues

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INTRODUCTION

Since 1991 the Kaliningrad Region (Oblast in Russian) is an enclave, it is a region separated from the main part of Russia by the territories of other countries. Presently, it is also an enclave in the geopolitical sense, because it is surrounded by countries of the European Union and NATO. It is one of the smallest regions of the Russian Federation and its most western part, which since its creation attributed as specific strategic significance. In addition, from the Polish perspective, Kaliningrad Oblast is the only part of Russia, with which we have a common border. This determines to have a look at the region of investigation and process taking place in it, not only in bilateral relations but also multilateral relations (e.g.: EU–Russia, NATO–Russia, cooperation in the Baltic Sea region). Regional and local co-operations on the Polish-Russian borderland has also a considerable significance.

Contemporary, Kaliningrad intensively changes; isolated from the rest of the world in the 2nd half of the 20th century due to its military nature, now catching up in almost every field. Its unique location in Europe and intensive changes, indicates needs of scientific analysis to consider the internal and external determinants of its operation. The main objective

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of this book is to show multilateral aspects of the functioning of Kaliningrad Oblast in contemporary reality. It has selected analytical and synthetic documentary issues on the Oblast, which is the interest field of researchers of Institute of Political Science, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, and researchers from Sweden and Russia.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part contains the following articles: *East Prussia: the Annihilation and memory* (Krzysztof Gładkowski); *Kaliningrad region: as a problem between Moscow and Europe* (Ingmar Oldberg); *A case of regional identity of inhabitants of the Polish-Russian borderland* (Arkadiusz Żukowski); *Historical identity and awareness in Kaliningrad region and Warmia and Mazury: Selected issues* (Krzysztof Żęgota); *Tatars as an ethnic minority in the Kaliningrad Region* (Selim Chazbijewicz); *The geopolitical role of the Kaliningrad Oblast in the Baltic Sea Region after 1989* (Marcin Chełminiak); *Local Border Traffic as a Tool for Integration of the Baltic Region States: The example of Poland and Russia* (Wojciech Kotowicz); *Cross-border and interregional cooperation (paradiplomacy) between Poland and the Kaliningrad Region* (Wojciech T. Modzelewski); *Cooperation between the Warmia and Mazury region and the Kaliningrad region* (Łukasz Bielewski); *Image of the Polish-Russian borderland in the Olsztyn mass media* (Katarzyna Maciejewska-Mieszkowska); *International activity of the universities – European Union from Kaliningrad point of view: Why do universities cooperate?* (Anna Barsukova, Igor I. Zhukovskiy); *The culture landscape of the Curonian Spit – a veduta of the lost world?* (Ewa Gładkowska). The articles were prepared in 2014 and 2015, in some cases were updated events from 2016.

The second part presents researches, scientific and educational cooperation of the Institute of Political Science, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn on Kaliningrad issues (Arkadiusz Żukowski, Wojciech Kotowicz, Marcin Chełminiak) and list of scientific publications on Kaliningrad issues prepared by the Institute of Political Science, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland (Marcin Chełminiak,

Wojciech Kotowicz, Wojciech T. Modzelewski, Krzysztof Żęgota, Arkadiusz Żukowski).

Some remarks about the terminologies used in the book are needed. The term “Kaliningrad Region” (sometimes, the word “region” written with upper letter) means administrative region of the Russian Federation which is officially named “Kaliningrad Oblast” (Калининградская область in Russian). The term is applied in official documents of the European Union¹ as well as at the official Russian websites of the Kaliningrad Parliament (Калининградская областная Дума in Russian)², the Kaliningrad Governor and Government (Правительство Калининградской области in Russian)³ and the President of Russia (Президент России in Russian)⁴.

Another key term used in the book is “Warmia and Mazury Region” which means administrative region of the Republic of Poland (województwo warmińsko-mazurskie in Polish). This Polish term is officially translated in different ways: “Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship”, “Warmia and Mazury Voivodeship”, “Warmian and Masurian Voivodeship”, “Warmia and Mazury Province” and others name it just “Warmia

¹ E.g.: Communication from the Commission to the Council the EU and Kaliningrad. Report from the Commission on the functioning of the facilitated transit for persons between the Kaliningrad region and the rest of the Russian Federation. Commission of the European Communities 17.01.2001; 15 July 2002 Ensuring a prosperous future for the Kaliningrad Region: the need for European solidarity – Report Committee on Economic Affairs and Development Parliamentary Assembly; 24 April 2003 Enlargement of the European Union and the Kaliningrad Region, Recommendation 1579 (2002); Joint Statement on Transit between the Kaliningrad Region and the Rest of the Russian Federation, Brussels 1.11.2002.

² <http://duma39.ru/duma/> [accessed 12 October 2015].

³ <http://www.gov39.ru/vlast/> [accessed 12 October 2015].

⁴ <http://en.kremlin.ru/> [accessed 12 October 2015].

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and Mazury”. The editors decided to give the authors a free hand to use English translation of the term “Warmia and Mazury Region”.

This book is the next publication, issued at the Institute of Political Sciences in Olsztyn regarding the Kaliningrad Oblast. It is the result of the research of the Institute on the Russian enclave and cooperation with other research centers. The editors hope that the book will be interesting to readers of modern and multi-faceted issues of Kaliningrad Region.

PART ONE

Krzysztof Gładkowski

EAST PRUSSIA: THE ANNIHILATION AND MEMORY

The greatest openness in relation to the history of Prussia had relocated to Lower Silesia Kresowiak, that accentuated that all Europeans should associate with all its history, and not just remove the raisins from the cake. Europe should be a solidary community in offering direct after his painful experience just the Germans and Poles must support each other, also with a sense of responsibility for inheritance after Prussia, which has already gone non-existence.

(Thadden, 2004, p. 9)

ABSTRACT

In this text, we drew attention to the process of restoring the memory. Former East Prussia even today do not exist; it is an important symbol

for the modern inhabitants of areas located today within the limits of separate states south-eastern part of the Baltic Sea basin.

After 1945, the relicts of Prussian and German culture were objects of vandalism. The term “annihilation” was used in this text as a result of analysis of the scale of the crimes committed here by the Red Army and early escape in front of the war and the expulsion of the German population. This community no longer exists, but the memory of its culture is undergoing a renaissance in Poland after 1989, as well as in other countries around of south-eastern part the Baltic Sea basin.

Material evidence of culture existed here evoked the memory of its history. Their knowledge is a condition of formation of a non-ideologized identity. Knowledge of past of places inhabited today by Poles, Russians, Lithuanians and representatives of other ethnic groups is a precondition for shaping a mature personality. No reference to the true past of former East Prussia shaped during the Communist period “closed personalities” or “suspended personality”. Today, open-minded attitude to the German cultural heritage gives the ability to shape of the mature identity of the inhabitants south-eastern coast of the Baltic Sea Region.

Keywords

cultural heritage, East Prussia, history, memory, identity, Warmia and Mazury

Introduction

I used the word “annihilation” in the title. This term has a definite meaning, therefore seems controversial in the context of a catastrophe which in reference to East Prussia ended with its total destruction. However, the term “annihilation” refers first and foremost to the people. In addition,

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although we do not have in the case of the population of East Prussia to deal with planned extermination, as it did in the case of the Jewish people, the scale of the crimes committed in this part of Prussia is not comparable with any other part of Germany, and this fact put the main emphasis which should be enough to justify the term used in the title.

No any part of German country experienced such a horrible treatment of people as East Prussia, where losses in people were the biggest: “Out of almost 2490 thousand inhabitants, 511 thousand of them, among which 311 thousand were civilians, because of the fight, flight, deportation, internment, hunger and cold” (Kossert, 2009, p. 306) did not survive the catastrophe of World War II. East Prussia vanished during the war: “Seven hundred years of German history in East Prussia lay under the ruins of the Third Reich” (Kossert, 2009, p. 306). Sebastian Haffner expels descendants of those who gave birth to the Prussian prehistory and mixed with them descendants of West Slavic peoples called the crime, “last crime congested crimes of war, which began Hitler and unfortunately Germany” (Haffner, 1996, p. 195).

Therefore the words “fall” or “end” of East Prussia may seem more appropriate, but they do not express neither the most tragic treatment of people in this area, nor the destruction of their 700-year old cultural output.

Due to the complexity of my topic, it is impossible to present even one issue in a short article. I will, therefore, focus on presenting the main points.

The area most experienced as a result of the annihilation of World War II is former East Prussia. It is here where the first and strongest impact of the Red Army took place. Here where the aggressor wreaked their whole hatred. Here, where the crimes against the civilian population took catastrophic proportions. After the war, the area inhabited by the new community has completely changed its nature, ethnic, and culture. But the memory of East Prussia continues (Kerski, 2002). Culturally, East Prussians are also those who, as heirs, live either in Germany or in Po-

land. The memory of East Prussia comes alive in the young generations of newcomers (cf. Knyżewski, 2014, pp. 183–189).

History and Politics

Within the frontiers of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the lands that were lost as a result of the partitions, and which were not included within the borders of the Second Polish Republic, are Warmia and a part of Royal Prussia. Periodically subordinate to the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland was the southern part of East Prussia (1466–1657), which did not come earlier in the territorial Crown and was weakly related to Poland in a cultural and ethnical field.

After the Second World War, the former German areas were named “Recovered Territories” by the post-war propaganda to legitimate the borders established after World War II and the transfer of the population in these areas. After 1989, the ideological term “Recovered Territories” was replaced by the term “Western and Northern Territories” (Mazur, 2000; *The Western*, 2015). They included the following German provinces, located in the east of the Oder-Neisse: the southern part of East Prussia approx. 23 354 km², the eastern part of Silesia approx. 34 529 km², the eastern part of Pomerania. 31 301 km², New Marches 11 329 km², the eastern part of Saxony, approx. 142 km². Total: approx. 101 000 km². In 1939 this area had a population of 7.1 million Germans and 1.3 million Poles. In the last months of World War II, much of the population escaped the approaching Red Army. Both, those who stayed at home, and those who returned after passing the front, were nationally verified by the Polish administration. About 3.5 million people considered Germans were displaced to Germany in the period from 1945 to the end of 1950 (Roszkowski, 1997, p. 157; cf. Eberhardt, 2003, pp. 142 ff).

The former German lands located within Polish borders after World War II were considered Polish by the German Democratic Republic due

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to the Treaty of Zgorzelec from 6th July 1950. The western border was recognized by the German Federal Republic on 7th December 1970 (Zięba, 2010). However, the CDU determined the recognition of the border by German unification, which eventually took place on 14th November 1990 when Poland's and Germany's foreign ministers signed a border treaty. This does not mean that Germany did not put forward territorial claims – some German organizations are questioning the nationality of the former lands belonging to Germany, now located within the boundaries of the Polish Republic. Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands demands a revision of the Oder-Neisse borderline and the use of the German Army for the revision of borders and restoration of historic, in their opinion, the borders of Germany (Kamusella, 2010, pp. 129–132; Romaniec, 2010).

I am mentioning this political context in order to show that the interest in prewar German territories (today belonging to Poland) is still present and, in the times of European Union, can be a crucial political and personal issue for many Germans. Thinking in national terms uses great quantifiers to define lands which for centuries belonged to the political jurisdiction of Germany. E.g. “The German lands in the east”. These nationalist and at the same time political definitions simply cover any historical changes and cultural diversity of areas recognized as German. In the political discourse rarely subjective approach is applied to the problem, and only this kind of approach can reveal the entire diversity of what we refer to as the cultural heritage of the area.

History and Memory

Humanities distinguish “history” and “memory” (Le Goff, 2007; Ricoeur, 2007). History contrasted to memory legitimates the power, memory brings from the past forgotten experiences and actions of a human. His-

tory uses the past, memory restores what was the experience, fascination and creation of a man or community. History deals with great figures and events, whereas memory focuses on real people (also, ordinary people) together with their life experiences (Ricoeur, 2006; cf. Domańska, 2006; Müller, 2013; Domańska, Stobiecki, Wiślicz, 2014).

After the Second World War, the history in Poland served to legitimize the boundaries within which the territories previously belonging to Germany were located. The official political discourse accepted only such a narrative, which treated the territories attached to Poland as “eternally Polish”. This discourse was charged with positive assessment of what was Polish, and the negative of what was German. Big national quantifiers grew from nationalist ideology – “Poland”, “Polish” – “Germany”, “German” – were clear axiological codes. Historical narratives based on ideological assumptions of the then Polish state could not describe the complex and multicultural past of the German areas incorporated into Poland. The shape of that politics headed for the creation of a single national society – by the expulsion of the German population together with the extermination of traditionally patriotic part of the Polish nation or its exclusion and marginalization from the society. It, therefore, excluded the narratives which described the real history and culture of the areas connected to the post-war Poland. The multicultural, multiethnic and multinational thinking was so eliminated from the social consciousness that the information that in Poland there was close to a million Germans after 1989 came as a real shock to many Poles. According to the official propaganda, they thought that in Poland there were no Germans.

While it comes easy for one to change the external environment, it is not possible to do the same with their thinking. Human personality is formed in the very early period of life and is influenced by the relationship with other (Chrobak, 2011, pp. 32–46). According to psychologists, its core is shaped until six years of age (Chłopakiewicz, 1987; cf. Erikson, 2000). This process in Poland led to create the identity which did not have any reference to the regional history of the past. This happened because

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the narrative of the real history of East Prussia was not allowed and radical feelings for everything what was German were exposed after the physical removal of the Germans and the unprecedented destruction of their achievements in East Prussia as a result of the war of the Soviet Army. It can therefore, be concluded that in East Prussia, as in other areas of the Western and Northern Territories, a nationalist Polish national identity was formed filled with communist ideology in the Soviet way. On this basis, we can draw a justifiable argument that there has been a destruction of not only the material and social heritage of East Prussia, but also that in the social consciousness a historical emptiness was established. Those conditions made me promote the concept of “suspended identity” (Gładkowski, 2014, pp. 49–57) in relation to people who came to live in the area today known as Warmia and Mazury. When in the minds of many Poles the concept of East Prussia did not exist anymore, there came changes of the 80s which restored the democratic order from the early 90s and began an open reckoning with the past. On its wave, many intellectuals, including scientists and culture creators began the arduous and honest effort to restore the social memory (Orłowski, 2006).

In our region, the most representative example of the implementation of the restoration of social memory is a Cultural Community and the Foundation “Borussia”. The inhabitants of our region (but not only them), especially young people, owe “Borussia” the results of an open relation to the multicultural heritage of East Prussia, assimilation of which becomes part of a mature European identity. Numerous international projects realized by “Borussia” created in the young generations of all Poles and Germans, Lithuanians, Russians, Ukrainians – the present inhabitants of the former East Prussia – an attitude related to the past of their native land to such extent, that some refer to themselves using the language once widespread here in daily use: “ich bin Allensteiner”, “ich bin Königsberger” etc. And although there may be isolated incidents, they express acceptance of different values, which expose them to get to know the past of their cities, towns, villages and countryside.

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Ingmar Oldberg

THE KALININGRAD REGION AS A PROBLEM BETWEEN MOSCOW AND EUROPE

ABSTRACT

This article examines the relationship of the Russian Kaliningrad exclave with the federal capital and with the neighbouring countries in the political, the economic and the military dimensions. It will be argued *inter alia* that Moscow's excessive demand for control meets some resistance from the region, whose population is in search of an identity adapted to its unique location and history. In the economic dimension, the small size and lacking resources of the region make it dependent both on federal support and much trade with the neighbouring states, and it is therefore highly susceptible to sanctions and embargos. Finally, the re-

gion remains marked by its history as a military stronghold. Its military role has increased under the impact of growing tension between Russia and the West, as epitomized by the current war in Ukraine. This has exacerbated the difficult plight of the Kaliningrad region and its inhabitants in all dimensions and also made it a security problem for its closest neighbours and other Baltic Sea countries.

Keywords

Kaliningrad, Russia, Poland, Lithuania, security

Introduction

Ever since the Kaliningrad region became an exclave cut off from the rest of Russia in 1991¹, it has had problems in its relations with both Russia and its neighbours in many ways. The region both reflects Russia's general problems and ambitions and has some specific features. This article will explore Kaliningrad's current relations with Moscow and with its EU/NATO neighbours in three dimensions, the political, the economic and the military ones. It will be shown that Moscow's excessive demand for control meets some resistance from the region, whose population is in search of an identity adapted to its location and history. The small size and lacking resources of the region make it dependent both on federal support and trade with the neighbouring states, and it is, therefore, most susceptible to sanctions and embargoes. Finally, the region remains marked by its history as a military outpost, and growing tension between Russia and NATO directly affects the role of Kaliningrad in the Baltic Sea context.

¹ Strictly speaking it is a semi-exclave, because it has connections with Russia across the Baltic Sea, compare Alaska-USA and Crimea-Russia.

Political problems

The Kaliningrad region is an integral part of Russia, which is a federation only by name and where President Vladimir Putin has concentrated all political power in his hands since 2000. The population of the region (about 950 000) is over 80% ethnic Russian and generally support Putin's foreign policy, including the aggressive actions against Ukraine since 2014. As all over Russia, 10 000 Kaliningraders rallied in mid-March to hail the conquest of Crimea (*About*, 2014). This, of course, impaired relations with neighbouring Poland and Lithuania, which belong to the strongest supporters of Ukraine in its standoff with Russia. When Ukrainian refugees arrived in the Kaliningrad region, the Governor Nikolai Tsukanov accused young men among them of being activists sent out by Western secret services to create a new Maidan in Russia (*Kaliningrader*, 2014).

In recent years the Russian leadership has increasingly promoted Russia's national traditions and its independent great power status, and its belonging to Europe has been de-emphasized (Makarychev, Yatsyk, 2014, p. 12). The Kaliningraders on the other hand, living as they are in the westernmost part of Russia and surrounded by EU states, are the most Europeanized Russian citizens and show a higher degree of social activism (Rogoza et al., 2012, pp. 29 ff). In early 2010 uniquely large demonstrations against new transport taxes induced the incumbent President Dmitrii Medvedev to replace a governor appointed by Moscow with one from the region. According to local sources, the support for the annexation of Crimea was much lower than elsewhere in Russia (Oldberg, 2014, p. 43; Ruin, 2014, pp. 52 ff). Russia's historical claim to Crimea in principle opens the door for Germany to lay claim to its former East Prussia (Cichowlas, 2014; *Fair*, 2014)².

² Three men raising a German flag in Kaliningrad on 11 March were arrested and faced long sentences (Coynash, 2014).

Further, 60% of the inhabitants hold international passports (Russian average 20–25%), of whom 25% have Schengen visas³. Only 18.5% of the urban population has never been abroad; most people go to Poland and Lithuania and have contacts and impressions from there, while less people go to ‘Russia’ (Oldberg, 2014, p. 43). In order to change this, air tickets to Russia are subsidized and efforts are made to improve rail connections (*Pravitelstvo*, 2014; Oldberg, 2011). Since 2002 there is an agreement between the EU and Russia allowing visa-free travel by rail across Lithuania from Russia to Kaliningrad with a so-called Facilitated Transit Document.

As most Kaliningraders nowadays have been born in the region, they have also started to develop a special, regional identity with an interest in the German past of the region. German buildings are restored, albeit partly as a means to attract tourists, and proposals have been made to replace Soviet names with old German ones (Misiunas, 2006, pp. 16 ff; Holtom 2006, pp. 81 ff; Ruin, 2014, pp. 54 ff). The idea of creating an independent state appeared in the 1990s and received about 10% of supporters in polls carried out in the early 2000s. When the economic situation improved and foreign travel was facilitated, the majority supported the current status (Klemeshev et al., 2011, p. 25; Oldberg, 2001, p. 61). Nowadays, when federal control and Russian nationalism is very strong, the opposition may only demand a higher status in the federation and more powers.

Admonished by the regional authorities Russia has repeatedly called on the EU to liberalize the Schengen visa regime with regard to Kaliningrad’s unique location. In 2011 an agreement was reached with Poland on a visa-free zone, covering the whole Kaliningrad region and the nearest Polish region including Gdańsk. For travels farther into Poland Schengen

³ In 2011 the Polish consulate issued almost 113 000 visas, over half of which were multi-entry, the Lithuanian one almost 83 000, and Germany 21 700 (Rogoza et al., 2012, p. 65).

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visas are still necessary (*Small, 2013*). The number of border crossings in 2013 grew from 2.5 to 6.2 million, most of them Poles who went to Kaliningrad (often several times a day) to buy excise goods like cigarettes, alcohol and gasoline. The number of air passengers increased by 10.5% in 2013, of which only a fourth was discounted tickets to Russia (Batyk, Semenova, 2014, p. 56).

However, Lithuania rejected the idea of creating a similar zone, because it would almost cover the whole country. Further, Moscow was reluctant to give special favours to the Kaliningrad region over other regions, and therefore mainly supported the agreement with Poland as a means to pave the way for visa freedom for the whole of Russia with the EU (Rogoza et al., 2012, p. 53). Further, Russia's aggression in Ukraine disturbed relations with Poland and caused the EU to stop the negotiations on a new partnership agreement and visa facilitation with Russia, and the future of the visa-free zone is uncertain. Finally, the drastically impaired economic situation in Russia (see below) since mid-2014 has significantly reduced the number of Russian travellers to Poland (Batyk, Semenova, p. 56).

Economic woes

While a coastal and enclave/exclave location often is an advantage among free economies (see Hong Kong), the Kaliningrad region has had a more mixed experience. When it became an exclave in 1991, it had virtually no economic links with other countries, and was wholly dependent on federal support. In order to promote trade and investments a free economic zone was established, which in 1996 became a special economic zone (SEZ). This meant customs-free import to and export from the region and tax-breaks for foreign investors, which boosted trade with the neighbouring states. However, since the region is a small market,

most of the trade except consumer goods went on to or originated in Big Russia, and foreign investments remained well below the Russian average. Foreign investors are also deterred by the rampant Russian bureaucracy and corruption (Rogoza et al., 2012, pp. 23 ff; Ruin, 2014, p. 53).

As a result of new rules in 2006, which limited the list of duty-free import goods, the number of foreign investors, most of whom are small or medium-size, decreased fourfold, while large, often state-owned Russian investors in energy and infrastructure projects were favoured in line with a Federal Target Programme. The regional budget in 2011 received about 60% of its income from the federal budget, but when calculated per capita, the region is among the ten regions with the least federal support (Rogoza et al., 2012, pp. 10, 17 ff; Oldberg, 2014, p. 43). Even if the living standard has risen and Kaliningrad city looks very European with the highest number of cars next to Moscow, the gross regional product is about 36% lower than the Russian average with high unemployment, low wages, high living costs and grave health and environmental problems (Rogoza et al., 2012, pp. 24 ff; Oldberg, 2014, p. 43).

Nowadays, the Kaliningrad region faces new economic challenges. Since Russia in 2012 joined the World Trade Organisation, the SEZ will expire in 2016 and foreign-made goods will be subject to customs fees and the value-added tax like all other regions. In May 2014 Prime Minister D. Medvedev went to Kaliningrad to discuss the problems and promised to take supportive measures (*Medvedev*, 2014).

Furthermore, in reaction to the Russian interventions in Ukraine, the EU, the United States and other countries imposed sanctions on Russia in the financial, energy and military technology sectors. This together with sinking world market prices on oil, on which the Russian economy is totally dependent, has led to the serious depreciation of the ruble (by about half its value in 2014), higher inflation and interest rates, capital flight, no more Western investment and negative GDP growth. This also affected the Kaliningrad region, which as noted depends on federal support and import from abroad.

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Furthermore, Kaliningrad was harder hit than all other regions by the Russian response to the Western sanctions, namely the one-year embargo on imports of all kinds of foodstuff (except wines) from the EU and the other states, including Poland and Lithuania. Kaliningrad was very dependent on such imports, since its agricultural sector has been totally neglected since Soviet times. Foodstuff constitutes 15.8% of the region's total import, and the EU states covered 34% of the total food imports, e.g., 90% of the meat consumption (*Minprom*, 2014; Cohen, 2014, p. 54). The embargo thus contributes to shortages, rising prices and stoppages in this sector. Thus, the fish processing plants, which had gone over to importing Norwegian salmon instead of relying on Russian fishing, have had to suspend their activity and lay people off (Oldberg, 2014, p. 43). The stop for importing Lithuanian dairy products made related factories in the region go idle and led to protests on the internet (*Kaliningrad residents*, 2014)⁴.

The official Russian solution to the shortage is to rely on and expand domestic production, in other words, import substitution. The Kaliningrad governor in August claimed the region had enough apples and defiantly advised Polish producers to send them to children in the separatist Ukrainian regions of Luhansk and Donetsk (*Kaliningrad governor*, 2014). Another solution for Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia was to import more foodstuff from countries outside the black list such as Belarus, Serbia, Turkey and South America. However, Belarus also became a loophole for imports from the West, since it has a customs-free union with Russia, which caused a strife between these states. Norwegian salmon was e.g. relabelled "made in Belarus" (*Die Zollunion*, 2014). Further, switching to domestic agricultural production in Russia takes time and requires in-

⁴ On several occasions before, e.g. in October 2013, Russia has stopped imports from Lithuania or sharpened controls on the border, for "sanitary reasons" in connection with political strifes, which has induced Lithuania to threaten with blocking transit across the country (*Putin*, 2013; Zdanavicius, 2014, p. 37).

vestments, for instance in transport and storage, and the new suppliers, unlike EU states, demanded full prepayment (Vylegzhanina, 2014). Even if the Kaliningraders to some extent may import foodstuff for private use through its border traffic agreement with Poland, the foodstuff embargo is thus adding to the general economic problems of Kaliningrad.

Energy issues

The Kaliningrad region also faces specific problems in the energy sector, which otherwise is Russia's greatest asset. It has very few energy resources save for a small oil field off the Curonian spit, which has been extracted since 2004. However, there is no refinery in the region, so the crude oil is exported, and the demand for petroleum products must be satisfied by imports from abroad or the rest of Russia, which raises the costs.

As for natural gas, which is mainly used for heating, this is imported from Russia by a pipeline through Lithuania and Belarus⁵. Since 1991 the region has received 80% of its electricity via the networks of the Baltic states from nuclear plants in Russia proper (Rogoza et al., 2012, pp. 18–20). In 2010 the second block of a gas-fuelled heat-and-power plant (TEC2) was finally opened⁶. The production of electricity in 2011 exceeded consumption by 50% (Menkiszak, 2013, p. 6). Nonetheless, Russia in 2009 decided to build a Baltic nuclear power plant (NPP) on the Neman river. The plan was to sell electricity to Lithuania, a country which in 2008 had been forced by the EU to close down the NPP at Ignalina for security rea-

⁵ In 2004 this was interrupted by Moscow due to a conflict with Belarus over the gas price (Rogoza et al., 2012, p. 19).

⁶ The Gazprom monopoly dragged its feet, because it did not deem the project profitable considering the small market.

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sons, to Germany, which in 2012 resolved to decommission all its NPPs in ten years, as well as to Poland and other countries (Rogoza et al., 2012, pp. 40 ff; Janeliunas, 2009, pp. 198–202).

However, Lithuania has decided to decouple from the Soviet electric power network and join the European system (ENTSO-E), and connecting lines with Poland and Sweden are to be operational in 2015. This means that Kaliningrad will soon be cut off from the all-Russia system. Concerning the Baltic NPP, the Russian hopes of having it partly (49% financed by foreign investors, chiefly German, and by foreign loans were soon deceived, and the prospects look even bleaker after the EU's financial sanctions on Russia since 2014). Furthermore, Germany showed little interest in buying energy from that kind of source, while Lithuania planned to build a new NPP in cooperation with other states or alone⁷. Also, Poland and Belarus (with Russian assistance) intend to build NPPs. In the face of these problems, President V. Putin in May 2013 decided to stop the Kaliningrad project (Menkiszak, 2013, pp. 1–4; Malmlöf, 2010, pp. 98–100). It may be of some interest to add that the Kaliningrad elite initially opposed the project, because the decision had been taken suddenly and without consultations in the region (except the unpopular governor). A public poll in the region in 2009 showed more resistance than support to the project, and an environmental movement emerged to oppose it and to demand a referendum (Rogoza et al., 2012, p. 39).

Military forces and activities

In Soviet times Kaliningrad became one of the most militarized regions of the country with well over 100 000 troops and was totally closed for Western visitors. After Kaliningrad became an exclave, Russia in the 1990s

⁷ However, this idea was rejected by a Lithuanian referendum in 2012.

demanded a corridor across Lithuania or Poland, and Russian radicals have since repeated the idea, the realization of which might cut off the Baltic states from the rest of NATO. Needless to say, Lithuania and Poland have rejected this idea as a serious security threat (Goble, 2014).

Instead of a corridor, Russia in 1993 signed a transit agreement with Lithuania, according to which all military transports on land had to go by rail, Russia had to ask for permission every time, submit to inspections and pay high fees. On Lithuanian insistence the agreement has to be renewed every year, and often when problems arise with Russia, Lithuanian politicians call for more restrictions, which cause angry protests from Russia. For instance, after the Georgian war in 2008, when a Lithuanian opposition leader called for stopping all military transit across the country, Russian representatives retorted that in that case old weapons had to be destroyed on the spot in Kaliningrad, causing environmental problems, and that the planned withdrawal of tanks by sea would take several years (Oldberg, 2009, pp. 353 ff, 365; *Lithuania*, 2013). The currently increased tension between Russia and NATO, including Lithuania, now threatens to spill over also to the military transit issue.

Turning now to the military forces in the region, these were considerably reduced in the 1990s after the withdrawals of Russian troops from Central Europe was accomplished, and since then remained relatively stable. The number of soldiers is estimated at about 15 000 men but rises to 25 000 if other security personnel is included (Oldberg, 2012, p. 13)⁸. Despite the reduction this is more than the regular military forces of the three Baltic states put together. Considering its small size and population the region can thus still be characterized as highly militarized. Moreover, one third of the area still has restricted access, including a 5-kilometre zone along the borders, most of the coastline and of the Vistula

⁸ In 2007 the ground forces were estimated at 10 500, and the navy people at 18 000 (Oldberg, 2009, p. 361).

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Lagoon, which hampers investments, traffic and tourism. The modern highway from Kaliningrad city to the airport and the sea resorts passes (unmarked) restricted zones, which has resulted in arrests, and the navy reserves the right to close the strait at Baltiysk, even if there is an agreement with Poland on traffic in the Vistula lagoon since 2009 (and also one with Lithuania concerning the Curonian lagoon) (Rogoza et al., 2009, pp. 12, 45 ff). This, of course, has restricted civilian traffic and the development of the Polish and Lithuanian ports in the lagoons. There are Polish plans to dig a canal across its part of the Vistula spit, but this has been considered too expensive (Bojarowicz, 2013, pp. 141–153).

The region belongs to Russia's Western Military District, with Kaliningrad City as the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet since 1956. Baltiysk is its main naval base with most of the warships⁹. These forces should be seen in conjunction with those in the rest of Russia (and Belarus), since reinforcements can be moved in. In recent years the naval forces have been reinforced and modernized. One, allegedly the world's largest, amphibious landing craft was taken into service after repair at the local shipyard Yantar in 2014 (*Russian navy*, 2014).

Further, there is an Air Force base with bombers in the region. Two airfields are being modernized and the runway of one is being prolonged so as to be able to receive any kind of aircraft, including Boeings and Airbuses (!), and an airfield for hydroplanes on the Baltic Spit is planned to be revived. In December 2011 a new early-warning missile defence radar station was made operational. In the following year, the air defence

⁹ At present, the whole fleet with a second base at Kronstadt has three diesel submarines, two destroyers, five frigates, 21 patrol ships, 15 mine warfare and 11 amphibious ships (*The Military*, 2014, p. 213; Vendil Pallin, 2012, p. 235; Oldberg, 2009, pp. 355 ff). There is also a naval infantry brigade with about 1100 men, which has since been used in Ukraine, an army brigade, an artillery and a missile brigade (Rogoza et al., 2012, p. 12 ff).

troops in the region, second in order only after Moscow, were equipped with S-400 Triumph missile systems with a range of 450 km, thus covering much of Poland and the Baltic Sea including Gotland. The region also has storage facilities for tactical nuclear weapons at Baltiysk, which means that such weapons can easily be deployed there – if they are not there already (*Kaliningrad special*, 2014, p. 2; Rogoza et al., 2012, p. 13).

Most concern among the Baltic Sea neighbours has been caused by the basing of Iskander ballistic missiles in the Kaliningrad region, because they have a range of over 500 km, high precision and are able to carry nuclear weapons. At least since 2007 Russia has threatened to deploy such missiles there as a response to US President George W. Bush's plans to build ballistic missile defence (BMD) bases in Poland and the Czech Republic against future threats from Iran, but which Russia saw as actually targeting Russia. In 2008 President D. Medvedev announced a decision to carry out deployment, when Poland in the wake of the Russian invasion of Georgia signed a deal with the United States on deploying Patriot air defence missiles in Poland. The Kaliningrad governor Georgy Boos greeted the decision (Leijonhielm et al., 2009, p. 196; Oldberg, 2009, p. 364). Even though the new US President Barack Obama soon decided to move the planned missile bases to Romania and Bulgaria, no agreement was reached with Russia, and D. Medvedev in late 2011 reiterated the decision (Akulov, 2014, p. 2). In late 2013 the Russian Defence Ministry confirmed media reports of deployment of Iskanders “near the Baltic states”, affirming that this did not violate international agreements, and a defence official even declared that Iskanders had been stationed in the Kaliningrad region for 18 months. The German “Bild” newspaper reported about satellite images of at least ten missiles (*Moscow*, 2013; Roth, 2013). Nevertheless, in December 2013 President V. Putin declared that the final decision concerning Kaliningrad had not been taken yet but Russia should not be provoked and that Iskander is not the only and not the most important weapon to defend Russia (President of Russia, 2013, p. 5).

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But in February 2014 the Chief of the General Staff stated that all Russian missile brigades would be armed with Iskander systems by 2020 (Akulov, 2013, p. 2). After the Ukrainian conflict had broken out Russia tested Iskander systems during an exercise in the Western Military District (*Russian missile*, 2014). From this one may conclude that threats to deploy Iskanders were used as a means to gain concessions from the US/NATO. If the deployment of Iskander systems in the Kaliningrad region is not a fact already, it is only a matter of time, since the US BMD plans are likely to proceed due to the Ukrainian crisis. Kaliningrad has thus become a pawn in the strategic power game between Russia and the US/NATO.

Due to its location and forces, Kaliningrad further plays an important role in Russian military activities in the Baltic Sea region. Several military exercises have been held there without Western observers and been seen as threatening by the neighbouring countries. One example was part of the Zapad 2013 exercise, which involved about 70 000 men and included amphibious landing operations (Järvenpää, 2014, p. 9).

When NATO intensified its presence and exercises in the Baltic Sea as a reaction to the Russian aggression against Ukraine in March 2014, also Russia intensified its activities there. Several air incidents took place between Russian fighters and Swedish and American reconnaissance planes over international waters. Russian reconnaissance planes turned off transponders in March and December 2014, thus risking collision with civilian aircraft. Mock air attacks against Swedish and Danish territory took place in March 2013 and June 2014. A violation of Swedish airspace in September resulted in an official protest against Russia. In October Sweden carried out a major submarine hunt near Stockholm, for which Russia (despite denials) was strongly suspected in view of former events. The airspace of the three Baltic states and Finland was also repeatedly violated (Frear, Kulesa, Kearns, 2014, pp. 2 ff; *Russian military*, 2014; Holmström, 2014; Byström, 2014). Undoubtedly, Russian forces and bas-

es in Kaliningrad were employed in many of these incidents and now play a prominent role in the military threat that the other Baltic Sea states perceive as emanating from Russia. As a result, these states and NATO have taken measures to increase readiness and strengthen their forces in the region, which Russia, in turn, reacts against (*Lithuania's*, 2014). Recently, the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov averred that Russia would beef up its combat capabilities specifically in Crimea, the Arctic and Kaliningrad (Heritage, 2015). A vicious circle of military build-up is at hand.

Concluding reflections

As also emphasized by the prominent Polish Kaliningrad expert Jadwiga Rogoza at the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, the problem for Kaliningrad and other Russian regions is that Moscow's priority has been control and security rather than welfare and development (Rogoza, 2014). It may even be claimed that Moscow's grip on Kaliningrad is tighter than on any other region (Dutch, 2013) due to its remote location and the Russian principle of territorial integrity (except for the neighbouring ex-Soviet republics) in international law. Moscow apparently fears that a prosperous and Europe-integrated Kaliningrad will drift away from Russia proper. The current crisis in Russia's relations with the West as a result of its actions to keep control of Ukraine raises the issue whether Russia will continue to allow the Kaliningraders to have special travel favours *vis-à-vis* Poland, a staunch NATO member and a prominent EU nation. Further, judging from the increased military activity of the Russian air force and the Baltic Sea Fleet since 2014 there is a certain risk that Moscow is turning Kaliningrad back to its position as a militarized outpost like in Soviet times, posing a threat to its neighbours and

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spurring military countermeasures (Rogoza, 2014). The hopes of the Kaliningraders of becoming a Russian Hong Kong on the Baltic since the 1990's or a pilot region for Russia-EU cooperation since the 2000s now seem utterly unrealistic.

The current tension between Russia and the democratic West over Ukraine has thus exacerbated the difficult plight of the Kaliningrad region and its inhabitant as well as made it a security problem for its closest neighbours and other Baltic Sea countries.

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A CASE OF REGIONAL IDENTITY OF INHABITANTS OF THE POLISH-RUSSIAN BORDERLAND

ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on the problem of the identity and determinants of the inhabitants of the Warmia and Mazury Region and Kaliningrad Region/Oblast as well as the case of border's neighbourhood and cross-border cooperation will be examined. The short history and uniqueness of the new Polish-Soviet/Russian borderland will be presented shortly with heritage of the earlier German influence period as well as state of research and basic terminology will be determined. The features and determinants of the new formed self-perception and

regional identity will be characterised (among others official symbols, place names, history-writings, attitude to the state and motherland) in the perspective of the common European space (European Union) and Polish–Russian bilateral relations. The implication of the emerging regional identity for the level of mutual cooperation on the Polish-Russian borderland will be analysed and some recommendation for the future will be formulated.

Keywords

regional identity, Kaliningrad Region, Warmia and Mazury Region, Polish-Russian borderland

State-of-the-art report

In this investigation, there is no intention of introducing the full state of the research on the issue of the identity on Polish-Russian borderland, but the main purpose is to present selected findings. The Western scientists (from West Europe and accidentally from U.S.) did not tackle the problem of regional identity on Polish-Russian borderland. Only few of them paid attention to the identity of the inhabitants in the Kaliningrad Region.

There were discourses of the present Russian Kaliningrad Region and the German past heritage. Some studies concentrated on the problem of collective memory prepared by e.g. Jörg Hackmann (Hackmann, 2008, pp. 381–391).

Others encompass different aspects of the past of the Kaliningrad Region and contemporary changes regarding official symbols, place names, architecture and a new history-writing.

A couple of scholars underlined the process of a new identity among the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region, e.g. Maximilian Spinner (Spin-

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ner, 2007, p. 28). The most known is Ingmar Oldberg who started partly to investigate a new socio-political phenomena which means the emergence of a regional identity among inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region (Oldberg, 2000, pp. 269–288). It should be underlined that the issue of emerging regional identity appears in many other publications, e.g. in the paper of Christopher Browning and Perti Joenniemi (Browning, Joenniemi, 2003, pp. 58–103).

The comparative analyses concerned two levels of identity: Russian regional (Kaliningrad) and national (federal) with the impact of German history, culture symbolism on Kaliningrad regional identity. Among others, the following scholars should be mentioned: Stefan Berger (Berger, 2008, pp. 15–37; Berger, 2010, pp. 345–366) and Paul Holtom (Holtom, 2008, pp. 15–37).

Others tried to investigate the impact of the European Union on the identity of inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region. Stefan Gänzle and Guido Müntel paid attention to the ongoing process of Europeization of the Kaliningrad Region caused mainly by the direct and indirect contacts with the European Union and its institution as well as its neighbouring members – Poland and Lithuania (Gänzle, Müntel, 2011, pp. 57–79). The impact of the European Union on the Kaliningrad Region and its inhabitants, especially the neighbourhood of the EU states: Poland and Lithuania, and also Sweden and Finland were underlined as above mentioned by Christopher Browning and Perti Joenniemi (Browning, Joenniemi, 2003, pp. 58–103; Joenniemi, 2002, pp. 417–446) and others.

Incidentally the topic was touched by Christian Wellman (Wellman, Karabeshkin, 2004; Wellman, 2007).

It is not surprise that the most comprehensive studies on the contemporary identity of inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region was conducted by Russian scientists.

The general picture of the topic in the context of ethno-cultural situation had been given by Nadezhda Dubova, Natalia Lopulenko and Mari-

na Martynova (Dubova, Lopulenko, Martynova, 1989). From sociological perspective of view, the problem was investigated by Mikhail Berendeev. He analysed the process for searching the identity based on contemporary inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region (Berendeev, 2007a; Berendeev, 2007b), influence of economic factors to the identity (Berendeev, 2007c; Berendeev, 2007d), aspects of social identity (Berendeev, 2006a), socio-philosophical perspective of identity (Berendeev, 2006b), political and economic self-identity (Berendeev, 2007e). He prepared a doctor's dissertation on the topic¹.

Anna V. Alimpieva tackled the social identity problem (Alimpieva; Alimpieva, 2009, pp. 76–84).

Olga Sezneva focused in her research on the impact of German/Prussian past on the identity of contemporary inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region, through division of generations (Sezneva, 2000, pp. 323–338; Sezneva, 2002, pp. 47–64; Sezneva, 2003, pp. 58–85; Sezneva, 2010, pp. 35–57; Sezneva, 2013, pp. 767–787). Such researches were also made by Valeri Galtsov who underlined the role of the specificity related to East Prussia and its past for the contemporary self-consciousness of the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region – meaning of East Prussia to Kaliningradians (Galtsov, 2012, pp. 141–152).

Anna Karpenko saw emerging new regional identity in some mutual crossed processes as: New Regionalism and by its increasing role of regional actors in European and Russian political spaces after the end of the Cold War and by the impact of globalization (Karpenko, 2006b, pp. 277–286). She, by perspective of New Regionalism, underlined her key dimension which includes cultural identity and by the context of ethnic and reli-

¹ M. Berendeev (2007), *Specificity of the identity of the Russian exclave in the post-Soviet period: state and development trends (on the example of the Kaliningrad region)*, the Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow.

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gious aspects (Karpenko, 2006a, pp. 84–95), including Muslim community (Karpenko, 2005, pp. 307–324).

Sociological and political sciences view of the problem gave Viktor Romanovskiy (Romanovskiy, 2014, pp. 280–281).

Historical aspects of the problem were investigated by earlier mentioned Valeri Galtsov (Galtsov, 2012) and Yuriy Kostyashov (Kostyashov, 2003).

Among Polish scientists the most deepest researches on the identity of inhabitants of Warmia and Mazury Region was conducted by Andrzej Sakson (e.g. Sakson, 1998; Sakson, 1999). The Ukrainian and German minorities in the region were also investigated by Bożena Domagała (e.g. Domagała, 1996; Domagała, 2009). Both researchers prepared as editors also common book (Domagała, Sakson, 1998).

Only a few Polish researches tried to tackle the problem of the identity of the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region, which had happened very sporadically – Wojciech Kotowicz (Kotowicz, 2011), Krzysztof Żęgota (Żęgota, 2014a, pp. 137–166) and preliminary researches about collective identity of inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region began Miłosz Zieliński (Zieliński, 2014, pp. 66–80; Zieliński, 2015a, pp. 109–134; Zieliński, 2015b, pp. 57–64). In turn Krzysztof Żęgota focused first of all on identity of Polish Diaspora in the Kaliningrad Region (Żęgota, 2014b). Only Andrzej Sakson permanently since the second part of the 90s of last century conducted researches on the mentioned subject. His crowning research achievement was fundamental scientific work (Sakson, 2011) entitled *Od Kłajpedy do Olsztyna. Współcześni mieszkańcy byłych Prus Wschodnich: Kraj Kłajpedzki, Obwód Kaliningradzki, Warmia i Mazury (From Klaipėda to Olsztyn. Contemporary inhabitants of former East Prussia: Klaipėda Region, Kaliningrad Region, Warmia and Mazury Region)*. The work is based on numerous direct and indirect conversations, interviews, observations and quantitative surveys which were supplemented by archival queries, analysis of official documents, memoirs, literature, newspapers and websites. In the work, the process of formation of a new identity

among modern inhabitants of former East Prussia and their relation to the German (Prussian) past is analysed².

Until now, only in small-degree the problem of identity on the Polish-Russian borderland was scientifically recognised. Arkadiusz Żukowski, more as a concept for the future, uses the term “identity” towards this borderland (Żukowski, 2008a, 308–314; Żukowski, 2008b, 647–653). The researcher made preliminary findings on possible impact of the local border traffic (called also small border traffic) on the identity of the inhabitants of the Polish-Russian borderland (Żukowski, 2013, pp. 99–110).

Borderland – main issues

Borderland is often called the frontier area. This area is usually diverse ethnically, culturally and located on the outskirts of the neighboring countries (Modzelewski, Żukowski, 2013, pp. 35–43). Borderland through the economic, social and cultural sphere is seen or should be seen as the contact area of mutual influence and penetration of a variety of contacts across national borders which naturally can do borderline a kind of bridge between the neighboring countries. In turn, the region most often is understood as a separate, relatively homogeneous area distinct from the other areas natural or acquired traits. Depending on the group of extracted features we can talk about regional climate, ecological region, historical region, demographic region, economic region or political-administration region. In contrast, cross-border region is a region located on both sides of the border, which should have the certain: degree of homogeneity (geographical, economic, cultural community, regional consciousness), the development and status of the region and the institu-

² Concerning the identity of inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region see two chapters: *Kaliningrad or Königsberg? – Attitude to the past* and *The new identities in the light of own research*.

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tionalization of cross-border cooperation, which is associated with a lack of or low formalization of the state border.

Within reach of the local border traffic is in large part, the territory of the former East Prussia. For centuries, it was one integrated historical region. In 1945 it was divided into two areas/states, which for over half a century almost did not cooperate with each other. Artificially designated border of East Prussia was divided into Soviet and Polish territory.

The specificity of this territory consists not only of the elements of nature and geography, among others, such as the location, shape of land, ecological subsystem, or hydrographic network, but most of all, it follows from the specific historical and political circumstances, the new national-ethnic composition, new social and economic relations and the new shaping of cultural identity.

Border nature of the area began to shape only in the 90s of the 20th century, because of socio-political and economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. The area do not has the typical characteristics of the socio-historical borderland, resulting from the identity of the indigenous people of these areas (because they constitute a very small percentage of the total population).

On both sides of the border live population with the little social cohesion. This is mainly due to the fact that this area as the result of political decisions were inhabited by new immigrant population with different ethnic composition, different traditions, culture and religion (including atheist).

Warmia and Mazury Region – historical and political background

After 1945, due to the centralization of political, economic and social life, as well as promoting the so-called “national unity of the state” the identity of the inhabitants were destroyed. Such policy was supported

by forced deportation or migration. In the case of north-eastern Poland, understood primarily as a current area of Warmia and Mazury Region (voivodeship), especially the counties located in the vicinity of the Polish-Russian border, the policy of getting rid of the indigenous peoples (of German, Warmian and Masurian origin) was a fact.

Today the north-eastern Polish borderland has some characteristics of backward region. The socio-economic statistics, most indicators differ negatively from national averages. In this area a lower economic, social and political activity (e.g. activity of non-governmental organizations, political parties, voter turnout) is noted.

The specificity of this area also results from the fact that Polish-Russian border is also the border of the European Union and NATO.

Kaliningrad Region – past and nowadays in the context of regional identity

Considering the Russian side of the borderland, the population of the Kaliningrad Region/Oblast survived more than 55 years in isolation. The circuit was a closed zone/area and a strong Soviet military base. There was executed an experiment of building a Communist/Socialist society by social engineering (to create *homo sovieticus*). Systematically all traces of the cultural heritage of East Prussia were removed (e.g. building government office House of Soviets on the ruins of the Teutonic Castle). The history of the region was limited to the Soviet post-war period (Browning, Joenniemi, 2003, p. 70). At that time was full negation of the German/Prussian past.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Kaliningrad inhabitants had not only troubles finding their own identity, but also they had trou-

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bles with a clarification of its relationship/attitude to its neighbours. Previously, in the Communist period, ideological friendship between nation/peoples was promoted but by the sealed/closed border. The political, economic and social events in the end 80s and 90s created, from one side, a new quality in the social consciousness of inhabitants of Kaliningrad Region, but from another side a vacuum space. The lack among inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region of a clear historically formed self-perception appeared (Misiunas, 2004, pp. 385–411). But soon ethnic and religious revival came into being. There were gradual and slow changes of the attitude towards the material culture and symbolic heritage of the pre-war past (German/Prussian) with its slowly acceptance. East Prussia became a multidimensional symbol and a socio-cultural historical phenomenon (Galtsov, 2013).

The specificity of the Kaliningrad Region does not result only its geopolitical situation with the status of Russian enclave (Chełminiak, Żukowski, 2015, pp. 233–240). The closeness of the European Union and neighbours played and plays an important role. The inhabitants of the Region are more open and socially active than in other regions of Russian Federation (e.g. the activity of different kinds of NGOs and informal groups of ideas exchange is visibly higher than in other regions of Russia). Many Kaliningraders, especially representatives of the younger generation have never been in mother land – Russia, but visited many times neighboring countries and Western Europe countries.

It is a fact that the regional identity of Kaliningraders is emerging but not in contradiction to Russian identity. The main cause of the regional identity is a unique location of the Kaliningrad Region encompassing by neighbouring states (members of the European Union and NATO, Poland since 2004 has been in the EU and since 1999 in NATO). The new identity, in some kind, links regional, Russian and European elements.

Some scholars showed some similarities between Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg – “They are both solidly Russian, Western-oriented and with economic grievances against the federal centre” (Oldberg, 2001, p. 71).

Others stated that Kaliningraders began to transform into the “Western/European” type of Russians or “in-between” identity of the inhabitants (Browning, Joenniemi, 2003, p. 73). In some aspects the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region combine both a Russian identity and a European one. According to the researches they began to feel their regional distinctiveness.

New identity based on regional, European and Russian elements with the dominant impact of the last element. But “regional identity is more important than ethnic or confessional membership” and “the territorial factor is beginning to predominate over the national” (Goble). In contradiction to the other parts of the Russian Federation special Kaliningradian identity was created (Galtsov, 2013, pp. 141–152).

On both sides of border religious identity is being defined by ethnicity and culture (I am Pole, then I am Catholic; I am Russian, then I am Orthodox).

Polish-Russian borderland – concept of identity and “positive legend”

Despite of mentioned social a few a few it could be stated that no formation of a local identity, and the more regional identity (due to mostly by forced and voluntary migration) became one of the characteristics which determine the specificity of Polish-Russian borderland. Both the Warmia and Mazury Region and the Kaliningrad Region are new cultural entities without clearly defined identity yet. It also indicates the existence of dissonance between the border areas, from the Polish and Russian side, arising from some difference in the level of civilization, although more such differences is created by the media than it is in reality.

By the end of the 80s of the 20th century border community was largely excluded from contact with the nearest abroad (the Warmia and Ma-

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zury Region and the Kaliningrad Region). The new quality of relations, breaking with selective and formalized contacts began in the early 90s of the 20th century (Gromadzki, Wilk, 2001). But social, political and economic contacts between both regions possessed quite strong and long institutional background (Palmowski; Modzelewski, 2011, pp. 153–168).

Political and economic realities in Poland after 1989 certainly raised hopes of the inhabitants of the Polish borderlands, but in the case of north-eastern Polish borderland in contrast to the western Polish borderland where was no such enthusiasm. There were a lack not only the historical tradition, but the cultural and religious proximity and other elements. First of all, there was a lack of the concept of mutual cooperation on both sides of the border. Regarding the Polish-German borderland hopes were connected with the development of cooperation in the construction, as it was determined by propaganda, of a “common European home” or “Europe of the regions without borders”. Those activities were often associated with the Polish-German reconciliation. The fundamental reorientation of Polish economic relations from the East to the West was perceived positively. However, in the case of the Polish-Russian borderland nobody said about building “common home” or something similar. From cooperation on this borderland mostly rapid economic benefits, mainly stemming from the development of trade with Kaliningrad were expected.

In the context of the north-eastern Polish borderland it is still difficult to talk about strong local socio-political and economic movements or associations, which articulate specificity of the region, and which put the goals to protect the interests of the inhabitants of this land. In most areas of these lands, there is no separate, both in terms of spatial, ethnic, cultural and social group which could fight for autonomy in internal and external actions. The symbolism of the contemporary “little homeland” is basically absent. The process of an entity of the community of the north-eastern Polish borderland has only just begun.

The processes of rebirth of national and ethnic identity of the inhabitants of the north-eastern Polish borderland which were clearly visible in the 90s of the 20th century (German and Ukrainian minority, the inhabitants of the former Polish Eastern Borderlands) did not affect positively for the intensification of cross-border contacts and regional identity.

Residents of the north-eastern Polish borderland have at least correct relations with the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region. The attitude of openness and friendship between the so-called “ordinary citizens” and local officials have become often in contradiction to the state of official Polish–Russian relations, especially at the government level (Żukowski, 2002, pp. 323–348). It seems that Polish political elites may take an example from so-called “ordinary citizens” and local officials in creating a climate of tolerance and understanding in mutual contacts.

On the north-eastern Polish borderland so called “positive legend” was not created so far. The legend could promote cooperation in the framework of the new Europe, especially among the younger generation by creating such legend it would not be such serious problems with identity of the inhabitants of the north-eastern Polish borderland with the area in which they live. Introduction of the so-called “positive legend” could favor the crystallization of a positive local, regional, national and European identity. This is particularly important and quite easy to implement because, as it was mentioned before, in this area, yet durable local or regional identity has not been developed.

To draw attention to the importance of the aspect of identification and regional identity also comes out from the assumptions of building an open and civil society. Creating the “positive legend” or regional identity, in addition to identifying the existing geographical space and the authority of the state, the civilization heritage of the area must be taken into account. The young generation could again feel themselves as Warmia and Mazury people (Warmia people or Mazury people), or even Prussians.

In the Kaliningrad Region as it was mentioned the phenomenon of the slow emergence of regional identity of its inhabitants is noted. Today,

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many of them see the distinctiveness of their region from other parts of the Russian Federation. A slow process of creating a new identity among the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region, in the sense of belonging to the region and Europe had begun. The rise and intensification of a distinct regional identity combining both Russian and European elements is a fact.

The process is under way. They had and still have an opinion about the lack among inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region of a clear historically formed self-perception. But authors of such opinions concluded also that a new local identity appears to be germinating (Misiunas, 2004, pp. 385–411).

In forming a new identity, the eventual emergence of some form of genuine local autonomy of the Kaliningrad Region should be favoured for the success of the process. It is a beginning of the process of regional identity-building on both sides of the Polish-Russian border.

In the case of the north-eastern Polish borderland, there is no need to make a breakthrough in mutual attitudes to each other between Poles and Russians. In these areas, as opposed to the western Polish borderland, there are no mutual prejudices and fears between Poles and Russians relations.

Conclusions

Part from the worries and inconveniences, the realization of the idea of local border traffic (was entered into force in mid-2012 but not stopped in mid-2016) should have a positive impact on better knowledge and understanding of the inhabitants of the Polish-Russian borderland, building partnerships at the individual and institutional level by local self-governments, non-governmental organizations and the scientific and educational institutions. Local border traffic may serve to build in the

future a common economic, social and cultural (and perhaps ultimately a political quasi) space by movement of people of borderland. Local border traffic as a new phenomenon may noticeably impact on process of regional identity but first and foremost for development of cross-border cooperation on the Polish-Russian borderland (Modzelewski, 2002, pp. 210–214; Modzelewski, 2006, *passim*).

An important aspect is the sphere of development of civic and open society and local democracy. No less important seems to be the question of the identity of the inhabitants of the Polish-Russian borderland because local border traffic relates primarily to this borderland.

The attention of the political decision-making centers should be drawn to the development of so-called “positive awareness” of the inhabitants of the Polish-Russian borderland. An important argument in favor of the creation of this new collective consciousness of the borderland is that it assists in removing of the existing xenophobic and extreme nationalist behaviors. Such policy would assist in creating communities on both sides of the border facing to each other, not like strangers as they did in the past. Creating and strengthening regional identity on the Polish-Russian borderland may be a common vision for the future.

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HISTORICAL IDENTITY AND AWARENESS IN KALININGRAD REGION AND WARMIA AND MAZURY: SELECTED ISSUES

ABSTRACT

The end of the World War II brought a new legal, political and spatial order in the area of the former East Prussia. The political, demographic and economic area has been divided between Poland and the Soviet Union, as a result of the decision made between the world powers. Both sides of the border carried out separate policies to respect the German heritage of these lands and changes made to the names towns and geographic features. These two approaches affected and continue to influence the current identity and historical consciousness of the inhabit-

ants of Warmia and Mazury and the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation. The aim of the article was an attempt to establish a comparison of this kind of historical policies related to the German heritage of these lands, and the processes of the evolution of identity and historical awareness of both communities, as well as to study the processes of the evolution of identity and historical awareness in Warmia and Mazury and Kaliningrad region. The following selected issues related to identity and historical consciousness were analysed: the history of the former German sacral and defensive architecture, museum collections and monuments; the state of preservation of pre-war names of rural, urban and geographical areas; the currently observed frequency of recourse to German resentments in society, culture and economy.

Keywords

historical identity, historical awareness, Kaliningrad region, Warmia and Mazury

Introduction

The end of the World War II brought a new legal, political and spatial order in the area of the former East Prussia. The political, demographic and economic area has been divided between Poland and the Soviet Union, as a result of the decision made between the world powers. Both sides of the border carried out separate policies to respect the German heritage of these lands and changes made to the names towns and geographic features. The Polish side tried at least partly to respect the German heritage of the southern part of the former East Prussia, in particular with regard to sacred monuments, castles and Teutonic fortresses. The politics of Soviet authorities in Kaliningrad region were aimed, in turn, in the direction of blurring the historical memory of the area belonging earlier to

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Germany in the first place. This was not exempt to only changes in the names of places and geographic features, but also to erasing the traces of German material culture. Former German museum collections were either destroyed or were deported to other territories of the Soviet Union. Numerous sacred buildings, castles, as well as urban systems and whole cities, were decided upon not to be rebuilt, justifying it not only with economic considerations, but also with the necessity of breaking ties with German traditions. Strong ideologisation of the reconstruction processes of the Kaliningrad region designed to shape the region in accordance with “the spirit of the Soviet Union” was a characteristic feature of the post-war era (Karpenko, 2006, p. 91). These two approaches affected and continue to influence the current identity and historical consciousness of the inhabitants of Warmia and Mazury and the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation.

The aim of this article is an attempt to establish a comparison of this kind of historical policies related to the German heritage of these lands, and the processes of the evolution of identity and historical awareness of both communities, as well as to study the processes of the evolution of identity and historical awareness in Warmia and Mazury and Kaliningrad region. The following selected issues related to identity and historical consciousness will be analysed:

- history of the former German sacral and defensive architecture, museum collections and monuments;
- the state of preservation of pre-war names of rural, urban and geographical areas;
- the currently observed frequency of recourse to German resentments in society, culture and economy.

Conceptual issues

A particular kind of approach to identity and historical awareness in the area of the former East Prussia is considerably important. The iden-

tity is defined as the identification with someone or something or searching for common elements between two (or more) factors (Marshall, 2004, p. 402). In this context, the historical identity of the community are those elements of identification, which are derived from historical experience, history of the place where the community in question resides, as well as the awareness of the changes taking place within the group identity as a result of historical phenomena (Bieleń, 2006, pp. 22–24). It is worth mentioning that the historical identity is a result of many processes and conditions, and is subject to constant change. According to the interpretation of a number of researchers, elements of historical memory are one of the most important conglomerates, allowing for the building of identification processes of social groups, including regional communities (Bokszanski, 2007, pp. 45–46). These elements attempt to answer the following questions: Who are we? Where did we come from? What is the history of the land that we inhabit? How strong are our relationships with these lands? Which elements related to the history of these lands allow for the enrichment of our identity?

These questions are particularly important in the context of the area of former East Prussia, which after World War II, undergone an almost complete replacement of the population. The new inhabitants, which arrived after the war, brought with them the memory of local homelands of their origin (Alimpieva). At the same time, the displaced have struggled with the problem of historical consciousness, in the context of the knowledge of its origin and history of the land on which they happen to currently inhabit. According to the researchers' interpretation, the historical consciousness is an effective historical knowledge concerning the origin, past ideas and the value system accompanying the aforementioned (Filipowicz, 2002, pp. 23–29; Tosh, 2010, pp. 1–6). The question of the historical consciousness of the people, who arrived in the territory of the former East Prussia after the World War II, is an important one. They built their attitude toward these lands based on two components: the first one was the assigning of a national narrative to the lands joined to their respec-

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tive countries (Polish or Soviet). The other one was the appeal to history as a source of justification for these lands to join either Poland or the Soviet Union. These two largely opposing tendencies had a decisive impact on the level of identity and historical consciousness of the inhabitants of Warmia and Mazury and the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation, where it's worth mentioning that they affect the identity and historical consciousness in both regions in different ways.

Selected elements of historical identity and awareness in both regions

Those trends had an impact on the selected issues, presented in the introduction, related to the identity and historical consciousness of the inhabitants of Warmia and Mazury and the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation. Awareness of the existence of German material heritage on lands of the former East Prussia implied, on the one hand, the desire to erase the remaining traces of German presence, yet on the other hand, it tended to protect the remains of the material culture, which justified the addition of these areas to Poland and the Soviet Union. This issue also affected the process of naming settlements and geographical features, though it proceeded differently on the Polish and the Soviet sides of the border: the Warmia and Mazury tried to appeal to the Polish historical naming convention, and the Kaliningrad region mostly elected to cut itself off from historical naming. At the same time, the awareness of the German past of these lands increased in the last 25 years in both regions and that part of history is made more and more commonplace in nomenclature, culture, marketing and everyday language.

To start with, the approach to the sacral and defensive architecture remaining from the pre-war times should be analysed. In Warmia and Ma-

zury, immediately after the end of war, the policy of intensive restoration of Polish tradition related to individual sacral buildings was carried out, among others, through liquidation of material remnants of German heritage (changes of religious paintings, removal of ornaments and decorations on the buildings). Original Polish inscriptions were often restored in temples. Also, the reconstruction of post-Teutonic castles was undertaken. Constructions restored in the post-war period included the castles in Węgorzewo, Kętrzyn, Nidzica, Olsztynek, Ostróda and Pasłęk. The effort put into the restoration of Teutonic castles should be considered a symbol, despite significant financial constraints in the post-war conditions (Sakson, 2005, pp. 153–154). In recent years, more or less successful reconstruction works have been carried out in castles in Ryn, Działdowo and Morąg. Most castle buildings were designated for cultural and educational purposes and for hotel facilities. Local museums and artistic events were organized in some of them (Sikorski, Jasiński, 2014, pp. 6–7).

The situation in the Kaliningrad region, where the issue of reconstructing German historical buildings was under strong ideological pressure, was different. The effort of Soviet authorities in blurring the historical memory of the area in question ever belonging to the German state needs to be emphasized. This mostly resulted in cutting off any German traces of material culture. Former German museum collections were destroyed or taken away to other territories of the Soviet Union. The decision not to reconstruct the destroyed centre of Kaliningrad was based not only on economic reasons, but also the need to detach from the German traditions of the town. The post-war years were characterized by strong ideologisation of the reconstruction process, aimed at developing the region in accordance with “the spirit of the Soviet Union” (Wellman, 2007, p. 2). Ideological reasons were also used to justify the lack of rebuilding of a number of sacred objects – many of them were deliberately destroyed after the war. It is worth mentioning that, of the 222 churches, which survived the war in the Kaliningrad region, 118 were deliberately destroyed after the war (Kotowicz, 2011, p. 159). The story of the Königsberg castle

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and the tomb of Immanuel Kant, located at the cathedral on the Kneiphof Island was the perfect example of the ideological approach to the problems of reconstruction in Kaliningrad and German heritage retention: in 1969 the castle ruins were demolished, after being considered as a part of the Prussian heritage of Kaliningrad. At the same time the tomb of Kant was preserved, since Kant was regarded, from the point of view of Soviet ideology, as one of the few trust German philosophers (Kostyashov, 2003, pp. 50–53; Oldberg, 2000, p. 273; Brinks, 1998, pp. 611–615).

Many other castles were destroyed and not rebuilt after the war, and remain to this day in a state of permanent ruin. Castle in Mayovka (ger. Georgenburg) fell into ruin after the end of hostilities. Of Chernyakhovsk and Neman castles, only the walls and some structures remain. Both towns are home to social organizations seeking to protect what is left of the once prominent buildings. Several of the preserved castle buildings have been repurposed. The surviving part of the Gvardeysk castle currently serves as a prison. In turn in Guryevsk and Sovetsk the functioning buildings are used for commercial purposes. In Polesk the castle was made into a local cultural center. It is worth noting, that although most of the surviving castle buildings remain in poor condition, there is an effort aimed at protecting the preserved buildings. Initiatives related to reconstruction of some of them have been undertaken. Throughout the region, there are noticeable trends towards documenting the historic value of the preserved buildings and facilities (Sikorski, Jasiński, 2014, p. 8).

An interesting issue was the process of renaming localities and geographical features in the post-war period. In the Kaliningrad region, this issue was also subject to the strong impact of the state ideology. Immediately after the war, the original German names were used with reference to localities and geographical features. Starting from July 1946 the process of renaming localities and geographical features of the Kaliningrad region began. Importantly, the new names do not usually have anything in common with the previous German nomenclature, despite the fact that the German nomenclature often originated from Polish or Lithuanian. New

names usually refer to the natural values of the Kaliningrad region, or to the Soviet war heroes (Matthes, 2002, p. 12; Kotowicz, 2011, p. 161).

The name of Kaliningrad was given to the town to commemorate Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet Union. The process of changing other names was based on soviet symbolism: Tapiaw into Gwardeysk, Neukuhren into Pionersky and Tilsit into Sovetsk, geographical and natural features: Baltiysk (Pillau), Yantarny (Palmnicken) and historical background: Bagrationovsk (Preußisch Eylau), Domnovo (Domnau), Mamonovo (Heiligenbeil), Nesterov (Ebenrode) and Chernyakhovsk (Insterburg) (Szcześniak, 2003, pp. 202–204). New names referred to the German language names only to a slight degree. This concerned usually the names related to nature, geographical location or characteristic land features. There were also attempts to refer to actually very faint Russian traditions of those lands and veterans of War World II and of historical Russian and German battles in the territory of East Prussia (Kretinin, Bryushkin, Galtsov, 2002, p. 472; Krickus, 2002, pp. 38–39).

In the Warmia and Mazury region, the issue of renaming geographical features and localities remained under the influence of dogma concerning re-polonization of those lands. It should be noted that due to many years of cultivating strong Polish traditions on those territories, most of the locales had Polish names, and there was no need for re-polonization. At the same time Polish historical names were often polonized German names, as these processes occurred particularly strongly in those parts of Warmia and Mazury, where Polish people lived before the war. Examples can be found in the names of towns, such as: Olsztyn (ger. Allenstein), Grunwald (Grünfelde), or Gietrzwałd (Dietrichswalde) (Szcześniak, 2003, p. 205). Therefore, attempts were made to use Polish historical names. These names operate in parallel with German nomenclature and often have a different root, i.e.: Elk/Łek (Lyck), Lidzbark Warmiński (Heilsberg), Morąg/Moraği (Mohrungen) as well as Olecko (Marggrabowa, Treuburg). Another tendency was translation of individual names of localities and geographical features from German to Polish (e.g. Guttstadt – Dobre Mia-

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sto, Bischofsburg – Biskupiec, Liebmuhle – Miłomłyn, Mühlhausen – Młynary). Finally, the fourth tendency was to give localities completely new names, without any clearer relation to historical conditions or to the pre-war German name, usually in honour of pro-Polish activists in the Warmia and Mazury region (Kętrzyn, Pieniężno, Giżycko, Barczewo, Mrągowo) (Lewandowska, 2008, pp. 106–107). However, the general principle was to refer to Polish traditions in the names of localities and geographic features, which were often significant, with the aim of strengthening links between Warmia and Mazury and Poland.

Conclusions

These two different approaches to the historical traditions of the former East Prussia are reflected in the current historical awareness and identity in Warmia and Mazury and in the Kaliningrad region, as well as in the frequency of referring to German traditions of this land in culture, politics as well as economics and marketing. In Warmia and Mazury, the echo of the German past of these lands was still quite alive. This was supported by not only the functioning of numerous representatives of indigenous peoples, but also the remaining material traces of centuries of German presence on these territories: places of worship, palaces, castles and other fortified edifices. The partial preservation of various tablets and memorials of residents of the former East Prussia taking part in military campaigns carried out by the army of the German Empire serves as a striking example of respect for the German heritage in Warmia and Mazury. In summary, the identity and historical awareness of the inhabitants of Warmia and Mazury is a peculiar mix of knowledge about the history of these lands and their awareness of Polish affiliation. This not only emphasizes the relationship of Warmia and Mazury with Poland, but it also allows for reasonable management of German heritage (Lewandowska, 2008, p. 109).

Phenomena associated with “working through” the history of the region have been occurring in Kaliningrad region only for several years. A process of particular significance that has been going on since the 1990s in Kaliningrad region has been referred to by researchers as the “appropriation” of the German heritage. It consists in emphasizing the German history of the Kaliningrad region and in applying references to the German language in the colloquial Russian nomenclature. The town of Kaliningrad is commonly called by the German name of “König”. A range of companies and trade brands incorporating the word “Königsberg” in their names has emerged. German monuments and remembrance sites related e.g. to Immanuel Kant, Prince Albrecht, Richard Wagner or Friedrich Schiller, have been restored. An exceptionally interesting process has been observed as regards secondary Germanization of Russian names and a specific trend to refer to German cultural heritage. It could be expected that this process in the Kaliningrad region will intensify mainly due to the fact that the young generation of the region inhabitants is growing up surrounded by non-Russian culture, creating a specific type of historical identity – being a mixture of Russian, German and general European elements (Romanovskiy, 2014, pp. 280–281).

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Selim Chazbijewicz

TATARS AS AN ETHNIC MINORITY IN THE KALININGRAD REGION

ABSTRACT

The author describes, public and religious range of cultural activities of Tartar minority in the Kaliningrad circumference of the Russian Federation. He gives a basic statistical data, characteristics of this activity and contexts to the international cooperation in the region.

Keywords

Tatar, Kaliningrad, Islam, minority, nations, region

In 1989, there were 3556 inhabitants with the Tatar nationality on the territory of the Kaliningrad Oblast. The majority of them (81%, 2882 people)

lived in towns, whereas 674 persons resided in the countryside (Nasyrow, 2002, p. 53). These numbers changed in the following years. In 1999, the total number of the Tatar population increased by 255 people, among them, there were 145 persons from the Russian Federation. In 2001, the number of Tatars in the Kaliningrad Oblast reached the level of 5000 people.

As early as 1991, the Kaliningrad Association of Islamic Culture and History was established consisting mainly of the Tatar people of this region (Nasyrow, 2002, p. 87). It was a kind of cultural-scientific and social society; its members were mainly retired soldiers and graduates from colleges and universities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Russian Federation, as well as representatives of technical intellectuals and medicine professionals. Apart from the social life, the religious one started developing – previously banned by the authorities. In October 1993, the Religious Society of the Kaliningrad Oblast Muslims (Religioznoje objedinienije musul'man Kaliningradskoj obłasti) was founded, managed by hajji Hakim Biktiejew. In the meantime, they began to solicit with building a mosque in Kaliningrad formally. In the same year, the Tatar Culture Society (Obszczestwo tatarskoj kultury) *Tugan Tamyr* was set up, it was led by Wenzel Sałachow, who was also chosen to the authorities of the religious society. These both organizations often organize common cultural-religious events to celebrate such holidays as *Kurban Byjrami* (the Feast of the Sacrifice) and *Uraza Bayram* [“festival of breaking of the fast”, also called the Feast of Breaking the Fast, the Sugar Feast, Bayram (Bajram), the Sweet Festival and the Lesser Eid], as well as *Sabantuy* – the Tatar ethnic feast – “plough’s holiday”. These two communities take part in the Kaliningrad Days and organize tourist trips, concerts, lectures. Among these communities members one can find the Lithuanian Tatar – Adam Adamowicz Jakubowski – residing in Kaliningrad teaching religion (Nasyrow, 2002, p. 89). Both of the Kaliningrad societies, consisting of Tatars, support the local and regional libraries by collecting the Tatar literature books, especially these ones written in the language of the Volga Tatars – people being the majority in the Tatar population of the Kalinin-

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grad Oblast. The Kaliningrad Tatars take also care of the music and folk tradition maintaining by establishing a youth song and dance ensemble. The number of Muslim in Kaliningrad itself is estimated at the level of 15 000. In the framework of the Kaliningrad Islamic community, there are: Tatars, Chechens, Bashkirs and other Muslim nation representatives of the Russian Federation and the Former Soviet Union. In 2010, the construction of a mosque by the Pregolya River began. The site building was situated on the one of city squares – Comsol Square (<http://www.bibula.com/?p=30317>). However, the part of the Kaliningrad inhabitants protested against the idea of building itself as wells as the mosque location. They also objected to 20-tree cutting. The construction has been lasting and so far has not been completed. The Tatar organizations are under the World Tatar Society which has the headquarters in Kazan in Tatarstan. Therefore they are the branch of ethnic policy of the Russian Federation.

The Tatar Society of Polish Commonwealth has been aiming at broaden cooperation and integration of the Tatars groups living in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic region. Mutual relations of the Tatar groups and organizations from Lithuania, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Ukraine and Crimea have been established. The relation with the Tatar Diaspora in Petersburg in the Russian Federation and in the Kaliningrad Oblast was set up, too. Particular Tatar groups, in the countries mentioned above, have different historical and cultural tradition, which should have been overcome, in order to facilitate organization of general meeting and cultural events. The Tatars of Poland, Lithuania and Belarus has the same background – the Former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, they are often connected by family, friend, and genealogical relations. The Crimea Tatars constitute a separate historical, cultural, ethnic, linguistic unity. They are strongly consolidated by the common trauma of 1944 deportation and the political struggle for returning to Crimea. The Tatars came to Finland at the end of 19th century; the most massive Tatar settlement in Finland occurred after 1917. They are assimilated with Finns. On the other hand, the Tatars in Petersburg have been settling since the mid-

dle of 19th century. It was the city of the Tatar aristocracy related with the imperial court, e.g. Prince Feliks Jusupow – the murderer of Rasputin. At the turning of 19th and 20th centuries, a mosque in Petersburg was built, preserving until today. It was designed by engineer Stefan Kryczyński, an architect coming from the Polish Tatars. Whilst Tatars appeared in Latvia, Estonia, and continental Ukraine and in the Kaliningrad Oblast after the World War II. They were settled there, as the Red Army officers and non-commissioned officers or as officers of other former USSR services, on grounds of work order binding in the Former Soviet Union. A lot of Tatars especially in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Kaliningrad itself come from these professional groups. Kaliningrad used to be a garrison city which was a kind of the back for the Naval Base. It was also closed, this means that you can enter the city only possessing a special pass what excluded this place for tourists.

In order to integrate the Tatars group, the Conferences of Tatars from the Baltic Countries, celebration of *Sabantuj*, concerts, lectures and discussions have been organized. These meetings take place in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and previously in Belarus. In 1997, there was a common gathering in order to celebrate the 600-year Tatar settlement in the Great Duchy of Lithuania. The meeting was in Vilnius and one year later, in Belarus. The Tatar groups were frequently times hosted in Gdańsk, among them – the Tatars from Kaliningrad. A great meeting of the Tatars from Poland, the Kaliningrad Oblast and Lithuania took place in Wieżyca in 2008. W. Sałachow, the chairperson of the Tatar society from Kaliningrad, every year, with a smaller or bigger delegation, visits Gdańsk. The last meeting with the Tatars from Kaliningrad was in December 2011, on the occasion of the Tatarstan President visit in Gdańsk. He was able to visit the National Center of Tatar Culture. Near this place, in Orunia Park, in 2010, there was a celebration of exposing the Tatar Uhlan in the service of the Commonwealth monument. Among the special guests, there were the Polish President Bronisław Komorowski and the Tatar delegation from Kaliningrad. Between 10 and 11 May 2009, the Tatars from Kalin-

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ingrad took part in a cultural event organized together with the House of Russian Culture in Gdańsk. This cooperation, once established, has been still maintaining since 1997 with different dynamics. These relationships aim at both mutual better getting to know as well as the development of trans-border Polish-Russia cooperation in the dimension of NGOs and personal relations – these both states citizens. The Tatar organization in Poland and Lithuania cooperates rather closely, taking into consideration political, social and cultural circumstances of the Tatar minority from the Kaliningrad Oblast, the relations with this minority group is maintained in the name of a good trans-border cooperation.

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Marcin Chełminiak

THE GEOPOLITICAL ROLE OF THE KALININGRAD OBLAST IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION AFTER 1989

ABSTRACT

The international bipolar system was replaced by a multipolar system with new centers of power after the disintegration of USSR. After the collapse of Soviet Union the Baltic Sea Region occupies an important place in the foreign policy of the Baltic Sea countries. One of the most important challenges for the Russian diplomacy after 1991 was the development of economic and political relationships with the Baltic States and Baltic organizations and institutions. After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc Kaliningrad Oblast became an open region to cooperation with other countries, both on the regional and local levels. Attempts to create in Kaliningrad Oblast Russian “Hong Kong on the Baltic Sea” have not

yielded results so far. But on the other hand, the Russian exclave is no longer seen solely through the prism of military factors. Poland and other countries in the region do not question the current political and legal status of the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Keywords

Kaliningrad Oblast, Geopolitics, Baltic Sea Region, cross-border cooperation

During the period of the bi-polar order, the cooperation between the countries in the Baltic Sea region was significantly limited by the fierce cold-war rivalry. The border between two opposite political-military blocks ran through the Baltic region at that time: NATO (Norway, Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany) and the Warsaw Pact (USSR, Poland and German Democratic Republic). This directly determined the conditions and the scope of the sub-regional cooperation of the Baltic States. It could concern only these common endeavors whose realization would not breach the vast international political obligations of its participants. It also concerned the neutral states of Finland and Sweden (Jaworski, 1991, p. 79). The most important initiatives in which participated the opposite blocks member states, as well as the neutral states were, among others, the Gdańsk Convention of 1973 and the Helsinki Convention of 1974 (see: Jaworski, 1992, pp. 107–131). Both of these initiatives could not include tight political or economic cooperation due to the conditions mentioned above. They concerned the issues connected with environmental protection and sea resources. Also, the Baltic areas of the Soviet Union took part in this cooperation (Jaworski, 1992, p. 91).

Russian Baltic Sea regions were included in the sub-regional cooperation network only after the Yalta-Potsdam Treaty, when international circumstances changed in Europe.

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In the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian Federation stood in opposition to the new model of political order on the global and European scale based on the USA domination. Even at the end of the 20th century, the Russian Federation authorities were trying to push for the strategy aiming at keeping the bi-polar line-up based on partnership and Russian-American cooperation. However, the fact that the American administration preferred the unilateral model of international politics made Russia change its concept. Russian policy-makers spread the need to reconstruct the multipolar structure of international political order; it would slow down the United States domination and in the area of safety it would be based on a universal organization, e.g., OSCE. At the same time, they would not resign from the partnership with western states and institutions and specify the position of Russia in the system of international relations among the western states and organizations, however, as a separate strong player.

In the area of strategic safety, Russia takes into consideration possible use of nuclear weapons in the potential conflict, it is considered to be the final tool, however – necessary. The Russian position in this matter is the result of lowering the level of using nuclear weapons by other states.

International position of Russia is conditioned by two factors. On one hand, Moscow is perceived as a world superpower, having a nuclear arsenal, the status of the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and regularly taking part in all the diplomatic summits where the leaders of the most powerful and influential states meet. On the other hand, the condition of Russian economy does not allow for significant modernization and development of the armed forces which results in it limiting the global political influences. The idea of realism is dominant in the Russian politics (it is also called pragmatism or centralism). Its basic assumption is keeping the dominant role of the Russian Federation in the area of the post-Soviet influences at the same time continuing non-confrontational and pragmatic politics with the West.

From the perspective of the European order stabilization, it is important to analyze the Russian Federation politics against the states and international organizations of the Baltic Sea region. It is also significant from the point of view of Polish foreign affairs policy; it must take into consideration the matters of separating of one of the two Baltic Sea regions, i.e. Kaliningrad Oblast from Russia. Polish involvement in the problems of the Kaliningrad Oblast should, in a longer perspective, favor eliminating civilizational and economical differences between north-east Poland and the Russian enclave. It would be a mistake to focus only on the preventive measures concerning fighting organized crime or illegal immigration.

International cooperation in the region of the Baltic Sea is an important part of the European politics of the Russian Federation and the very cooperation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and the Leningrad Oblast with foreign partners would definitely be one of the factors which after 1989 contributed to breaking historical, social and political barriers in the Baltic area.

After the collapse of the USSR, the Kaliningrad Oblast as a Russian exclave has been the subject of interest from Polish and other Baltic Sea states. Kaliningrad issue, however, was not the priority problem in the relations of these countries with the Russian Federation, but the most significant place it played in Lithuanian–Russian relations. This was due to the following factors: military potential gathered in Kaliningrad Oblast, a Russian transit through the territory of Lithuania or the issue of the so-called “Lithuania Minor”. German policy towards the Kaliningrad Oblast since the early 90s was characterized by caution. The position of the German authorities on the issue of Kaliningrad was consistent with the policy of the European Union. Germany supported the activities enhancing the socio-economic development of the exclave, among others through the EU aid programmes in the framework of TACIS programme. Officially, Germany declaring restraint on the policy towards the Kaliningrad

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Oblast conducted at the same time quite extensive cooperation with this entity of the Russian Federation. It pointed particularly to the German commitment to cooperation in the sphere of economy and trade. Germany was next to Poland and Lithuania the most important trading partner of the Kaliningrad Oblast. In the case of the Nordic countries it must be emphasized that the most active in cooperation with the exclave was Sweden and Denmark. Finland and Norway showed less activity in turn. The Nordic countries perceived the Kaliningrad Oblast primarily through the prism of cooperation in the field of environmental protection, health, civil society development and local democracy. Kaliningrad Oblast became the subject of interest also from non-state actors, primarily the EU and NATO. Baltic sub-regional organizations, e.g., the Council of the Baltic Sea States played, in turn, the role of the forum where interested parties put their demands in relation to the Russian exclave (see: Żukowski, Chełminiak, 2015, pp. 180–188).

After the collapse of the USSR, in the context of the Russian considerations of the geopolitical role of the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation, there were two conceptions opposing each other. The one group of politicians and experts can be called realists. The matter of the enclave was seen by them through the Baltic rivalry between Russia and the West; the rivalry reaching out of the military area and the Yalta-Potsdam order into the field of economy. Noticing a certain role of the economic potential, they also criticized the concept of functioning of the Free Economic Zone in the Oblast. In their view, the zone served exclusively the purpose of weakening Russian economic interest and corrupting the officials. At the same time, they criticized the EU policy concerning the enclave. They treated the Union as a tool for implementing German geopolitical ambitions, like, e.g., returning the former East Prussia territories to the Federal Republic of Germany (Sergounin, 2003, pp. 160–161). The realists suggested, on the other hand, tightening ties with Moscow and increasing direct control over the Oblast by the Kremlin. The reply to ex-

panding NATO into the East was to continue to keep military forces in the enclave at a significant level as well as tightening political and military cooperation with Belarus (Sergounin, 2003, pp. 160–161).

In opposition to the realists stood the supporters of the pro-western option, so-called Euro-Atlantic supporters. They saw the Baltic region in the context of cooperation with the western states and institutions; in their opinion, this cooperation should be the priority of Russian foreign affairs policy. The representatives of this trend (among others: Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Kozyrev, Jegor Gajdar) in the first years of the 1990s postulated decreasing military forces in the Baltic Sea area as well as stronger cooperation with regional and sub-regional structures (for instance as a part of the Council of the Baltic Sea States). In their view, international cooperation and non-military tools of international politics started to play a significantly bigger role after the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam order and became important parts guaranteeing security and supporting Russian Federation interests in the area (Sergounin, 2003, pp. 255–256).

The representatives of the Euro-Atlantic option, similarly to the realists, connected the matter of pulling back the Russian army from the Baltic Sea republics with the issue of protecting the rights of the Russian-speaking residents of these areas. B. Yeltsin, referring to these issues in January 1992, at the United Nations Security Council meeting, stressed that Russia had to have a special position as the guardian and guarantor of safety and stability in the area of the former USSR states. Similar was the tone of A. Kozyrev at the UN General Assembly in 1993 (Zhuryari, 1994, p. 80).

In the discourse concerning the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation, the supporters of this option were usually called liberals or “the Atlantists”. It was possible to find them among the representatives of political and economic elites as well as in the scientists’ circles. They claimed that, along with the end of the cold-war rivalry, the military significance of the Oblast diminished. They thought that due to its unique geopolitical location, the Russian enclave had a chance to play the role of

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the “pioneer” Russian Federation region in terms of regional and sub-regional cooperation, especially in fields like trade, transport, and ecology or health protection issues. In the opinion of the liberals, an important role in tightening the cooperation between the Oblast and the member states of the expanded EU could be played by the EU Northern Dimension (Sergounin, 2003, pp. 160–161). The governor of the Oblast, Yuri Matoczkin, was undoubtedly a politician belonging to this option and one of the main initiators of starting WSE “Jantar”, the advocate of economic independence of the enclave as well as cooperation with the West. In 1993, together with Sergey Siemienow, the Oblast Duma President of the day suggested a referendum which would change the status of the enclave and transform it into a republic as a part of the Russian Federation (Oldberg, 2000, p. 275). Y. Matoczkin was of an opinion that the Oblast should be a kind of Liechtenstein of Luxembourg in terms of status. A small area whose advantages could be: its geographical location, simplified conditions of foreign banks registration, tax exemptions and investments in new technologies. He also claimed that the Kaliningrad enclave is deemed to keep its political independence from Moscow; however tightening economic links with the EU was inevitable. In his opinion closer economical connection with the West was an irreversible process.

Also, the leader of a liberal movement of the Union of Right Forces, Boris Nemtsov, demanded bigger independence for the enclave. In February 2001 he postulated increasing the degree of economical and administrative independence of the Kaliningrad Oblast (Baxendale, 2001, p. 462). Similar to theses in the academic circles were also put forward by Wiaczesław Dasziczew of Moscow. According to him, in the conditions of forming the new European order and Russia resigning from the superpower ambitions, the Kaliningrad enclave – as a free economic zone – should be the supporting factor for the good neighbor relationship of the Russian Federation with the Baltic Sea states, and at the same time, increase Russia’s security. According to W. Dasziczew, the role of the Kaliningrad Oblast to a high degree depends on “whether Russian foreign

policy is taken over by the understanding of the importance of European unity and creating Europe-wide political, economic and legal space for Russian national interests” (Daszyczew, 1993, p. 22). Jurij M. Zverew and Konstanty Gimbicki had similar opinions of the position of the Russian enclave in geopolitics. In their opinion, the target should be to develop a conception allowing the Oblast play the role of a bridge between the Russian Federation and the EU in the conditions of expanding the Union in the eastern direction. They also point out that this strategy for the Oblast must include optimally its autonomy with “keeping it in the political and economical space of the Russian Federation, reasonable balance between the state regulation of territorial development and the free self-organization of the society” (Zverew, Gimbicki, p. 280).

When analyzing the role of the Oblast in the Russian geopolitics, Alexander Sergounin additionally identifies an extremely liberal type of the liberal trend – the globalist trend. The supporters of this option assumed that the globalization and regionalization processes concern the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation directly. On one hand, it is the subject of discussion between two global players: EU and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, however, there is a tendency to create a new international region in the Baltic Sea area, where the Russian enclave could play a significant role. In the opinion of the globalists bigger independence and autonomy of the Oblast from Moscow would be the first step to transforming the enclave into an associate member of the EU and including it in the European Free Trade Association (Sergounin, 2003, p. 163).

The politics of the federal government in relations to the border areas of Russia might be accused of lack of consequence and continuity. There are certain indications, however, which prove growing interest in improving of the economic and social situation in these areas of the Russian Federation. E.g., in July 2001 the meeting of the Russian Federation Security Council under the leadership of Vladimir Putin was called; the meeting was devoted to the future of the Kaliningrad Oblast. It was the first in his-

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tory meeting of the Council concerning only one region of the Russian Federation. The participants, when discussing the future of Kaliningrad, pointed out the necessity of improving the economy in the Oblast, especially in the context of expanding of the EU. The Security Council wanted to increase the influence of the central power to the situation in the enclave and so they established the position of the deputy to the accredited representative of the President in the North-West Oblast; the deputy's task was to be controlling and coordinating the activities of the federal organs directly in Kaliningrad.

Another step of the federal administration constituted government-prepared federal projects and programs of development of some of the border areas of the Russian Federation. They mainly aimed at lessening the gap between their economic development and their neighbor states. The tools used for implementing these ideas are mainly:

1. development of transport infrastructure;
2. external investment increase;
3. modernizing and developing of the power networks.

Ambitious plans of the Russian administration might be shattered by the lack of funds for their implementation. Especially, that nearly a quarter of the funds should come from foreign investors.

From the standpoint of the European political order, the sub-regional structures of the Baltic cooperation do not play the main role. It is difficult to compare their significance to the role that such organizations as NATO or EU play. It is, however, necessary to stress that the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Union of the Baltic Cities have from the very start been open to the membership of the Russian Baltic regions. The participation of the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation in these organizations is significant mainly in the context of further processes of the cooperation development in the regional as well as in the cross-border fields. Further cooperation of the sea regions of Russia with other states of the Baltic Sea area also depends on the level of intensity of further works on building the cross-state transport corridors around

the Baltic Sea, and, above all the Via Hanseatica route, which is to run through the territory of the Russian enclave (see: Parteka, Szydrowski, 2003, pp. 11–36).

The participation of the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation in organizations and institutions of the sub-regional cooperation had a positive influence on stabilizing this region. Taking part in the works of that the Council of the Baltic Sea States or the Union of the Baltic Cities let keeping the relations with the Baltic Sea States, and also participation in international projects in the fields of economy, ecology or human rights protection.

Some experts point out that the that the Council of the Baltic Sea, placing bigger pressure on the full integration of the Baltic Sea areas of Russia with the Baltic Sea area, disregarded at the same time including the Russian State as a whole into this process. This, however, is the result of the special character of the sub-regional cooperation under the Baltic Sea organizations; it does not have to include the areas of the whole states. Another charge concerns the policy-based lack of interest in the security matters which, in the case of the Russian enclave, play an important role. It must, however, be remembered that the sub-regional movements created certain bonds, where, apart from the information exchange, leading political consultations and appearances against broader European structures, also sector cooperation was started for security in the soft security category. The matters of hard security were solved in bilateral relations of the Russian Federation with the Baltic Sea States, as well as in the NATO and OSCE forums. The Council of the Baltic Sea States played a positive role in the eastern expanding of the EU (also in the context of the problems connected with the Oblast), but above all, as a forum for informal contacts for the interested parties. Its secondary significance in the direct negotiations with the enclave-neighboring states and the most important organs of the EU, especially the European Commission, must be emphasized. The important thing is that the Russian side – despite many matters of concern – treated that the Council of the Baltic Sea States as an organ-

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ization favoring building of multilateral trust and security in the area of the Baltic Sea.

The end of the “Cold War” and the formation of the new order in Europe contributed so fundamentally to change the geopolitical significance of Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation. During the “Cold War”, it fulfilled only the role of a military base for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, Russian exclave became an open region to cooperation with other countries, both on the regional and local levels. Attempts to create in Kaliningrad Oblast Russian “Hong Kong on the Baltic Sea” have not yielded results so far. But on the other hand, the Russian exclave is no longer seen solely through the prism of military factors. Poland and other countries in the region do not question the current political and legal status of the Kaliningrad Oblast. Increasingly they see it more through the prism of cooperation in the Baltic region, rather than as a source of danger. Changes in relations between NATO, the EU and the Russian Federation could be affected not only by the shape of future European order, but also on changing the role of the Kaliningrad Oblast in Polish–Russian relations (see: Żukowski, Chełminiak, 2015, pp. 180–188).

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Wojciech Kotowicz

LOCAL BORDER TRAFFIC AS A TOOL
FOR INTEGRATION OF
THE BALTIC REGION STATES:
THE EXAMPLE OF POLAND AND RUSSIA

ABSTRACT

On 21 December 2007, Poland became a member of the Schengen area, which resulted in the abolition of border controls with Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania. Polish accession to the Schengen zone has transformed the north-eastern and eastern Polish borders with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine into the eastern border of the European Union. Polish accession to this zone also meant the introduction of uniform visa rules for Russia, the same which are used by other countries of the Union and sealing the Polish border with its eastern

neighbours. Therefore, control procedures have been modified and customs inspections have become more detailed. It was feared that the introduction of the visa regime would cause a decrease in trade and tourism with its eastern neighbours, hinder contacts between local communities, and – in political terms – would cause the deterioration of relations with Russia. In order to overcome these problems, the EU creates a special policy on external borders and border regions. According to the EU, borders between countries should not be an obstacle to sustainable development and integration of border areas. The EU policy recognizes that in the border regions, both economic and socio-cultural rights are important factors for applying mitigating solutions or even abolishing the visa regime. In order to accomplish this, the EU has drawn up the system for small border traffic, so-called local border traffic.

Keywords

Kaliningrad Region, Russia, Poland, local border traffic, cross-border cooperation

The foreign policy at the turn of 20th and 21st century has to take into account the challenges connected with the processes of globalization and international integration. Setting priorities, implementing appropriate methods and means and achieving chosen goals hinges upon numerous internal as well as external factors. However, the politics of a country depends mostly on geopolitical changes influencing that country. Foreign policy of the modern European countries has to additionally take into consideration the character of the EU whose characteristic is the fact that external policy of the member states takes place on both levels; namely supranational and national. Poland, which is the member state of the EU, has limited sovereignty as far as making decisions about its political relations with other countries (and obviously with Russia) are concerned.

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After Poland's joining the EU structures in 2004 the terms of Poland's relations with the Russian Federation and its organs have been conditioned not only by the reciprocal agreements between the two countries but also by the treaties signed by the EU and RF. Such a legal system also pertains to cross-border cooperation between north-eastern regions of Poland and the Kaliningrad Region. As far as Poland is concerned one of the priorities of the international and cross-border cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region is a collaboration with the Kaliningrad Region. So far the legal footing of the cooperation with the Kaliningrad Region has been determined by intergovernmental arrangements, agreements on forming Euroregions as well as agreements of regional and local authorities (Kotowicz, 2012, p. 215).

In the framework of Poland's admission to the EU the issue of visas for the Russians was a vital one. The consultation on regularizing this issue commenced in March 2000. The both sides of the negotiations concurred that the visas ought to be used many times and they ought to be inexpensive. The first of October 2003 was fixed as a date of introducing the visas. On that day Poland denounced free-visa travel on the border between Poland and Russia.

The implementation of the new rules concerning visas influenced significantly the cooperation on the borderland. There appeared additional formalities on the border which occasioned the situation that in the first year of the visas being in force occurred a major diminution of the arrivals to Poland.

Polish authorities perceived it as important that the collaboration with the eastern neighbour in the new international and legal framework did not lead to the isolation of the Kaliningrad Region from north-eastern regions of Poland. Consequently, the EU fostered Lithuania, Poland and Kaliningrad Region of Russian Federation Neighbourhood Programme (INTERREG III A/TACIS) which was in force in the years 2004–2006. The funds of the European Regional Development Fund which were obtained by the Warmia and Mazury Region (Warmińsko-

-Mazurskie Voivodeship) amounted to 4.8 million euros which constituted 14% of the country's funds. As far as the money is concerned about 1.6 million euros were designated for the projects concerning the development of tourism and tourism infrastructure as well places of historical interest which have trans-border importance. Over 1 million euros were designated for works on the state border. For instance, for the infrastructure in Elbląg harbour. The rest of the funds were committed to the projects dealing with the protection of the environment

After the first of May 2004, the most significant role in cross-border cooperation between the Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship and the Russian Kaliningrad Region is played by the Euroregion "Baltic" (despite the contribution of new Euroregion "Sesupe" and Euroregion "Lyna-Lava"). It was mostly created in order to intensify cooperation from bilateral to multilateral.

In the recent years, the Lithuania-Poland-Russia Cross-border Cooperation Programme has been a vital project boosting the collaboration of the Warmia and Mazury Region (Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship) with the Kaliningrad Region. Its aim consists in enhancing of the contacts between Poland, Russia and Lithuania through bipartite and tripartite cooperation. The specific objectives are fostering of social and economic development in both countries, interoperability aiming at elaborating attitudes on common challenges and problems as well as supporting interpersonal contacts. The program has been offering support for social and economic development and has been pursuing the objectives of improving life conditions for the inhabitants of the region. Presently there have been 60 projects which have been allocating 100 million euros.

The new stage in the relations of Poland with the Kaliningrad Region was the implementation of laws on "local border traffic".

According to the Lisbon Treaty, one of the main objectives of the EU is providing its citizen's freedom, safety and justice without internal frontiers (*Traktat*). As far as external relations are concerned the free movement of persons, goods and capital are considered as one of the greatest

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achievements of the European community. One also has to bear in mind that it is vital for the EU that borders with neighbouring countries were not barriers for commerce, social interactions, cultural exchange or regional cooperation (Fieduciuk, 2009, p. 37).

This objective is accomplished through implementing the EU special policies for external borders and cross-border regions (Szymański, 2009, p. 76). The borders between the countries ought not to pose obstacles to development as well as integration of cross-border regions (Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska, 2011, p. 119).

The regions which are situated along the external land borders of the EU are deemed to have the most adverse conditions where problems typical of cross-border regions are exacerbated by the closure of the borders for almost half a century and by a considerable difference in economic development between the EU countries and the countries beyond its borders. These problems were particularly acknowledged after Austria's and Finland's accession to the EU. Due to this enlargement, the eastern borders of the EU almost coincided with the Iron Curtain. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 also highlighted problems on eastern borders, especially disparities in the economic and social development of cross-border regions (Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska, 2011, p. 122). It had considerable relevancy on the eastern border of Poland, which until 1991 had generally been a closed border, which led to the social and economic alienation of the cross-border region (Dołzbłasz, Raczyk, 2011, p. 66).

The level of development of the regions bordering the EU was lower than the average of all EU's regions. The insufficient infrastructure (transport, energy supply, waste utilization) is considered as the most pernicious factor for integrating of cross-border regions. This factor is noticeable beyond the EU and it translates into considerable lower rates of income per capita, PKB as well as productivity (Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska, 2011, p. 123). Hence, in order to overcome these disparities, the special role was ascribed to cross-border cooperation of these regions.

According to the EU, the main goal of cross-border cooperation ought to be solving mutual problems in cross-border regions such as poor ac-

cessibility of information technology, weak local industry, insufficient business infrastructure, the lack of links between local and regional levels of administration, low level of research and innovation, the environmental pollution, the negative attitude of the citizens of the neighbouring countries as well as unsatisfying job market integration and cooperation between educational institutions (*Rozporządzenie Parlamentu*).

Eliminating barriers in mutual relations are vital for cross-border areas since their residents traditionally rely highly on local border trade. The EU policy acknowledges economic, social as well as cultural issues as import and premises for reducing or eliminating visa requirements. Consequently, the EU implemented the special rules for local border traffic, the so-called small border traffic (Doliwa-Klepacka, 2011, p. 147).

According to these rules, the residents of the border areas are entitled to travel across the land border of the neighbouring country on condition that:

- a) they obtain a permit for crossing the border according to the rules of small border traffic if it is needed by bilateral agreement under article 13 and possess a travel document;
- b) they are not persons who are enlisted in the Schengen Information System for the purposes of their entry refusal;
- c) they do not pose a threat to the public order, internal security, public health and international relations of any of the member states (*Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 1931/2006*).

One has to emphasize that Poland, being the country with the longest external border in the EU with non-member states, has been interested in developing relations according to small border traffic and its representatives have participated in the preparation concerning small border traffic (Fieduciuk, 2009, p. 38). The following agreements have been signed so far:

- between Hungary and Ukraine (December 2007);
- between Slovakia and Ukraine (May 2008);
- between Poland and Ukraine (March 2008);
- between Romania and Moldova (November 2009);

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- between Poland and Belarus (February 2010);
- between Latvia and Belarus (August 2010);
- between Lithuania and Belarus (October 2010);
- between Russia and Norway (November 2010);
- between Latvia and Russia (December 2010);
- between Poland and Russia (December 2011) (*Komunikat*).

In 2011 the European Commission reviewed the process of implementation and functioning of rules concerning small border traffic and concluded that the agreements lived up to the expectations since they facilitate trade and mutual relations. There were few cases of malpractice. The commission also stated that there has been a proper relation between the implemented facilitations and the issue of safety in the Schengen area (*Sprawozdanie*).

On 20 December 2006 the European Parliament and the EU Council adopted a regulation laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States (*Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 1931/2006*) which allows derogating, for persons living in a border area, from the general rules on border checks set out in the Schengen Borders Code (*Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 562/2006*).

The term “local border traffic” should be understood as a crossing of the external land border by border residents in order to stay in the border area e.g. for social, cultural or substantiated economic reasons, or for family reasons for a period not exceeding the time limits laid down in this Regulation (*Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 1931/2006*).

The main purpose of local border traffic is to prevent the emergence of barriers to trade, social and cultural interchange or regional cooperation with neighbours – it refers both to physical and mental contacts between border communities (Gruszczak, 2005, p. 13). In implementing the local border traffic regime, the Member States may conclude bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries (outside the Schengen agreement) aimed at addressing specific needs in relation to their respective neighbours, as these needs vary because of different local, geographical,

social and economic situations. These agreements should be in line with the principles of local border traffic, laid down in EU regulation.

Laying down criteria and conditions to be complied with when the crossing of an external land border under the local border traffic regime is being eased for border residents, the EU has had to strike a balance between facilitating border crossing to border residents acting in good faith, having legitimate reasons for frequent external land border crossing, on the one hand, and the need to prevent illegal immigration and threats to security posed by criminal activities, on the other hand (*Wniosek*).

The agreement on local border traffic was signed during the meeting of foreign ministers of Poland and Russia; respectively Radosław Sikorski and Sergey Lavrov. The meeting was held on 14 December 2011. According to the statements of the both sides the arrangement constitutes a significant milestone in the relations between the two countries and enables a further opening up for the cooperation of the Kaliningrad Region with the EU in the future (Żołądek, 2013, p. 3). It was decided that the borderland included the whole area of the Kaliningrad Region and the same area in Poland that is in Pomeranian Voivodeship: Gdynia, Gdańsk, Sopot and the following counties (*powiaty* in Polish): Puck, Gdańsk, Nowy Dwór, Malbork and in Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship the cities: Elbląg and Olsztyn and the following counties (*powiaty* in Polish): Elbląg, Braniewo, Lidzbark, Bartoszyce, Olsztyn, Kętrzyn, Mrągowo, Węgorzewo, Giżycko, Gołdap, Olecko. The terms of local border traffic apply to 2 million people in Poland and 940 000 people in the Kaliningrad Region.

The regulations of the agreement pertain to the whole Kaliningrad Region which is an exemption from the customary practice considering as a borderland an area from 30 to 50 km from the border. The agreement entered into force on 27 July 2012. The inhabitants of the borderland wanting to travel more freely may obtain a special multiple exit and re-entry permit.

The agreement on the local border traffic facilitates direct local commercial tourists and other people-to-people contacts. The immediate result of the implementing the regulations of the local border traffic is an

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increase of trade flows on the borderland. The introduction of the agreement on the local border traffic is regarded as an outstanding achievement (Żęgota, 2013, p. 75). On 11 May 2013 R. Sikorski stated: “thanks to the Russian customers [...] the turnover in our shops in the region which is included in the terms of the agreement has increased by 30%”. He added: “It strenghtens our determination to eliminate the barriers in the human traffic and to re-establish visa-free movement with all our neighbours including the Russian Federation. In turn, S. Lavrov evaluated the agreement as a positive one. He said that the free-visa travel of the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region and Polish inhabitants of the borderland does not pose any problems (Wojciechowski, Bełza, 2011).

It ought to be noted that there have not been any serious violations of the rules of the local border traffic. Since the moment of issuing of the permissions for crossing the border, there has been an increase in the human traffic and it reached the level of the human traffic before Poland’s entering Schengen regulations.

This agreement (*Umowa*) is based on existing institutional infrastructure, namely on provisions of the Treaty between the Republic of Poland the Russian Federation on Friendly and Neighbourly Cooperation of 22 May 1992. Both contracting parties have declared that they wish to promote and strengthen good-neighbourly relations between the two countries, as well as economic, commercial, technical, cultural and including other fields cooperation, thus thereby support the development of contacts between the inhabitants of the border region (Żukowski, 2013, p. 56). Successful negotiations on local cross border movement were deemed by the authorities of the two countries as one the major successes in bilateral relations after Poland’s becoming the member of the EU.

Under the terms of the agreement, the permit is issued on the basis of a valid travel document and a certificate of permanent residence in the border area for at least 3 years (Polish or Russian Citizenship is not required). Social, cultural, family and other substantiated economic considerations may be the cause of crossing of the border (art. 3). The authorized stay in the border area of the other country may take up to 30 days

after crossing the border, but no longer than 90 days in total during every 6 months from the date of the first crossing of the border. The first permit is issued for two years, and the next one for 5 years (art. 4). It should also be noted that local border traffic applies only to travel by land. It is worth noting that local border traffic greatly eases the regular crossings of the external land border of EU by border residents. It can be noticed in an increase in the number of persons crossing the Polish-Russian Border. Since the introduction of the agreement on small border traffic, the Border Guards have recorded dynamic growth of traffic at border crossings between the Polish and Russia.

The introduction of local border traffic has undoubtedly become an important element in facilitating border crossing, which significantly contributed to the recovery in the border zone. It should be emphasized that the small border traffic with Kaliningrad has been a success both in economic and social terms. It is noted that Poland has benefited more from the agreement, not only because of revival of trade, but also – thanks to well-prepared accommodation facilities – on the increase of intensity of tourist traffic from Russia. However, the Russian side has also noted benefits such as: boosting people-to-people contacts, an overall increase in the number of joint projects received by NGOs, local governments or universities, closer cooperation between border services and the expansion of the infrastructure at crossings.

Implementation of the agreement about local cross border movement may improve cross border relations but it will not change significantly the role of Kaliningrad Region in Polish foreign policy.

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CROSS-BORDER AND INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION (PARADIPLOMACY) BETWEEN POLAND AND THE KALININGRAD REGION

ABSTRACT

Foreign activity (paradiplomacy) of local governments is one of the elements of Polish foreign policy, changing the traditional approach to foreign policy and diplomacy in our country. Paradiplomacy is an activity that is parallel and complementary to the classic diplomacy which is realised by the government. This paper presents the results of the investigations concerning foreign activity of Polish local and regional governments with Kaliningrad Region. This Oblast constitutes for Poland an important region from the geopolitical point of view. In particular, there

is intensive cooperation between the Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship (Warmia and Mazury Region) and Kaliningrad Region which forms the Polish-Russian borderland. Relatively intense relations have been established between the Kaliningrad Region and Pomeranian and Podlaskie Voivodeships. For the Polish side, the development of this type of relations with Russia, and especially with the Kaliningrad Region was and is part of the peaceful transformation of this part of Europe.

Keywords

paradiplomacy, partnership agreements, Polish-Russian borderland, Warmia and Mazury Region, Kaliningrad Region

Introduction

The modern international relations are characterised by several levels on which states function, as well as the multiplicity and diversity of participants other than states themselves. As a consequence, various levels of analysis have to be considered to discuss international relations at present.

Modern states are multivocal actors. In the world of interdependencies, and such a polyphony is a result of the international mixing with the national. This has led to the situation in which organisational units of states are perceived internationally as independent subjects and they are increasingly active on the international scale (Duchacek, 1984, pp. 5–31). Territorial units (regions, communes or cities) which start cooperating with foreign partners are counted among the so-called subnational participants of international relations. Their cooperation is realised in line with conditions established in the internal laws and international agreements; to a certain extent it is controlled by the authorities of relevant

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states; however, it is not an automatic extension of their foreign policy. Local and regional authorities have a considerable amount of freedom, which makes it possible to treat them as participants of international life independent of the states within which they act (Popiuk-Rysińska, 2006, pp. 496–497). International cooperation of regional and local territorial units is more and more often referred to as paradiplomacy. It is divided into cross-border cooperation and interregional cooperation. The first type refers to neighbourly relations, while the second one encompasses units which do not have a common border.

Paradiplomacy of Polish self-government units started in the 1990s and since then it has become a permanent social element of Poland's international activity and its foreign policy, complementing the traditional diplomacy. It played an especially positive role in the integration process between Poland and the European Union, and after the Polish accession to the EU in 2004 it was actuated and gained new importance. As the matters falling within the responsibility of self-government became more international and as they got incorporated in the multilevel system of government, regional and local authorities can at present exercise influence not only on intra-national matters but also – to a certain extent – on the state's foreign policy. This is especially visible in the European Union, where territorial units try to have an impact on the European decision processes, e.g. through the Committee of the Regions or conducting their own lobbying activities through regional offices in Brussels.

The origin of the right to cooperate with local and regional communities of other countries and the right to establish international associations which local governments enjoy can be seen in international multilateral agreements (such as the European Outline Convention of Transfrontier Cooperation, which Poland ratified), international bilateral agreements (such agreements Poland signed with all its neighbouring countries), as well as Polish internal law. It is worth remembering also about political conditions of paradiplomacy, which prove especially important in contacts with the Russian partners (Modzelewski, 2006).

The legal basis for the cooperation between Poland and the Kaliningrad Region on the local and regional level comprises primarily three agreements: the Treaty on Friendly and Good-Neighbourly Relations between the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation, the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Russian Federation about North-eastern Provinces of Poland and Kaliningrad Oblast (Russian Federation) Cooperation (both documents were signed on May 22, 1992), and the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cross-border Cooperation of October 2, 1992. Considering the functioning of the common border, one needs to enumerate here also the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Russian Federation on Border Crossings of May 22, 1992, whereby four road and three train border crossings operate.

The Polish-Russian cross-border and interregional cooperation maintained on everyday basis had preceded the establishment of any institutional framework for its existence and had been characterised by an energetic grassroots development of mutual contacts. The first documents signed between Poland and its partners from the Kaliningrad Region included: the Protocol of Cooperation between the Kaliningrad Oblast and Elbląg Voivodeship – signed by the Elbląg Voivode and the Deputy-Governor of the Oblast (Region) in October 1990; as well as the Intentional Protocol of Cooperation of the Kaliningrad Oblast, the Elbląg Voivodeship and the Blekinge Province of June 1991. In November 1991, the Agreement on Cooperation between the Olsztyn Voivode and the Chairman of Administration of the Kaliningrad Region was signed. Similar agreements with the Region's administration were signed by the voivodes of the current voivodeships: Szczecin (1991), Elbląg (1992), Suwałki (1992) and Gdańsk (1992). Moreover, in 1997 the regional council of the Olsztyn Voivodeship signed two agreements with the Kaliningrad Region: a bilateral and a trilateral one, the latter including partners

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from Kommunförbundet Halland in Sweden. The partners declared their will to develop cooperation in fields related to local democracy, economy, ecology, education, science and culture, which was to be achieved through sharing skills and experience, organising workshops and seminars, and establishing committees and working groups.

Cross-border cooperation

The Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship (Warmia and Mazury Region), since its establishment in 1999, has become the main partner in contacts with the Kaliningrad Region. The two entities entered cross-border cooperation, which is defined as neighbourly cooperation conducted across the border within the adjacent cross-border regions which constitute a common borderland (Modzelewski, 2015, pp. 5–24). Such cooperation is one of the elements of the regional development policy executed by the voivodeship government. The present development strategy of the Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship embraced in 2013, encompasses an assumption that cooperation with countries and regions of the Baltic region constitutes an important impulse in the overall development of the region. Among all the partners, the Kaliningrad Region occupies a unique position as it is the closest neighbour of the voivodeship (*Resolution No XXVIII/553/13*). The voivodeship government has an important task of providing the right conditions and functioning as an intermediary for other local government units when it comes to establishing international contacts. These steps should be taken in line with the priorities of the foreign policy of the voivodeship, passed by the regional assembly [first in 1999, with subsequent amendments in 2002, 2006, 2009, and 2014 (see: *Attachment*)]. In every version of the resolution, the neighbourhood of the Russian enclave was referred to as a significant developmental impulse for the region. In every version there is also a statement that the

foreign policy of the voivodeship is conditioned first of all by the neighbourhood of the Kaliningrad Region and chances thereof.

Implementing the set priorities, the voivodeship marshal signed an agreement with the governor of the Kaliningrad Region in September 2001, while the chairman of the assembly – with the chairman of the Regional Duma in April 2002. In September 2002, the voivodeship signed a letter of intent on trilateral cooperation, including a Danish county of Bornholm.

The voivodeship government promotes all contacts with the Kaliningrad Region, also those in the sphere of economy, through such activities as supporting the entrepreneurs willing to enter Kaliningrad's market. They can receive all the necessary information and patronage of fairs, conferences, trainings and business trips. Initiatives facilitating the development of regional and cross-border tourism are also supported. When it comes to the social and cultural undertakings, a few dozen events are organised each year. These are festivals, open air artistic workshops, days of a number of cities, and other cross-border projects. Among the biggest events, one needs to enumerate Days of the Kaliningrad Region in Warmia and Masuria, and Days of Warmia and Masuria in the Kaliningrad Region. Some of the events are organised regularly, permanently shaping the Polish–Russian relations in the borderland. These are for instance the International Cycling Race for the Cup of Consul General of the Republic of Poland in Kaliningrad or the International Lyna-Lava Canoeing Rally.

In the recent years, the cooperation of Warmia and Masuria and the Kaliningrad Region has become more dynamic, which is also visible in individual contacts in the borderland. This is a result of implementing the rules of local border traffic (LBT) in July 2012, following the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Rules of Local Border Traffic of 14 December 2011. This agreement granted the privilege of local border traffic to all the citizens of the Kaliningrad Region and some of the citizens of the

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Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship and Pomeranian Voivodeship [15 counties as well as Tricity (Gdynia, Sopot, Gdańsk), Olsztyn and Elbląg]. Since it was implemented the border traffic has been considerably growing: in 2012 it was 4.7 million people (while a year before only 2.3 million), in 2013 it exceeded 6 million, in 2014 likewise (*Ruch*, 2014), and by October 2015 it amounted to 5.1 million (<http://www.wm.strazgraniczna.pl>). In 2012, the Polish partner issued 12 500 permits entitling people to cross the border in line with the rules of the local border traffic (the LBT cards). In 2013 the number of permits was over 184 000, in 2014 – 53 000, while by the end of September 2015 – 51 000 (<http://www.kaliningrad.msz.gov.pl/pl>). Also, the character of cross-border cooperation has changed. The Polish part of borderland, among other factors due to its nature-related values and attractive prices, is more often visited by Russians who come to visit, stay in hotels, use various forms of entertainment, as well as doing shopping in shopping centres and shops close to the border. For instance Braniewo, with its 17 000 citizens, has a few discount chain shops in which Russians are the majority of customers (Wenerski, Kaźmierkiewicz, 2013, pp. 10–12).

At the local level, most of the counties in the Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship have established some contacts with the partners in the Region, with 8 counties having signed partnership agreements. The Bartoszyce County signed an agreement with Bagrationovsk, Giżycko – with Nesterov, Kętrzyn – with Pravdinsk and Oktiabrsk, Lidzbark Warmiński – with Bagrationovsk, Ostróda – with Pravdinsk, Węgorzewo – with Chernyachovsk, Ozyorsk and Pravdinsk. For many years Polish municipalities have been cooperating with their Russian partners: Olsztyn with Kaliningrad (since 1993), Elbląg with Baltiysk and Kaliningrad (since 1994).

When it comes to the number of Russian partners, the Węgorzewo County is a record holder. The range of cooperation encompasses: tourism (exchange of information about the local accommodation, cycling races, walking tours, International Canoeing Rally on the Sapina and the Węgorapa rivers), culture (artistic exchanges, exhibitions, sharing expe-

rience in the field of cultural heritage protection), and education (holiday youth exchanges with language courses). Russian guests take part in regular events co-organised by the Museum of Folk Culture in Węgorzewo, such as International Folklore Fair, the Węgorzewo Rally or Days of Węgorzewo. The county authorities in cooperation with the commune of Węgorzewo shape the realised programmes, initiate new enterprises and provide financial and organisational support (<http://www.powiatwegorzewski.pl>).

At the commune level in the Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, along Euroregional contacts (Baltic, Nieman, Lyna-Lava) and cooperation not based on formal agreements (a few dozen communes¹), 16 communes signed agreements with their partners in the Kaliningrad Region: Banie Mazurskie – Ozyorsk, Barciany – Zheleznodorozhny, Bartoszyce – Pionersky and Bagrationovsk, Braniewo – Zelenogradsk, Frombork – Svetly, Gołdap – Gusev, Górowo Iławeckie – Bagrationovsk, Kętrzyn – Svetly, Kowale Oleckie – Krasnoznamensk, Lidzbark Warmiński – Sovetsk, Miłakowo – Slavsk, Miłomłyn – Ozyorsk, Olecko – Gusev, Olsztynek – Polessk, Sępólno – Pravdinsk, Węgorzewo – Chernyachovsk.

The fact that Bartoszyce is located less than 20 km from the biggest border crossing in Bezledy naturally facilitates cooperation with the Russian partners. The town's partner towns are its closest neighbours: Pionersky and Bagrationovsk, with Ozyorsk cooperating with Bartoszyce informally. The town focuses on culture-related projects which are regularly developed during International Days of the Bartoszyce Region, Borderland Fairs, folk festivals and sports tournaments. It is worth adding that apart from the direct contacts exercised at the level of Town Hall, there are also those established at lower levels, e.g. by the Municipal Social

¹ It is worth emphasising that beneficiaries from both sides of the border have to apply for the funding if the project is to be funded from the EU, which often constitutes a reason to undertake an *ad hoc* cooperation. This pertains to Małdyty and Ozyorsk, Biskupiec Pomorski, Nowe Miasto Lubawskie and Pionersky, Ostróda and Nieman, Gusev and Ozyorsk.

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Help Centre, the local lower secondary school or the Bartoszyce Culture Centre. New areas of cross-border cooperation are sought, to involve local businesses, hospitals and non-governmental organisations.

All border counties and communes cooperate with the Russian partners, and those which do not keep in contact with the Kaliningrad Region are located in the southern part of the voivodeship. Olsztyn and Elbląg are the most active – these are the entities with the greatest potential, as well as Bartoszyce, Gołdap and Węgorzewo – the closest to the border. Thus it can be said that cooperation is determined by geographical vicinity and financial abilities of the partners. Moreover, personal engagement of local government representatives also plays an important role when it comes to the intensity of the contacts. The majority of cross-border undertakings are related to the policy of local development and refer to common projects, mainly in the social and cultural sphere. The important fields of cooperation include lobbying for the establishment of new border crossings, such as Perły – Kryłovo (the Węgorzewo commune and county), Michałkowo – Zheleznodorozhny (Barciany commune, Kętrzyn county), Rapa – Ozyorsk (Banie Mazurskie commune, Gołdap county), Stopki – Ostre Bardo on the Lyna river (Sępopol commune, Bartoszyce county), Piaski – Baltiysk on the Vistula Spit (Krynica Morska commune, Nowy Dwór county) and Głębock – Kornevo (Lelkowo commune, Braniewo county).

Interregional cooperation

Relatively intense relations have been established between the Kaliningrad Region and its neighbourly Polish voivodeships – Podlaskie and Pomeranian (with the national border on the Vistula Spit). Occasional contacts with the Russian partners are undertaken by the Podlaskie Voivode, who signed a letter of intent with the Governor of the Kalinin-

grad Region in April 2003 with a view to strengthening and developing good-neighbourly relations. The government of Podlaskie Voivodeship cooperates with the Russians from time to time, without any partnership agreements, although a plan of cooperation for the years 2008–2009 was signed. Interestingly, the priorities of international cooperation of the Podlaskie Voivodeship included two Russian regions: Kaliningrad and Kursk (*Resolution No XXXVII/480/06*). The Pomeranian Voivodeship has been cooperating with the Kaliningrad Region since its establishment, continuing the contacts of the Gdańsk Voivodeship. The resolution of Pomeranian Voivodeship assembly on the priorities of foreign cooperation, this Russian region was enumerated as one of the main directions of the activity in the Baltic Sea area. Consequently, the chairman of the assembly and the marshal signed agreements with the Russian regional administration in 2002. This provided a basis for institutional cooperation of both regions, among others, in the sphere of training local government clerks, exchange of information on legal regulations concerning entrepreneurship, trade, tourism and maritime economy. Other fields of cooperation include multilateral organisations, such as the Union of the Baltic Cities and the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation Conference (Gdańsk).

The West Pomeranian Voivodeship, continuing a long-term cooperation started by the Szczecin Voivode, in 2004 signed an agreement with the Kaliningrad Region administration, and in 2007 an agreement was also signed by the representative of the Voivodeship Assembly and Regional Duma. Since 2009, the Marshal of the West Pomeranian Voivodeship has been a member of the Polish-Russian Council for Cooperation between Regions of the Republic of Poland and the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation. Apart from formal relations, a few Polish regions have been maintaining occasional contacts with partners from Kaliningrad, e.g. the Łódź Voivodeship and the Lublin Voivodeship.

It is worth pointing out that in order to develop the cooperation at the level of regions, the 1st Forum of Regions Poland-Russia was organised in

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Moscow in September 2009 under the patronage of the Senate of the Republic of Poland and the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. The discussions included the issue of conditions of cooperation and opportunities for its development. Particular regions presented their offers. The following meetings took place alternatively in Poland (2nd in Warsaw, 4th in Tomaszowice) and in Russia (3rd in Skolkovo n. Moscow, 5th – so far the last – in 2013 in Nizhny Novgorod). The 6th Forum of Regions Poland-Russia in Gdańsk planned for 2014 did not take place (Poland cancelled it) due to the international situation and tension in the Russian-Ukrainian relationships (*Odwołuję*).

Apart from cities of Warmia and Mazury, the list of Kaliningrad's twin cities includes: Białystok, Gdańsk, Gdynia, Łódź, Racibórz, Starogard Gdański, Toruń and Zabrze. Bełchatów and Kutno signed partnership agreements with Sovetsk, Brzeg Dolny and Grudziądz – with Chernyachovsk, Goleniów – with Guryevsk, Krynica Morska – with Baltiysk, Łeba – with Zelenogradsk, Nysa – with Baltiysk, Pabianice – with Gusev, and Świnoujście – with Svetly. Contacts not based on formal regulations have also been established between the Kaliningrad Region and Ruda Śląska, Środa Śląska, Szczecin and Nowy Sącz County.

Conclusions

The intensity of cross-border and interregional cooperation between Poland and the Kaliningrad Region results primarily from the geographic location. For the local governments functioning in the closest vicinity of the border, cooperation with Russian partners is natural; the further from the border we move, the less interest in this cooperation there is. Furthermore, mutual relations are determined by the Polish membership in the European Union and the character of the Polish-Russian border pursuant to this, including formal and legal conditions to cross the

border (the visa system, local border traffic permits). From the perspective of regional development, it is a priority for the local governments to use the available funds devoted to cross-border projects.

In 2015, Poland celebrated the 25th anniversary of its self-government, which functions also on the international stage. The conclusions that can be drawn after this period encourage one to think optimistically about the future. Such an assumption pertains also to the Polish–Russian contacts, which are particularly difficult politically; however, the cooperation of local governments as well as human relationships are truly satisfying.

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Łukasz Bielewski

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE WARMIA AND MAZURY REGION AND THE KALININGRAD REGION

ABSTRACT

This paper is devoted to the cooperation linking the Warmia and Mazury region (Warmińsko-Mazurskie region) in Poland and the Kaliningrad region in Russia. The main aim is to show it from the practical point of view, i.e. through actual documents, initiatives and actions initiated and implemented in bilateral contacts. This text also focuses on how those local undertakings contribute to “global” Polish–Russian relations.

The paper begins by looking at strategic documents (intergovernmental, interregional) which establish the framework for collaboration.

Then it concentrates on selected areas of cooperation with some examples of common events and tools dedicated to support Polish-Russian initiatives. In this context, special attention is given to the sector of tourism.

Several forms of political cooperation are also described: both those initiated by regional authorities and those governed by state bodies with the participations of regions.

This text also considers how the introduction of Small Border Traffic has changed the reality of cross-border cooperation. It also points out future possibilities and certain challenges linked directly to the SBT regime as well as it shows its meaning for the Polish–Russian relations in the times of EU-Russia political crisis.

Keywords

Warmia and Mazury/Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Kaliningrad, Russia, Small Border Traffic, cross-border cooperation

The Polish-Russian border is a space in which interregional, inter-municipal and cross-border collaborations have emerged over the past years. Therefore, the cooperation linking the Warmia and Mazury region (Warmińsko-Mazurskie region) and the Kaliningrad region¹ is a phenomenon worth observing since not only does it (to some extent) reflect current Polish–Russian bilateral relations, but it may be a great example of what can be achieved on the European Union external border as well.

¹ In this text I use the word “region” as I believe it is internationally recognised the most. Nevertheless, such terms as “Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship” and “Kaliningrad Oblast” are often used as well.

Strategic documents

As far as intergovernmental level is concerned, fundamental documents regulating cross-border cooperation, The Treaty of Good Neighbourhood and Friendly Cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation and The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Russian Federation on cooperation of the north-eastern regions (voivodeships in Poland and Kaliningrad Oblast, were signed on 22 May 1992 and created new space for common local initiatives. They were then followed by The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Russian Federation on cross-border cooperation on 2 October 1992. These legal acts played a significant role in establishing cross-border cooperation, but a ground-breaking decision was yet to be taken. The signing of the Polish-Russian Small Border Traffic Agreement on 14 December 2011 has introduced a completely new reality for the borderland.

Important documents can be found at the regional level as well². On 19 September 2001, The Agreement on Cooperation between the Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship and the Kaliningrad Oblast was signed (*The Agreement*) and indicated a strategic framework for common initiatives. This agreement was accompanied by the Action Plan drafted for a period of two or three years to identify concrete Polish-Russian undertakings and partners involved in their implementation. The currently binding Action Plan is for the years 2014–2016 (*Action*). Additionally, a separate Action Plan exists for the area of tourism.

The neighbourhood with the Kaliningrad region is also taken into account in terms of strategic regional management. E.g., The Strategy of

² I refer to activities ran by the Warmia and Mazury region's authorities (the region was formed in 1998) while I do not describe the previously existing Olsztyn (Olsztyńskie) region which also cooperated with the Russian partner.

Socio-Economic Development of the Warmia and Mazury Region until 2025 (*The strategy*) mentions Kaliningrad a number of times underlining “certain hopes related to Small Border Traffic” (*The strategy*, p. 27) or seeing the Russian region as a commercial hub between China and Russia and EU (*The strategy*, p. 31). Similarly, major cities in the Warmia and Mazury region such as Olsztyn, Elbląg and Elk also see the proximity of Kaliningrad as an opportunity³ and this is confirmed in their strategic documents.

Moreover, the Polish-Russian context is visible in another highly important regional document, The Priorities of the International Cooperation of the Warmia and Mazury Region⁴. It names the Kaliningrad region “important and natural” partner (*The Priorities*, p. 4) and indicates such neighbourhood and especially Small Border Traffic as factors for economic development and for intensification of Polish-Russian cooperation.

Chosen areas of cooperation

The flagship initiative that has been co-organised by the two regions is a huge exhibit held in Poland one year (Days of the Kaliningrad Region in the Warmia and Mazury Region) and in Russia in the next one (Days of the Warmia and Mazury Region in the Kaliningrad Region). Usually taking place in spring, it covers different areas of mutual interest gathering different actors from both countries. Among the numerous

³ The city of Elbląg in 2012 even opened permanent representation in Kaliningrad.

⁴ It is a compulsory document adopted by regional parliament (Sejmik Województwa). It must be consistent with the principles of foreign policy of Poland and presents the main aims and geographical directions of international cooperation of the region as well as its plans to join international regional associations (*The Priorities*).

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elements, there are always official meetings of heads of both regions, local business-orientated B2B meetings, sports events and science sessions. It is also accompanied by a very rich cultural programme. Furthermore, these activities are not limited to main cities (Olsztyn, Kaliningrad), as the *Days* events are spread throughout the territory.

Another official meeting held regularly is Forum of Partner-Regions of the Kaliningrad region. Each year it offers space for thematic discussions, best practices exchanges and meetings of experts. The Warmia and Mazury region always actively participates in the event⁵.

Although official political contacts are indispensable for bilateral relations, people-to-people meetings play an important role as well. Therefore, the regional administration supports local initiatives using different tools. For instance, each year in Warmia and Mazury region an open call of interest is announced for non-governmental organisations which may apply for grants. Such a call embraces various areas ranging from environment, health, culture and education to European integration and international cooperation. Local Polish-Russian events always make up to a noticeable number of all applications and some of them are chosen to be co-financed. What is more, regional authorities want to assist in creating common space for NGO's from Poland and Russia, thus contact-making meetings and forums are organised.

Alongside the above mentioned general tools dedicated to strengthening people-to-people contacts, certain local events, many with long-standing traditions, obtain support from regional authorities. E.g., every May the bike rally on the Kętrzyn–Prawdinsk route gathers a few dozens of participants from both countries. The towns of Kętrzyn and Prawdinsk also host an environmental initiative called Earth Days in April that engages Polish and Russian teenagers. Obviously, other youth exchanges or

⁵ More about Forum on the official website of Agency for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Kaliningrad region: <http://id.gov39.ru/en/agency/international-and-interregional-relations/partner-regions-forum>.

sports projects can count on regional support as well (more examples of local initiatives in: Wenerski, Kaźmierkiewicz, 2013, p. 23).

Tourism is a field of cooperation that involves a significant number of subjects on both sides of the border. Taking in consideration the Warmia and Mazury landscape, one cannot doubt how strategic this sector is for the regional economy. Local and regional authorities together with business partners have been striving to make the Polish-Russian borderlands fruitful in terms of tourism development. The introduction of Small Border Traffic has naturally opened a new window of opportunity. “The launch of SBT has also revealed the enormous flexibility of the services sector (hotels, retail chains, restaurants), which promptly adjusted to Kaliningrad customers, introducing Russian-language services and signage. Russian even was added to road signs in Warmia and Mazury (Warmińsko-Mazurskie) and Pomerania (Pomorskie) regions [...]. Other welcome outcomes have included the greater intensity of trade contacts (such as study visits by hoteliers and restaurateurs); expansion of recreational facilities, especially in Warmia and Mazury region; and tighter cooperation among local self-government administrations (again, especially in Warmia and Mazury region), most notably in transport and tourist infrastructure. One example here is the establishment of the Mazury Tourist Cluster, where a major goal is to exchange information about the Russian market. Local governments also coordinate their activities with respect to future projects such as the construction of a biking route along the northern counties of Warmia and Mazury region” (Dudzińska, Dwyer, 2013, p. 4). Furthermore, “to attract Russian tourists various initiatives are undertaken by tourist organisations in cooperation with the industry representatives (e.g. hotels and restaurants), often with the support of a professional PR agency. The most popular ones are combined product and image promoting campaigns on Russian radio and television as well as happenings organised in the centre of Kaliningrad” (Wenerski, Kaźmierkiewicz, 2013a, p. 7). The above mentioned actions have often been inspired or supported by the regional administration both from

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the Warmia and Mazury and the Kaliningrad regions. In practical terms, it embraces such forms of cooperation as participation in various fairs and presentations (e.g. International Tourism Fair “Jantur” in Kaliningrad, Russian tour operators’ visits to Warmia and Mazury region), promotion of local tourism initiatives or creation of products for trans-border tourists. However, although there are reasons for satisfaction, there is still much to be done to boost tourism around the Polish-Russian border [some challenges for the tourist sector (especially Russian) are highlighted in: Wenerski, 2014, p. 9].

A separate category of actors contributing to bilateral cooperation are various regional institutions working together in their specialised areas. The Regional (Voivodeship) Labour Office in Olsztyn and the Agency of Employment in the Kaliningrad region hold cyclical seminars but recently they also have conducted a joint project co-financed by the EU (more details: <http://www.territorialcooperation.eu/frontpage/show/20643>). Some joint initiatives are shared by regional hospitals as well. Very often they have seminars or technical meetings, however, bilateral EU projects can also be noticed in this case. Culture is another area of cooperation. Regional entities such as theatres in Elbląg (<http://www.lt-pl-ru.eu/en,news,167>) and Olsztyn or the Museum of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn represent a good example of those contacts. Generally speaking, most regional institutions develop partnerships and projects in conjunction with their Russian counterparts.

Political cooperation

There are a couple of forms of political cooperation between the Warmia and Mazury region and the Kaliningrad region and are realized on different platforms. Some of those platforms are the result of a bottom-up approach and have been initiated by regional authorities, and

others are governed by state institutions to which both regions have been invited.

As mentioned before, when Days of the Kaliningrad Region in the Warmia and Mazury Region or Days of the Warmia and Mazury Region in the Kaliningrad Region take place, an important element of the agenda is the meeting of heads of the two regions. Such official talks usually cover a limited number of current and long-term questions and help to discuss common interests. Not only representatives of executive office (marshal, governor) are present, but chairpersons of the regional parliaments (Sejmik, Duma) and Polish and Russian diplomats gather at the table as well. As for the regional parliaments, they also collaborate in different contexts. Firstly, their committees responsible for international cooperation hold a joint meeting every year. Secondly, both Sejmik and Duma are members of Forum of the Parliaments of the South Baltic⁶. In 2014 the Kaliningrad Regional Duma for the first time hosted the annual assembly (http://sejmik.wzp.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=307:xii-forum-parlamentow-poludniowego-baltyku-kaliningrad-dn-19-22-maja-2014&catid=38&Itemid=229).

As far as the Baltic Sea Region is concerned, both the Warmia and Mazury and the Kaliningrad regions were among the founders of the Euroregion “Baltic”. This structure contains regions from Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Lithuania and the Russian Federation which collaborate to promote sustainable development around the Baltic Sea. It is the first Euroregion officially involving a Russian partner. In February 2015 the Kaliningrad region took over the one-year-long vice presidency in the Euroregion “Baltic” (further information about the Euroregion “Baltic” can be obtained at <http://www.eurobalt.org/>).

⁶ Forum gathers partners from Poland, Russia and Germany. More information about this organisation: http://sejmik.wzp.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=114:czym-jest-forum-parlamentow-poludniowego-baltyku&catid=38&Itemid=229.

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In addition to regionally animated political initiatives, those inspired by the state bodies take place. Forum of the Regions Poland-Russia was established by upper chambers of both parliaments, Senate of the Republic of Poland and Council of the Federation. Its first edition was organised in Moscow in 2009 and in the following years it engaged numerous politicians and experts from Polish and Russian regions offering space for bilateral discussions. Different Polish and Russian cities hosted this cyclical meeting on various topics and the Warmia and Mazury representatives always participated. Such a constructive situation changed in 2014 when the 5th Forum planned in Gdańsk was cancelled due to Russian aggression against Ukraine (<http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/27778/news>).

Another Polish-Russian body managed by the central authorities is the Polish-Russian Council for Cooperation of the Regions of the Republic of Poland and the Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation. The Council is co-chaired as well as its committees which work on different issues vital for both sides. Joint work refers, for instance, to infrastructure, agriculture or culture and education and are summed up during the annual sitting held in turns in Poland or in Russia.

To make this “political” picture complete, it must be mentioned that both the Warmia and Mazury region and the Kaliningrad region collaborate also with diplomatic representations. In this context, the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Kaliningrad and the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Gdańsk remain key partners.

Small Border Traffic. New possibilities, new challenges

Since 27 July 2012 when the Small Border Traffic (SBT) regulations entered into force, Polish-Russian regional cooperation has gained a new

dimension. “The agreement on local border traffic between Poland and Russia is not a typical one, as in its assumptions it goes beyond the standard framework laid down in the Regulation of the European Parliament and the EU Council. The adopted solutions are more advantageous than in other agreements of this type, which made it possible to cover a much greater area with the regime. The above mentioned EU instrument defines border area as the area reaching not further than 30 km from the border or, in certain cases, not further than 50 km. Whereas the area covered by the LBT regime, both on the Polish and on the Russian side of the border goes far beyond these limits” (Wenerski, Kaźmierkiewicz, 2013a, p. 4–5). However, in case of the Warmia and Mazury region, only a part of its territory enjoy SBT benefits⁷.

Experts are certain that this new cross-border regime has had profound consequences and “has proved to be a success, both economically and socially. On the surface, it might appear that Poland has the upper hand, with higher retail sales and receipts from hotel and service establishments catering to increased inflows of Russian tourists. But benefits were seen by the Russian partners, too, in the form of more intense people-to-people contacts, higher numbers of joint NGO projects, closer border guard cooperation and expanded border-crossing infrastructure” (Dudzińska, Dwyner, 2013, p. 5)⁸. This phenomenon of the Polish-Russian borderland gained the attention of not only think tanks and their experts but international press as well: in October 2013 “The Economist” published the article describing various aspects of SBT (<http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/10/poland-and-kaliningrad>).

⁷ This refers to the cities of Olsztyn and Elbląg and the following counties (*powiaty* in Polish): bartoszycki, braniewski, elbląski, giżycki, gołdapski, kętrzyński, lidzbarski, mrągowski, olecki, olsztyński and węgorzewski.

⁸ According to other experts, Small Border Traffic was “a tangible result” for Russia (Devyatkov, 2013, p. 9) or “important for Russia for a number of reasons” (Wenerski, 2014, p. 7).

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Obviously, over the last two and a half years political leaders from different levels have also had many opinions. E.g., in December 2013 Foreign Ministers Radosław Sikorski and Sergey Lavrov chaired the 8th meeting of the Committee for Polish-Russian Cooperation Strategy underscoring the Small Traffic Border Agreement's great success (http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/committee_for_polish_russian_cooperation_strategy_holds_8th_meeting). Moreover, STB has become a permanent point of the annual address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Minister R. Sikorski in 2013 stated in the Polish parliament that, "The local border traffic agreement is working well, which enables the inhabitants of northern Poland and the Kaliningrad Oblast to get to know one another. Increasingly open borders also lead to notable economic benefits" (*Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the goals of Polish foreign policy in 2013*, p. 18) while in 2014, "We are optimistic about both the social and the economic success of local border traffic with the Kaliningrad Oblast" (*Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the goals of Polish foreign policy in 2014*). Such policy was continued by the new Polish minister, Grzegorz Schetyna, who during a speech to parliament claimed in November 2014: "We believe that Polish–Russian relations can be good. We have positive examples to prove it, namely the Local Border Traffic with the Kaliningrad Oblast, which has yielded tangible economic and social benefits for both countries" (*Report*). Those statements prove how valuable and necessary local and regional initiatives might be, especially in times of EU-Russia political crisis, to build a mutual understanding.

Therefore, for the Warmia and Mazury region Small Border Traffic continue to be a mechanism of the utmost importance as it bears fruits in terms of trade, people-to-people contacts and may even contribute to improved political relations between governments. There is no doubt SBT has been a great impetus towards Polish-Russian collaboration and has been well regarded by local citizens.

There are, however, some challenges that have to be faced by the regional authorities. As it was mentioned before, only a part of the Warmia

and Mazury region is covered by Small Border Traffic regulations. Such a situation has been seen as unfair and incomprehensible by many local authorities remaining outside the SBT zone and led to some official petitions by them. According to experts, “as far as the area [...] on the Polish side of the border is concerned, a lot of interviewees have noticed that it has not been particularly well thought out and that it ends in such places that a Russian person may easily unintentionally cross the border area limits” (Wenerski, Kaźmierkiewicz, 2013a, p. 5). Moreover, Small Border Traffic regime involves only land border crossings whereas adding marine border crossings would definitely be beneficial, particularly for tourism development in the Elbląg subregion (see also: Dudzińska, Dyner, 2013, p. 6). Unfortunately, the current international situation and tensions between the European Union and Russia make it basically impossible to re-open now any talks on SBT adjustments. Notwithstanding, the authorities of the Warmia and Mazury region firmly state that the whole its territory should be covered by Small Border Traffic. This postulation returns in various documents as well as it remains on the agenda of the annual SBT conference organised by the Polish region in October⁹.

Perspectives

The cooperation between the Warmia and Mazury region and the Kaliningrad region should be considered to be fruitful and beneficial for both sides. The role played by the regional administration to date

⁹ The conference gathers Polish and Russian participants: local and regional authorities, NGO's, SME's and various institutions. The 1st edition of the conference took place in Mikołajki in 2013, the 2nd in Dębówko in 2014. The 3rd conference took place in October 2015.

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has been vital in inspiring various form of collaboration, engaging different local partners and maintaining official relations. A growing density of direct bilateral contacts proves that policies drafted and implemented together have been effective. Nevertheless, there is still space for further deepening collaboration and promoting even greater institutional engagement.

This cooperation has been facilitated through the introduction of Small Border Traffic regulations. It seems this new regime has increased the willingness of some local subjects to engage in Polish-Russian initiatives. While the situation might be seen as quite satisfactory, the broadening of the SBT zone on the Polish side of the border will continue to be a high priority for the authorities of the Warmia and Mazury region. Nevertheless, despite certain challenges, Small Border Traffic still has a huge potential for growth and for making Polish–Russian relations even more active.

As an interesting context for bilateral undertakings, the planned 2018 World Cup in Russia can be seen as Kaliningrad is supposed to be one of the tournament's host cities (more thoughts on that: Dudzińska, Dyer, 2013, p. 7). The regional airport in Szymany, which is to be operational from 2016, together with the planned rail connection between Olsztyn and Kaliningrad should also open up new perspectives.

Above all, however, hopefully, cross-border cooperation will not suffer from the political crisis dividing the European Union and Russia and from the cooling of official Polish-Russian contacts.

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THE IMAGE OF THE POLISH-RUSSIAN BORDERLAND IN THE OLSZTYN MASS MEDIA

ABSTRACT

The relations between residents of cross-border areas are largely conditioned by experiences resulting from mutual contacts and by the law regulations governing the relations between neighbouring countries. The main carrier of information about these relationships are regional media, which are active participants in international communication at the level of cross-border cooperation. In the case of Olsztyn media, the news regarding cooperation and the situation in the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation are of particular importance. Especially noteworthy is a series broadcast by Radio Olsztyn, titled "Szto u was" ("How are you")

in English), which shows lives of the residents of the Kaliningrad Oblast in the broad political, social and historical context.

Keywords

international communication, the Kaliningrad Oblast, “Szto u was”

Introduction

Polish–Russian relations are a frequent topic of a debate and research studies (Bieleń, Skrzypek, 2012, p. 222; Czachor, 2011, pp. 109–131; Bieleń, 2012, pp. 5–27; Zięba, 2011, pp. 35–60; Kotowicz, Modzelewski, Żukowski, 2013, p. 362). This is so not only because of the proximity and shared history, but also because the relations between Warsaw and Moscow resemble a sine wave which reflects the degree of “warming” or “cooling” of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In addition, by the fact that Poland is a member of the European Union, another factor appeared affecting the quality and level of the relations with the Russian Federation, which is noticeable, inter alia, in cross-border cooperation between the Kaliningrad Oblast and principles of so-called local border traffic between Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship and the enclave.

However, for citizens, the primary source of information about the relations between two countries are media reports that:

- provide the information;
- affect the political awareness and the assessment of the international situation (Ociepka, 2002, pp. 66–68).

A special role of media in informing about relations between states at the international relations level was already identified in 1956, at the IX General Conference of UNESCO in New Delhi. The resolution adopted there called for the use of media in cooperation between nations and

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states and mutual understanding, as well as to reduce international tensions and maintain peace (*Records*, pp. 28–31).

It should be noted that in practice “Knowledge of a foreign nation accumulates as a result of specific activities of institutions, different organizational structures established for the above purpose (so-called institutional forms of influence) as well as spontaneously, during direct contacts between people (so-called interpersonal interaction). This division into two types of international communication is particularly evident when we ask about the tasks and goal of the information activity of the broadcaster” (Olędzki, 1998, p. 26).

Therefore, the residents of border areas are in particular situations as they can, to some extent, verify media reports on a regular basis (institutional forms of influence), comparing them with experiences resulting from their direct contacts with neighbours from “near abroad” (interpersonal interaction). Knowledge resulting from direct contacts also allows them to react to such phenomena as: operating stereotypes about “neighbours” (Golka, 2008, pp. 173–176), and to determine their own attitude towards the actual quality of cooperation at the level of cross-border contacts.

Jerzy Olędzki also notes that with regard to international communication “Institutional forms of communication have the task of providing opinions, which are accomplished by means of broadcast information. A specific purpose, in the case of government bodies, is most often initiating and supporting of benevolent opinions and creating a positive image of the country, which in turn promotes the development of international economic, cultural and technical cooperation. [...] In turn, non-governmental media participate in the international flow of information, pursuing their own statutory goals, e.g. the promotion of particular religions, ideology, adverts of various products, music programs or information materials on request of a foreign recipient” (Olędzki, 1998, p. 26).

In the case of cross-border cooperation, this is a relevant duty of regional media. The media, being close to the inhabitants of the region, as-

sess the quality of relationships within the co-operation and cross-border contacts. It is based on their activity and experience gained.

In Warmia and Mazury Region – “Gazeta Olsztyńska”, TVP Olsztyn and Radio Olsztyn are the major media providing knowledge about developments in the region, including the cooperation with the Kaliningrad Oblast (Region). It should be noted, however, that TVP Olsztyn and Radio Olsztyn as public media, have a statutory duty to “accurately show the entire diversity of events and phenomena in the country and abroad” (*Ustawa*, art. 21, par. 2, point 2). Therefore, the media carry out the tasks assigned to the institutional forms of communication, in so far as it is described by the legislator.

In addition, they are also obliged to make airtime available to ethnic and national minorities living in the territory of Poland, during which the minorities can broadcast programs in their native languages, on issues relevant to the ethnic or national community (*Ustawa*, art. 21, par. 1a, point 8a). Radio Olsztyn in the execution of this task provides its airtime to the Ukrainian minority (titled “Programmes in Ukrainian”), and to German minority (titled “Programmes in German”), while TVP Olsztyn broadcasts a programme titled “Ukrainian news”.

In contrast, “Gazeta Olsztyńska”, which as a commercial medium, selects its topics depending on their attractiveness for readers, which ultimately results in the sales volume of the daily. Indeed, there are no statutory duties imposed on commercial media which are concerning the presentation of international issues. Their information and opinion-making function in this area depends on decisions of an owner and editor of a particular journal, who focus primarily on implementation of their own statutory objectives.

But what unites “Gazeta Olsztyńska” and TVP Olsztyn is that both the media focus in their communications concerning relations with the Kaliningrad Oblast mainly on individual, current events, which mainly concern the following issues:

- the situation on the border between Poland and the enclave (including a military situation);

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- issues related to the so-called small border traffic;
- official contacts between the representatives of regional authorities, and the academic, social and artistic communities (Sakson, 1995, pp. 301–304; Maciejewska, 2004, pp. 59–65; Maciejewska, 2008, pp. 209–216; Szurmiński, 2007, pp. 104–119).

However, in the context of the issues related to the Kaliningrad Oblast, special attention should be paid to the materials of Radio Olsztyn which present the relations with the enclave not only in the context of one-off reports on events related to cross-border cooperation in broadcasts such as “Echoes of the day” or “Morning questions”, but mainly in the series of broadcasts titled “Szto u was”.

Analysis of research

“Szto u was” is “a weekly commentary on current issues concerning Kaliningrad and the Kaliningrad region”. Programs started to broadcast in the autumn of 2005, and have a formula of conversation between a journalist Leszek Cimoch and Tadeusz Baryła an expert of Ośrodek Badań Naukowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego in Olsztyn. Its target group are listeners aged 30+.

Originally, the program was broadcast on Saturdays at about 7:30, it lasted an average of about 3 min and was dedicated to one specific theme or event. Since 15 February 2014 the program has been one of the four parts of the magazine titled “Between East and West”, which is broadcast at around 13:15 and lasts about 40 min. The section on the situation in the Kaliningrad Oblast retains a formula from the period when it was still a separate radio program. The magazine itself raises issues concerning both Poland’s relations with its neighbours and the situation in these countries.

Extending the scope of presented issues concerning international relations by Radio Olsztyn results from the suggestion of the National Council of Radio and Television. The new formula, the increase in airtime and broadcast time change from morning into afternoon band shows clearly that the broadcaster strives to get international issues to a wider audience than it has been in previous years.

This analysis covered the research programs in the series “Szto u was” issued from 2008 to 8 February 2014. There were 253 pieces of the cycle, and the total time of their emission is 14 h 7 min. In 2014, the analysis included only those programs that were broadcast before the creation of the magazine “Between East and West”.

Quantitative and qualitative analysis were conducted on a sample of the content of the whole. A categorizing key was used as a research tool. The research unit adopted was all programs broadcast within one year. A registration unit was a single program and turnout was used as a unit of measurement (Lisowska-Magdziarz, 2004, pp. 54, 59, 66). The number of broadcasts and the time of their emissions in each year are presented in table 1.

Table 1. Number and emission time program “Szto u was” in 2008–2014

Year of issue	Number of programs	Total time
2008	38	1 h 49 min
2009	42	2 h 16 min
2010	39	1 h 55 min
2011	45	2 h 24 min
2012	44	2 h 23 min
2013	41	3 h 41 min
2014	4	14 min

Source: the own calculations based on data obtained in the PR Olsztyn.

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Problems discussed in the “Szto u was” can be divided into the following categories:

- political events;
- the military situation;
- the cross-border cooperation (visas and border traffic);
- the standard of living of the inhabitants of Oblast;
- crime and corruption;
- tourism and sightseeing;
- anniversaries, holidays and celebrations;
- others.

Quantitative analysis showed that the subjects most often taken in the test interval were: the standard of living of the inhabitants of the enclave, political events, cross-border cooperation and tourism and sightseeing.

Noteworthy is the fact that over the researched period not much attention was paid to the military situation in the Oblast. This theme held only the third position among the most commonly undertaken issues, and it took place only in 2008 and 2009.

It is also worth noting that in 2013 the third place among the most commonly undertaken issues was held by the category called “other”, into which these programs were included, the topic of which in a given year was undertaken only once. In 2013 there were six such programs, and they raised the following issues:

- summary of the events of 2012;
- analysis of the possibility of obtaining by Kaliningrad a donation of private collections of works of art worth billions of dollars;
- discussion about amber output in 2012;
- presenting the situation of Polish organizations in Kaliningrad;
- analysis of plans to build a nuclear power plant in the enclave and of reduction of its power in relation to the original design;
- discussion about plans to build a mosque in Kaliningrad and related problems.

The summary of the most common issues undertaken each year is shown in table 2.

Table 2. Summary of the three most common themes in programs undertaken in "Szto u was" in 2008–2014

Year of issue	I	II	III
2008	standard of living of the inhabitants of Oblast (9 programmes)	political events (7 programmes)	military situation (6 programmes)
2009	standard of living of the inhabitants of Oblast (10 programmes)	political events (9 programmes)	military situation (5 programmes)
2010	standard of living of the inhabitants of Oblast (14 programmes)	cross-border cooperation (7 programmes)	political events (4 programmes)
2011	political events (14 programmes)	cross-border cooperation and tourism and sightseeing (after 7 programmes)	standard of living and crime (after 5 programmes)
2012	tourism and sightseeing (11 programmes)	political events (9 programmes)	cross-border cooperation (7 programmes)
2013	standard of living of the inhabitants of Oblast (12 programmes)	cross-border cooperation (9 programmes)	others (6 programmes)
2014	cross-border cooperation (2 programmes)	standard of living of the inhabitants of Oblast and anniversaries, holidays and celebrations (after 1 programmes)	–

Source: the own calculations based on data obtained in the PR Olsztyn.

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In the context of other thematic categories, the following issues were raised, inter alia, over the period considered:

1. Political events:
 - the visit of the prime minister Donald Tusk in Moscow in 2008 and its possible influence on cross-border cooperation;
 - the situation in Oblast and Russia before and shortly after the presidential elections in Russia in 2008;
 - the influence of election results on relations between Russia and Europe (2008);
 - a change in electoral rules for the governor of Oblast (in 2009);
 - the elections at: federal, regional and municipal levels in 2011;
 - the personnel changes at different positions and the evaluation of the Kaliningrad authorities' activities.
2. The military situation:
 - the reaction of Oblast authorities to the plan of deployment of missile defence system in Poland;
 - the presence of nuclear ships in Baltiysk;
 - the announcement of the deployment of Iskander missiles in the enclave, and the construction of a military radar in response to the missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic (2008);
 - the military reform in Russia and the enclave;
 - the reform of the Baltic Fleet;
 - the importance of military exercises called “Zapad 2009”, organized in Oblast.
3. The cross-border cooperation (visas and border traffic):
 - the negotiations on a local border traffic regime between Poland, Lithuania and Russia (2008);
 - the cooperation with Oblast within Euroregion “Baltic” during the Polish presidency in the organization;
 - the issue of visas and implementation of a small border traffic regime in Oblast (e.g. a joint action of Polish and Russian Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the UE on behalf of the small border traffic in the enclave);

- the issue of introducing a small border traffic and the situation at border crossings (2011);
 - “the small border movement”, which took effect from July 2012 and topics related to it [e.g. rules for local border traffic, the opening of the visa center in Kaliningrad and new rules for issuing visas at the consulate in Kaliningrad (2012)].
4. The standard of living of the inhabitants of Oblast:
- the economic and financial situation of the inhabitants (e.g. rising prices of food products, salaries);
 - a quality of tap water;
 - the change of a gas supplier to the enclave;
 - plans for building nuclear plants;
 - a difficult demographic situation (2008);
 - the economic and financial crisis (e.g. demonstrations which took place in Kaliningrad and Chernyakhovsk);
 - the request of the governor of the enclave to the authorities of Russia for remission of taxes for those inhabitants of Oblast who were behind with them (2010);
 - the comparison of wages.
5. Crime and corruption:
- the problem of cigarette smuggling from Kaliningrad to the EU countries;
 - the wars between criminal groups in Kaliningrad (2011);
 - trading high positions in the state administration (2011).
6. Tourism and sightseeing:
- monuments, history and tradition of Kaliningrad, Svetlogorsk, Zelenogradsk, Pionersky, Yantarny, as well as the Curonian Spit Circuit and District Moose;
 - possible problems tourists and visitors may face while visiting the Oblast.
7. Anniversaries, holidays and celebrations:
- Christmas holidays;

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- Russian fans at Euro 2012 matches;
 - celebrations of Kaliningrad Days organized in Warsaw.
8. Others:
- the fire of one of the largest factories in Kaliningrad;
 - exploitation of amber deposits;
 - and the monopoly of state-owned fisheries for fish catching.

As a qualitative analysis showed, themes raised in radio programs titled “Szto u was” were very varied so that the series presented a wide range of information, from which listeners were able to choose the ones that most interested them.

On the basis of the program content, it can be said that it is of informative and influential character. However, due to the fact that the program has adopted a convention of a relaxed conversation, a listener does not perceive it as a moralistic message or indoctrination. A relatively short duration of a single program seems to be significant in this respect. As stated by L. Cimoch “the program lasts long enough to attract the listener, while it does not get boring” (author’s own archive). The same idea lies behind the selection of topics by the hosts of the program to make them so diverse and current as to continually attract the interests of the listeners.

Conclusion

While analyzing the cycle “Szto u was” it can be concluded that L. Cimoch and T. Baryła wanted to show the complicated reality of Kaliningrad Oblast in an accessible way.

Discussing the standard of living of the average inhabitant of Kaliningrad they portrayed citizens and their problems, which have the roots both in the difficult economic situation, as well as in the specific geopolitical location of the enclave.

At the same time, by presenting the history of the region and its tourist attractions, the authors of the cycle encouraged listeners to visit the “next door” neighbours, often facing the same problems as the people of the Warmia and Mazury Region (e.g. unemployment or financial problems).

The series of broadcasts called “Szto u was” clearly “lived through” everyday life of the inhabitants of Oblast. For each planned broadcast, the hosts of the programs carefully selected current topics which were not only up-to-date, but which seemed to be very important for inhabitants of the enclave.

The problem of relationship and cross-border cooperation between Russia and Poland didn't receive any particular attention but appeared as one of many other issues discussed by L. Cimoch and T. Baryła.

Generally, the emphasis was put on discussing the everyday reality in Kaliningrad and on the political influence on the situation in Oblast, and as such it referred to the relationship with the Warmian-Mazurian Voivodeship.

Therefore, the series “Szto u was” plays an important role in an international communication process between the inhabitants of the border area. By making Polish listeners more acquainted with the reality of the Oblast, the authors of the program support the process of understanding of the culture, attitudes and behaviour of the inhabitants of the enclave. Thanks to this program a broadcaster engaged themselves in realisation of the principles contained in the resolution of UNESCO of 1956 on the use of media for cooperation between states and nations.

The fact that this public demand is implemented by a public medium causes that they are institutional forms of influence on the inhabitants of the border area, in order to create a positive relationship between the inhabitants of Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship and the Kaliningrad Oblast, regardless of tension in relations between Warsaw and Moscow. Therefore, the main task of the program is primarily to explain the causes and possible consequences of the discussed phenomena and events. De-

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spite time constraints (duration of one episode is about 3 min), the hosts of the program try to analyse each event in a broader context, e.g., historical, social or political, depending on what aspect of life in the Oblast is presented.

The conclusion is that for Radio Olsztyn the role of international issues within broadcast programs has increased as evidenced by the creation of the magazine "Between East and West". The fact that "Szto u was" was a precursor to the magazine, and is now a regular part of the new format indicates that the program not only has met the expectations of the broadcaster, but also has become a kind of foundation for the creation of a new magazine.

For listeners and residents of Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, it is important that the contents of "Szto u was" series are in many cases useful in dealing with inhabitants of the enclave and verification of their experiences with the reality of life in "near abroad".

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INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE
UNIVERSITIES – EUROPEAN UNION FROM
KALININGRAD POINT OF VIEW:
WHY DO UNIVERSITIES COOPERATE?

“Sapere aude! – Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen!”

Immanuel Kant
(Kant, 1784, p. 481)

ABSTRACT

International cooperation in Academia has become a norm. The evolution from sporadic contacts of leading professors for exceptionally ac-

ademic and scientific purposes to wide-range cooperation programmes based on common values and tangible political mission – besides aiming at the attraction of human resources at external markets has taken not so much time from the historical perspective. Why do European Universities cooperate? What are the goals of cooperation with third countries? How has the vector of cooperation between Russian and the European Union university systems been developing?

Keywords

internationalization of higher education, academic mobility, universities in world politics, European Union

Universities today represent a complex system of interrelations between academia and the state in which the University is functioning. European Union (EU) still characterized by not yet stable both domestic and internal political systems and not clearly understandable priorities for supranational development remains one of the best examples of development of international cooperation in the field of education and science both within and outside EU.

Observing principles and rationales of international cooperation between Universities in such sophisticated systems as EU where inner institutional decisions (not only in the field of higher education) of EU states preserve their significance and rest on various traditions of professional corporations – it is extremely important to understand common and specific goals and practices of international cooperation both within EU and “non-partner countries”.

Large-scale international cooperation between EU key countries started almost simultaneously with the development of integration projects in the western part of the Continent. These projects were aimed at coordination of economic policies of keynote players at principal markets (such

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as European Coal and Steel Community). Besides their economic goals, these projects had clear political dimension: developing conditions for overcoming distrust between large European countries.

Undoubtedly, Universities from the very moment of their establishment have become an integral part of political world not only being an element of national pride but an instrument of realization of foreign policy goals connected with expansion of research and education representation in keynote regions (from the geopolitical interests of the country perspective) and increasing export of education services into the countries being in the scope of strategic interests zone.

The history of the establishment of the first University on the territory of modern Russia that is the Königsberg University (former Königsberg and now Russian exclave in the EU) is a good example of understanding both political and geopolitical significance of the University. After a formal ceremony of University opening by Duke Albrecht von Hohenzollern on 17 August 1544 the news of the University establishment was officially spread among all neighbouring countries (Denmark, Sweden, Poland and German Hanseatic cities). The University mission was associated with distribution of humanistic ideas as well as German culture and Protestantism on the colonized Baltic territories. This fact preconditioned the process of invitation of both lecturers and students from citizens of bordering states. Does not this interpretation of the University mission render modern ideas about possibilities and desirability of using University as a source of “soft power”?

Serving the goals of good neighbouring atmosphere development the integration projects in the field of youth, cultural and academic exchange have been boosted. Academia was rightly interpreted as a bearer of collective memory being the factor for the national idea consolidation as well as representing the structure owing the greatest potential of intellectual influence on vast social layers.

In 1950 the German Academic Exchange Service (*Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst*, DAAD) re-started its activities which were in-

errupted by the World War II. The German Academic Exchange Service is a self-governing consortium of German Universities¹. DAAD initiated by a number of rectors in 1925 as an instrument facilitating academic exchange started to associate itself with an instrument of research, educational, and cultural presence of New Germany in a new (post-war) world. Looking up first at the biggest players of the post-war European politics since the beginning of the 60s, DAAD has started to play the role of the catalyser of international contacts as well with the countries on another side of the geopolitical fault line. Since 1958, the German Academic Exchange Service has launched programmes in the field of research and educational cooperation for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. We can affirm that actively developing German-French and German-Polish academic cooperation DAAD has contributed significantly to overcoming historically caused distrust towards neighbours. It is necessary to note leaving out the equation of the present overview that interests and current goals of global politics formulated in Moscow and Washington mainly predetermined academic relations between West and East Germany.

At the same time, one more fact that boosted international cooperation within western boundaries of the European continent was the mass establishment of specialized centres for country studies in West German Universities at the beginning of the 70s. They were created following the form and methodological pattern of American area studies centres. Introduction of international agenda as a research field became a catalyser for the large-scale student, academic, and staff exchange mainly on European continent. Preserving German as the main language of instruction, English being *lingua franca* is actively introduced into teaching process in German Universities. They represent a perfect example of active integration of a national university system into international academic cooperation processes.

¹ More information about DAAD – see the official website: <http://www.daad.de>.

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Nowadays these tendencies can be perfectly illustrated by two University projects supported by German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of them is Andrassy University Budapest (AUB)² that is an international German language University located not on the German territory. The second one is a modern issue of the Europa-Universität Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) being a trans-border University focused on Polish students in educational context and on Polish problematics in terms of research.

Using German case as an example, significant reasons for University international cooperation can be detected. They are solving political goals of good neighbourhood relations development and training staff for international cooperation and in applied relevance preparation of analytical materials for national and global consumers.

A good example of successful interrelation between foreign interests of actors and networking cooperation of Universities is the Baltic Sea region that is one of the key political macro-regions on the European continent and the region of cooperation between Russia and EU. Baltic Sea region states actively use possibilities of University network cooperation to implement and support their foreign policy interests. Due to a geopolitical shift at the end of the 20th century, new ambitious players appeared in this region. They actively consolidate their positions by means of all available instruments including University networking opportunities.

An interesting example is a French model that preserves national language as an absolute priority in an academic environment, focuses on French-speaking countries (*La Francophonie*), and being one of the most desirable academic mobility destinations.

Export of education services, attraction of students from target regions (not only French-speaking countries) is one of the most successful vector of French policy. Notwithstanding that only a few French Universities are represented in prestigious international rankings (in a QS Rank-

² See the official website: <http://www.andrassyuni.eu>.

ing in 2012 only 4 French Universities were among 200 first)³, the model of French education services export is one of the most efficient among all other EU countries. According to the data of the survey conducted in 2011 international students distinguished the following reasons of their choice in favour of French education: quality of education and command of the French language (*Enquête exclusive Campus France*).

The main principles of organization and administration of the higher education system in France are regulated by the Savary Law dated 26 January 1984 (*Loi n°84-52 du 26 janvier 1984 sur l'enseignement supérieur*), which was later supplemented by some new acts (one of the latest was about innovations and researches) and aimed at preserving the main principles: autonomy and involvement. Government preserves its influence on University HR policy. It is reflected e.g.; on the possibility to invite leading foreign specialists, be independent in choosing regional and country priorities in the process of foreign students selection. Government education centres Campus France conduct selection of international students.

French system of higher education is often considered as a closed one. First and foremost it is predetermined by the existence of not only classical universities but also well-known *grandes écoles* or “great schools” that are regarded as a “real French cultural exception” (*Le site*) are seen as a competitive advantage on the rapidly globalizing higher education market. High education quality and the indisputable authority of a diploma both inland and abroad were the factors that contributed to such schools becoming a place of elite formation not only within France it-

³ More information: (Oui, 2012). Only one French university in Top-500 in the Shanghai Ranking – Université Paris-Sud. See: (*Classement*, 2010). The only exception is the Paris School of Economics (PSE). See: <http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/en/>, that was established in 2006 following the model of the London School of Economics and Political Science, occupying high positions in professional ratings.

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self (almost all its presidents graduated from at least one “great school”, whereas some of them, including *Valéry* Giscard d’Éstaing, obtained diplomas of two schools), but also in its foreign partner countries (e.g., Colombian-French politician – Ingrid Betancourt, President of Cameroon – Paul Biya, US diplomat – Paul Bremer and many others).

The French experience thrusts into the spotlight a number of goals set for the international cooperation between universities. They are: personnel training for overseas partners as well as popularization of the national education model and national language in the global context.

Intensification of integration processes within European communities in the 1990s – and later within the EU – led to the necessity of elaboration of common organization principles for academic and research international cooperation both inside the EU and in collaboration with third countries.

It should be noted that the last decade of the 20th century, characterized by dramatic geopolitical reconstruction, was a period of escalating competition for the best researchers, teachers and students from the former USSR countries and the so-called Eastern Bloc. The competitors were the biggest players on the academic and research recruitment market, including Asian universities and R&D centres. The majority of the EEC countries and, later, the EU launched programmes aimed at attraction of the most qualified research and teaching personnel from third countries and, mainly, from former socialist countries.

Perception of national necessity in recruitment of overseas personnel served as an accelerator of specialized exchange programmes formation and attraction of EU students, teachers and researchers to the work at universities. Aggravation of competition for human resources demanded a more open and active recruitment policy aimed at external markets. Andreas Schleicher, OECD analyst, 7 years after the signing of the Bologna declaration gave a good account of such a policy saying “if Europe wants to retain its competitive edge at the top of the global value-added chain (*primarily compared with Asian universities – AB*), the education

system must be made more flexible, more effective and more easily accessible to a wider range of people” (Schleicher, 2006).

Active university cooperation in the context of the personnel issues resolution can be illustrated with the example of academic cooperation between Russian and EU universities that started in 1990s as a collaboration of unequal: Russian universities served as beneficiaries of financial and methodological assistance, implementing common European practices into the educational and research aspects of a university life. For the majority of Russian students and researchers participation in European programmes became a tool of emigration facilitation and a means of individual integration into the EU academic context – including even emigration from Russia to the EU countries for the regular place of work.

Initially, the main cooperation programme aimed at local authorities and large regional universities was the TACIS programme (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States). It provided technical assistance to reforms in the CIS countries. The programme was launched in 1991; the EU spent 4.2 billion euros during the first 8 years of its realization and 3.1 billion euros in 2000–2006 (EU-Russia Cooperation Programme). The programme terminated in 2006 giving way to the new programme launched within the *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument* in 2007. The financing scheme changed (joint financing is expected) as well as selection of projects in accordance with common strategic interests did. Priority cooperation actors are north-western regions of Russia, the Kaliningrad region and, in particular, leading universities focused on international research and having a high potential in promoting cooperation between Russia and the EU. Directions and aims of joint project activities of these actors go beyond the four common spaces and include also public health, social welfare as well as environmental and cross-border cooperation issues.

In 1990 another instrument of European financing appeared in the post-Soviet space – the Tempus programme, it emerged in Russia in 1994 (National TEMPUS Office) – that was actively used by Russian universities. The programme had a significant influence on Russian regional

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higher education institutions: due to the programme possibilities and resources offered by it, first workable networks uniting Russian and European universities emerged. Most of the networks appeared to be rather sustainable. In the years 2013–2014 11 projects operated in Russia, e.g., Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (IKBFU) was involved in one of them – Promoting Sustainable Excellence in Testing and Assessment of English (PROSET) (European projects of IKBF).

Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window programme launched in 2004 is one of the main instruments ensuring academic mobility within consortia of universities. It is a programme of cooperation and mobility within higher education. The programme is aimed at improving the quality of the European education as well as promoting dialogue and mutual understanding between people and cultures through cooperation with third countries. Erasmus Mundus contributes to the development of human resources and boosting of international cooperation in the field of higher education in third countries through promotion of the academic mobility between the EU and its members (*Education*). The programme provides individual grants for undergraduates, PhD students, post-doctorates and staff members of the universities united by the programme consortium. IKBFU was a member of the Triple I: Integration, Interaction, Institutions consortium (<http://www.utu.fi/iii>). Erasmus Mundus 2009–2013 continues and extends the activity sphere of consortia launched in 2004 and provides mobility opportunities for students, researchers and university staff members.

One of the global priority projects aimed at promoting cross-university cooperation was the initiative to establish specialized EU Centres at the leading universities, chosen from the perspective of current state and regional policies.

The programme resulted in opening of 37 centres all over the world. Following the establishment of centers in Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan six centres were opened in Russia. In June 2012 two more centres appeared in Hong Kong and Macao (*European Union: External Action*).

In Russia, such centres were established within the programme Support to the Establishment of EU Centres in the Russian Federation. In 2010 three centres were opened in Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad and Tomsk, in 2011 three more ones were established in Kazan, Rostov and Petrozavodsk.

Therefore, the EU experience shows us additional reasons for international cooperation between universities: mobilization of internal resources in the competitive environment, improvement of education and research quality as well as attraction of best specialists and best students.

Summarizing the experience of our European partners and the EU as a whole, the following reasons, motivating universities to cooperate with external partners, can be traced:

- resolution of political tasks aimed at formation of neighbourly relations;
- training of personnel for the aims and objectives of the international cooperation as well as preparation of analytical materials for national and global consumers;
- training of personnel for overseas partners;
- popularization of the national education model and the national language in the global context;
- mobilization of internal resources in the competitive environment;
- improvement of education and research quality;
- attraction of best specialists and best students.

The modern successful university is an international university actively represented on the global market not only as the actor guided by national interests, but also as a force able to generate the global agenda – in order to develop the very “spirit of academic cooperation and competition”.

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Ewa Gładkowska

THE CULTURE LANDSCAPE OF THE CURONIAN SPIT – A VEDUTA OF THE LOST WORLD?

ABSTRACT

The text is an attempt to present the role which the landscape played in the art of East Prussia. Curonian Spit is an outstanding example of the landscape which inspired writers and painters. The text presents two artists for whom East Prussian *Landschaft* was the essence of their work. Expressionist Ernst Mollenhauer, a member of the art colony in Nida (Nidden), author of Curonian landscapes and images of life of its inhabitants, following the entry of Red Army into the Curonian Spit lost all his works. He had been recreating them systematically until his death in 1963. Robert Budzinski, the most popular graphic of the interwar period

in East Prussia, in his literary and artistic endeavours revealed fascinating Curonian Spit by setting the plot of his book *Curi-neru* there and illustrating it with numerous engravings. The landscapes of Sambian Peninsula and Curonian Spit, besides the views of Mazury, created by Budzinski are the most common motifs of this artist. With the loss of the sources of inspiration his work after the war is no longer characterised with the earlier power of creativity and distinctive sense of humour. The attachment to the East Prussian landscapes in the case of those artists constitutes a contribution to the process of mythologizing the place while, at the same time, it is a touching example of the attachment to the closest places for both of them. The text raises the question of the awareness of cultural heritage of this place among the current residents of the Curonian Spit, suggesting this topic as an interesting research area.

Keywords

cultural landscape of the Curonian Spit, art colony in Nida (Nidden), Robert Budzinski, Ernst Mollenhauer, veduta of lost world

Until 1945, the Curonian Spit was a location that inspired its residents and visitors alike (Orłowski, 2003, p. 17). Its landscape attracted such figures as Thomas Mann or Max Pechstein. At one time, a true colony of artists developed there. The landscape of this little fragment of East Prussia became an inspiring motif in hundreds of literary works and paintings. Among painters, the most popular graphic artist in the pre-war East Prussia, Robert Budzinski, who also created literary works with his own illustrations, contributed immensely to the mythical appeal of the Curonian Spit. R. Budzinski authored the book *Curi-neru*, in which, with his distinct sense of humour, he created a literary and graphic image of the culture landscape of the Curonian Spit. Since 1945, that culture landscape has featured in the German literature and visual art as a veduta of

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the lost world. In the context of this presentation of the pre-war cultural landscape, it is justifiable to inquire about the contemporary culture landscape of the Curonian Spit, divided between Lithuania and Russia (the Kaliningrad Oblast).

Picturesque landscapes of Curonian Spit are included in UNESCO World Heritage List. However, the culture creating the factor of this place does not exist in the social awareness of the inhabitants of Curonian Spit and other parts of Lithuania. Having been in Nida few years ago, I found only a modest mention about the existence of the artistic colony there and few reproductions of the works, exposed in the little classroom. The residents whom I questioned about the artistic tradition of that place could not tell me anything about it. It raises an obvious question whether one of the most important artistic colonies of the first half of the 20th century constitutes a case of dissonant heritage, which is referred to with two different perspectives of the past and two different narratives.

Not assuming the right to the conclusion that I examined carefully the strategy of assimilation of foreign heritage of this place I would like to focus on presenting a brief history of the artist colony and the role of E. Mollenhauer in creating cultural memory of this place and the aforementioned R. Budzinski, who frequented only in Nida, but it has contributed to mythologization of Curonian Spit with its visuals.

Artistic ambience of East Prussia was formed by the Academy of Fine Arts in Königsberg. It was established in 1841 on the initiative of August Hagen and Theodor von Schön and constituted the only art education centre in the region. Not only did the inhabitants of East Prussia enrol on artistic studies in this multicultural city, but also talented young people from the central part of Germany studied in Königsberg. Artists such as Heinrich Wolff, Emil Nolde, Maximilian Schmidt ran their studios there. Art history was taught such a renown art historian as prof. Georg Dehio (Timm, 1982).

This specific landscape full of dunes attracted artists from the Academy of Fine Arts in Königsberg from the end of 19th century. The most

important place, a heart of the colony and a forming basis of the expressionist artists' colony was the rest house of Hermann Blode in Nida. Lovis Corinth, M. Pechstein, Alfred Lichtwark, Karl Schmidt-Rottluff, and Alfred Partikel were some of the German expressionists who stayed there to marvel at the pristine landscape. Julius Freymuth and Eduard Bischoff were the painters from Königsberg who frequented the Curonian Spit. Ernst Kirchner, E. Mollenhauer, Hermann Wirth and Franz Domscheit are among other visitors worth mentioning here. The artists were usually guests at Blode's inn and their paintings were left there. Some of the members of the *Künstlerkolonie Nidden* built their own studios and lodgings in the area.

E. Mollenhauer, born in 1892, in Tapiaw (now Gvardeysk), East Prussia, was attached to that place in a particular way. In 1919, he appeared in Hermann Blode's house for the first time and after a year he became his daughter's husband. E. Mollenhauer resumed his studies, previously interrupted by World War I, in Königsberg in the studio of prof. Arthur Degner. In 1922, preparing for the exhibition in New York, he sent there the best of his works which got lost after arriving to the US. He was dauntingly reconstructing the lost pieces to exhibit them in the hall of a large hotel which soon got burnt with all his canvas. Despite all the adversities, E. Mollenhauer became famous as a first German artist who exhibited his works after World War I in the USA (Ehlermann-Mollenhauer, 1995, pp. 9–10).

In line with Treaty of Versailles from 1919 Nida and the northern part of the Curonian Spit became assigned to the Klaipėda Region. In 1923 it was annexed by Lithuania. In the difficult economic and politic situation of the region, in 1923 E. Mollenhauer decided to come back to Curonian Spit and take care of the famous guesthouse of his decrepit father-in-law. He stayed till 1945 to guard the artistic achievements of the colony located there. After joining Memelland (now Klaipėda Region) to German Reich the painting of the artist became regarded as degenerated (*entartete Kunst*), and he was forbidden to work and exhibit his works. His

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friendship with T. Mann, who had a house there together with the visits his guest with Jewish ancestry ania posed a threat of arresting him by Gestapo. As a repercussion of Soviets army invading the area in winter 1945 was the distraction of artistic works of E. Mollenhauer as all the collection of paintings created from the 19th century in the house of Hermann Blode. As Maja Mollenhauer, the artist's daughter, correctly observes, the artist colony in Nida ceased to exist then, but not only as an organisation but also all its achievements got lost. The memory of it exists only as a slight mention about it in history of art (Ehlermann-Mollenhauer, 1995). From the pre-war works of an expressionist artist, E. Mollenhauer, survived only those which were located in the west of Germany.

After coming back from camp in Denmark and English camp in Schleswig-Holstein he was looking for a place to settle down. A place which could possibly remind him about the lost landscapes of Curonian Split. Finally, he built his summer atelier in Keitum on a German island Sylt. He recreated there the Curonian landscapes and the unity of nature and a man, which exists there. In painting them, he was seeking in art what he called spirituality (Ehlermann-Mollenhauer, 1995, p. 11). Two years before his death, E. Mollenhauer painted Curonian beaches, harbour and graveyard in Nida in expressionist fashion, and, a year later, the house of Hermann Blode in Nida precisely reconstructed from memory.

R. Budzinski, the most popular graphic of the interwar period in East Prussia, was another graduate of Kunstakademie in Königsberg. He was older than E. Mollenhauer, born in 1874 in another part of East Prussian land close to Neidenburg (nowadays Nidzica), in the village Klein Schläfken (nowadays Sławka Mała) where he started to record lives of the inhabitants and landscapes of East Prussia. Being enchanted with the genius loci of this area, he created its graphical representations which would be soon popularized all over Germany (Gładkowska, 2005). As a student of a landscapist M. Schmidt, he was also very skilful in landscape painting. R. Budzinski spent some time among the artists from Nida colony, but he found his artistic and personal path in the movement

called Wandervogel. That movement was formally established in the beginning of the 20th century in Berlin. Soon its ideas spread all over Germany. The basis of this association was the belief in the value of learning about the world in a way which promotes building closer relationships through common wandering across the country and sleeping under the open sky. During such wanderings, R. Budzinski was giving drawing lessons and doing illustrations for brochures and pamphlets issued for the purposes of Wandervogel movement.

Wandering after World War I in East Prussia, which was separated from the rest of the country with *Korridor*, had particularly patriotic overtones. Commitment to East Prussian landscapes and their mythologizing were the factors which helped in developing the collective identity (Traba, 2001, pp. 40–46). R. Budzinski with his landscapes fits into the stereotype of creating East Prussian homeland. However, in his version, it has its own character and paired with Budzinski's biography it is far from the determinants of this stereotypically understood patriotic East Prussian atmosphere. Including Budzinski's biography and reproductions of his graphics in the catalogue from the exhibition in Nürnberg entitled *Künstlerkolonien In Europa. Im Zeichen der Ebene Und des Himmels* may serve as the measurement of his contribution to the cultural heritage of Europe. The exhibition organized under the patronage of European Parliament took place in Germanisches Nationalmuseum in Nürnberg and constituted the presentation of artist colonies in European culture.

The graphic works of R. Budzinski often complimented his books. The characteristic sign of the artist was the distance to himself, the world and above all politics. In the whimsical tale *Entdeckung Ostpreussen* (Budzinski, 1975) the narrator getting ready for the trip to East Prussia says goodbye to his family as if it was his final journey. The land seems distant for them because for inhabitants of central Germany it is associated with lower civilizational level and located close to Siberia. The book's author and illustrator at the same time wanted to show there the genius loci of East Prussia. The irony of the book suggests that the East Prussian

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world should be observed as habitat of the traditional way of life and wisdom which is a result of living close to nature. The woodcuts adorning his book present the cultural diversity of that land, its towns, famous and ordinary people. Curonian Spit is also a frequent motif of his works. Sambian Peninsula and the beaches of Curonian Spit besides the views of Mazury are the most frequent landscape motifs of R. Budzinski who since 1919 lived in Königsberg. He illustrates the beauty of Masuria and Curonian Spit in original and witty way with words and drawings in his book *Curi-neru* (Budzinski, 1927). The characters, Ewa and Adam, depart for their honeymoon from their residence near Elbing (nowadays Elbląg) to the farthest region, the distant exotic island. Before reaching the ultimate destination they stop on the exotic island Neru-sam. The drawings show their happy days there. They bath naked in the crystal water of the lake and sleep under the open sky. The inhabitants of the island seems to Ewa extremely noble saying exotic phrases such as “pca krew”, “diable, satanie”. The next island Curi-neru enchants the spouses with its “mystical blueness of water”. They feel liberated from the burdensome ties of social customs and their relationships becomes perfect there. Graphic illustration of the book reflect freedom and joy of life which result from living close to nature. Before the end of the story Ewa deciphers Curonian Spit hidden under the name Curi-neru, but it’s difficult for her to believe that exotic Neru-sam is Masuria. The author’s benign irony towards the stereotypes of thinking about East Prussia also includes self-deprecation to his own utopian visions of the world.

The artist had to leave Königsberg in 1944 because of the war. After his wanderings through west Germany, he finally settled in 1945 at Wartburg. He moved to his friend Erica Stern after the death of his wife. E. Stern lived in Marburg, where R. Budzinski died and was buried in 1955. Watercolours with flower motifs dominated in his post-war works. Loss of his major inspiration which was East Prussia with its inhabitants and cultural landscape took away his creative power and sense of humour known from his pre-war works.

The recorder of the atmosphere of the remotest corner of Germany is known today to the art lovers looking for “the veduta of the lost world” but also to scholars who appreciate quality of his graphics. The experimenter in the field of this technique was also recognized by, among others, bookplates collector Gernot Blum, who delivered the publishing rarity containing Budzinski’s bookplates with frequent, dominant landscape motif. The luxurious edition (50 copies out of 209 reproductions) became a desired position not only because of the emotional bond with East Prussian themes but also for the graphic artistry. At the beginning of the 21st century the works of R. Budzinski were brought back thanks to the exhibitions at Wartburg (2000) and Winsen (2004). In Poland, the figure of R. Budzinski is still known to few researchers. In this text, the author refers only to those works in which the Curonian Spit, the key word – the icon, is the obvious source of inspiration, which, of course, is only a partial representation of his rich oeuvre.

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PART TWO

Arkadiusz Żukowski
Wojciech Kotowicz
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RESEARCHES, SCIENTIFIC
AND EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION
OF THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF WARMIA
AND MAZURY IN OLSZTYN
ON KALININGRAD ISSUES¹

The large part of the international scientific and educational activity of the Institute of Political Science at the University of Warmia and

¹ In the paper only partners from the Kaliningrad Region are taken into consideration.

Mazury in Olsztyn is concentrated on the internal and external issues of the Kaliningrad Region (Kaliningrad Oblast) of the Russian Federation.

The Institute belongs to one of the few research centers in Poland and Europe which conducts political science researches concerning mainly the socio-political reality of the Kaliningrad Region and the contacts of this part of the Russian Federation with the Baltic states and European organizations and institutions, especially, taking into account the cross-border cooperation².

* * *

In 2001, the Institute began to create a research team dealing with the Kaliningrad issues. The incentive for this purpose led to submit a research grant. The Institute received a scientific grant from the State Committee for Scientific Research (Komitet Badań Naukowych in Polish) entitled “Poland towards the Kaliningrad Region in terms of European order changes”³. The work on the grant took place from 1st March 2002 to 31 January 2004. The scientific goal of the project was prepared multi-aspects analysis of the place and role of the Kaliningrad Region in Polish foreign policy against the background of European processes of globalization and regionalization, including the economic and cultural issues. The other goal of the project was to investigate the practical realization of the idea cross-border cooperation on the example of the contacts be-

² Part of the papers presented during the conferences and symposiums as well as scientific publications of the staff of the Institute of Political Science are located at the Institute’s website: <http://www.uwm.edu.pl/inp/index.php/badania>. Full list of publications of the Institute on the Kaliningrad issues see in this book: pp. 195–220.

³ Number of the research project 2 H02E 041 22 and the Polish title: “Polska wobec obwodu kaliningradzkiego w warunkach przemian europejskiego ładu politycznego”. It was the first research grant implemented by the Institute on the topic.

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tween the Warmia and Mazury Region and the Kaliningrad Region and to answer the question about the role of Kaliningrad Region related to the conditions of transformation of European political order, especially in the context of the eastward enlargement of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The results of the research had important application to decision-making centers shaping Polish foreign policy. During the studies the theories of foreign policy, which emphasized on the concepts of international roles were used to recognize them as central categories of research.

The results of the findings have been presented at the conferences as well as in the scientific publications.

The scholars from the Institute of Political Science at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn (Marcin Chełminiak, Wojciech Kotowicz, Wojciech T. Modzelewski) in 2003–2004 participated in research, partly prepared the report about Polish-Russian Cross-Border Cooperation which was published by Borussia Cultural Community (located in Olsztyn) within the framework of the Friendly Neighbourhood Forum program. The main aim of the program was to create a communication platform for actors from Poland, Lithuania and Russia (the Kaliningrad Region/Oblast). The report accordingly focused on cooperation between the Warmia and Mazury Region/Voivodeship and the Kaliningrad Region. The report was addressed to those already involved in cross-border cooperation as well as those interested in getting involved. The authors tried to present the state, directions, scope and barriers to Polish-Russian cross-border cooperation in the years 1990–2003. The report could serve as a springboard for reflection about the future of Polish-Russian cross-border cooperation and help bring down all barriers too often encounter this cooperation. M. Chełminiak and W. Kotowicz analysed problem of the academic cooperation between the Warmia and Mazury Region and the Kaliningrad Region and cross-border cooperation between the Pomeranian and Podlasie Region/Voivodeships and the Kaliningrad Region. W. T. Modzelewski analysed problem of the Eurore-

gional cooperation and the cooperation by district (*powiat*) governments (Romanowska, Samońłowicz, 2004).

The grant of the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education for the Institute, entitled “The level of local democracy on the Polish-Russian borderland and its implications for trans-border cooperation” had great importance (implementation 2009–2011). The purpose of the project has investigated the state of the local democracy in Warmia and Mazury Region and Kaliningrad Region.

The other implemented research grant was from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was entitled “Eastern Policy of Poland and international cooperation of Warmia and Mazury Region”. The grant functioned in the framework of the support mechanism of civil and local dimension of foreign policy instrument “Small projects of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and local government” (implementation 2011–2012).

The general overall objective of the project was to exchange the experiences between scientists from University of Warmia and Mazury and local authorities from Warmia and Mazury Region. The others objectives were:

- development of the public debate about Polish foreign policy;
- support for civic and social dimension of diplomacy.

The Institute of Political Science – in a framework of this project – organized international academic conference about Eastern Policy of Poland and international cooperation of Warmia and Mazury Region for scholars, representative of local governments and students from Poland and Russia. The Institute also prepared scientific book about this issues.

The scientific aim of the project was to analyse the international role of Warmia and Mazury Region in the context Eastern dimension of the Polish foreign policy after 1989, with special emphasis on cross-border cooperation between Poland and the Russian Federation. The main methodological research analysis used were: system approach methodology, institutional and political science methods. The geopolitical changes, brought

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about by the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam order, resulted in Poland's (and its regions) being able to redefine the priorities of its foreign policy. Following the system transformation, the leading political parties reached a consensus concerning the its main objectives. Polish political elites finally agreed on the Euro-Atlantic direction of particular importance for the Polish foreign policy were the cross-border and interregional relations between Polish regions with neighbours' regions, especially with the regions from Russian Federation and Germany. The experts and scientists in the framework of this project tried to analyse how the beginning of the 21st century provided also challenges for Poland and its regions associated with the membership in the European Union, but also in terms of creating new eastern policy. They stressed that Poland also supported reforms towards democracy, especially in Ukraine and also opposition movements in Belarus. Representatives of local governments stressed the need of continuation and development of trans-border cooperation with Kaliningrad Region, but they said that Poland's accession to the EU did not impact positively for improvement of Polish–Russian relations on central decision-making level.

After the analysis of the problem of Eastern Policy of Poland and international cooperation of Warmia and Mazury Region, the following conclusions of the project: international cooperation of Polish regions was one of the main priorities of Polish diplomacy; this kind of cooperation in the first half of the 90s was perceived by the Polish government largely through the prism of challenges and threats; Poland treated eastern dimension of the international cooperation of the Polish regions as an important issue for the development and stability in the our region; In relations with Eastern partners Poland drew particular attention to the development of cross-border cooperation; Polish-Russian border cooperation has been largely conditioned by the state of political relations at the interstate.

In cooperation with the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad employees members of the Institute's staff took part in a re-

search project entitled “EU 4 YOU”, which fulfilled the EU Centre at that university. The culmination of cooperation in this project was the participation in the international scientific conference “Common spaces of Russia and the EU. Current problems and possible solutions”, which took place in Great Novgorod on 25–26 May 2012.

The great achievement for the Institute was receiving the European Union grant entitled “Close neighbours in the 21st century – new communication and perception” in the framework of the Lithuania-Poland-Russia Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2007–2013 (implementation 2012–2014) together with a partner from Kaliningrad – Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University⁴. The general overall objective of the project was to develop and improve social contacts and cross-border cooperation especially in the field of science and education between the community border region of Warmia and Mazury of Poland and Kaliningrad Region of Russia, through the analysis of trends and challenges of the process of intensification of bilateral cooperation between both regions, and the promotion of joint projects in the field of research and education. The project also dealt with issues of migration, national and ethnic minorities and development policy as well as with activity to increase a level of knowledge about local government and political, social and cultural conditions on Polish-Russian borderland. Also the intensification of joint ventures in the field of education in order to increasing knowledge about local government, political, social and cultural conditions on Polish-Russian borderland among students and representative of local governments was on agenda.

Target groups were: academic staff, students, PhD students, local governments activists and the final beneficiaries: borderland community of Warmia and Mazury Region and Kaliningrad Region. The project assumed

⁴ For more information see: <http://www.uwm.edu.pl/inp/index.php/sasiedzi> [accessed 25 March 2015].

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such estimates results as: increase of level of knowledge on Polish-Russian borderland among 200 students from Poland and Russia; increase in number of scientists who conduct researches on Polish-Russian borderland; overcome of mutual distrust and negative stereotypes that exist in both countries in cooperation between scientists and students from Warmia and Mazury Region and Kaliningrad Region; creation of pro-state and civil society attitudes among persons who were directly and indirectly covered by the project.

There were many scholar and educational activities in the framework of the project. A team of researchers from the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn and Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad, qualified in various areas of political science and social sciences was established. The team prepare a scientific questionnaires to students, local governments and researchers in cross-border regions, the questionnaires will be conducted on both sides of the border, what gave a comparative analysis of the state of consciousness, expectations and perceptions of cross-border cooperation of Poles and Russians. Among others, the team prepared and conducted seminars for bachelor, master students and postgraduate students on the problem at issue in the project conducted by researchers from both universities, specializing in various aspects of Polish-Russian border issues. Exchange of students and academic staff took place and lectures presenting the results of researches were conducted.

To the achievements of the project, summer school in Olsztyn for 50 participants (students and scholars from the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad) should be included. The main aim of the school was to deepen a knowledge of students on political, social, cultural aspects of the Polish-Russian borderland⁵. Besides this: internation-

⁵ About the programme of the summer school see: http://www.uwm.edu.pl/inp/docs/letnia_program.pdf [accessed 25 March 2015].

al academic conference, at the end of the project, for scholars, representative of local governments and students from Poland and Russia took place); expertise and the preparation of scientific books and joint scientific journal on Polish-Russian border issues have been also made.

The Institute tries to investigate current and difficult issues, e.g. a completion of such research projects as “Monument’s Policy in Poland towards post-Soviet memorial sites – Polish and Russian point of view” (2014) and “Small border traffic in conditions of crisis in Polish–Russian relations” (2015) – grants received from the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding.

Following the collapse of Communism well over 25 years ago, the communist-era monuments were toppled all over Eastern Europe, in Poland also. Research projects “Monument’s Policy in Poland towards post-Soviet memorial sites – Polish and Russian point of view” had begun and finished in 2014. The Institute of Political Sciences organized debate about monument’s and historical policy in Poland towards post-Soviet memorial sites and scientific seminar about historical policy in Poland and Russia. Scholars, experts, students and local officials from Poland and Kaliningrad Region participated in these events. It was great opportunity to exchange points of views and opinions from two sides of the border.

The main subjects of the debate and the seminar were the following issues:

- respect for the symbolic and historical signs of the presence of the Soviet army in Poland;
- the legal acts in this area in Poland;
- experts’ opinions and mass media information on the necessity of the removal of monuments and other symbols associated with the Soviet presence.

During the discussion, the opinions on Polish monument’s Policy have been confronted with the opinions of experts, local government officials and representatives of public institutions responsible for monument’s

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policy. Representatives of local authorities from Pieniężno stressed the need of the removal of the memorial of Gen. Ivan Chernyakhovsky. They argued that Chernyakhovsky crushed units of Poland's clandestine Home Army during the war and also symbolizes the imposition of Communism on Poland. The local authorities from Pieniężno suggested sending Chernyakhovsky's monument to Russia, where he is still a national hero. The scientists from Poland and Russia stressed that the main source of the problem is a clash between Russia's view of history and that of the other former communist states. The end of the Second World War for Russians is synonymous with liberation from Nazism and their victory. Many citizens of the states of Eastern Europe, by contrast, see it as the beginning of a new occupation. The main effect of this social debate was to establish cooperation between the Polish and Russian opinion leaders and representatives of local communities in terms of discussing the need for policy coordination and historical monument on the Polish and the Russian side of the border.

The goals of the research project entitled "Local border traffic in the context of a crisis in the Polish–Russian relations" were the organisation of a debate, a scientific seminar and the publication of a scholarly paper. The project investigated the effects of the local border traffic (LBT) at the Polish-Russian border, in the context of the continuously deteriorating relations between Poland and Russia.

The starting point for this enterprise was the signing of the local border traffic agreement by Russia and Poland in December 2011 and the implementation of this mechanism mid-2012. Once this agreement came into effect it encouraged border mobility, and thus the social and economic relations on the Polish-Russian border were revived and the number of Polish and Russian citizens in the neighbour's borderland increased. The most common phenomenon was the journeys made by citizens of the Kaliningrad enclave to the areas of Poland where the local border traffic mechanism had been implemented. The effects of this movement included not only the revitalisation of trade, services and other tourism related

sectors, but also, through Polish–Russian interactions, the opportunity to overcome negative stereotypes. These positive effects of the LBT have been confirmed by statistical information, local government officials, investors, as well as community members living in the areas falling under this mechanism.

One of the aims of the local border traffic agreement was the familiarisation of Russian society with Europe. The other one was to perform a kind of experiment related to the liberalisation of the visa regime with relation to some citizens of the Russian Federation.

When observing the numerous phenomena related to the implementation of the local border traffic, it is noticeable that these are fascinating from scientific, social and political perspectives. Research indicates that initially the Russian Government was not entirely supportive of the introduction of the local border traffic. This was probably due to the fear of the potential effects the Polish-Russian interaction and cooperation would have on Kaliningrad citizens' political preferences. Between 2013 and 2014, in the face of the exacerbating conflict in the Ukraine, attempts were made to antagonise the local communities of the areas of the local border traffic.

Research data demonstrates that the aversion towards the actions of the Russian government observed in the Polish society, does not directly translate to hostility towards the Russians who visit the areas under the local border traffic mechanism. Some researches even claim that the LBT has such a positive influence on the Polish–Russian relations, that in the provinces where the mechanism is employed (Warmia and Mazury Region/Voivodeship and Pomeranian Region/Voivodeship) the percentage of negative opinions related to Polish–Russian relations is lower than in other Polish regions.

This research project investigated the effects of the local border traffic on the Polish–Russian relations from two perspectives. The first one was purely scientific and it considered the political implications of the LBT, as well as the general effects of this mechanism on the Polish–Russian

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relations. The second one focused on the perception of the LBT by various social groups. These included local governments, the representatives of local communities, investors, NGOs, as well as governmental institutions (both Polish and Russian). The debate had as its goal to reach an understanding of the points of view of both parties and to propose tools, which would help to improve Polish–Russian relations with regards to cross-border cooperation. The debate participants came from various social groups and involved representatives of numerous Polish and Russian institutions and organisations; local government officials, historians, political scientists and representatives of the Russian Federation Consulate in Gdańsk and the Polish Consulate in Kaliningrad. The scientific seminar involved Polish and Russian historians, political scientists and sociologists who investigate Polish–Russian relations, trans-border cooperation and local border traffic.

The last research topics of the Institute are also related to the Polish-Russian local border traffic, among others preparation of the international grants entitled “Mechanism of local border traffic on the Polish-Russian border. Theoretical determinants – international conditions – regional and local implications” and “Perception and implications of local border traffic between Poland and Russia. Theoretical determinants and experience of researches”.

* * *

The interest in the Kaliningrad Region have resulted in preparing doctor's thesis by the staff of the Institute. It seems worth to admit that the Institute was one of the first places in Poland where such scientific works were prepared. The author of the first doctor's thesis was W. T. Modzelewski. The thesis was titled “Political conditions of the cooperation in the borderland of Poland and Russia”⁶ (Supervisor: A. Żukowski).

⁶ Polish title: “Polityczne uwarunkowania współpracy na pograniczu polsko-rosyjskim”.

The thesis was admitted at the Gdańsk University in 2005. In the thesis the political conditions of the cooperation in the Polish-Russian borderland were analysed. The connections between the situation in the area and Polish foreign policy were highlighted. The thesis also included reflections on the contention issues in relations between the countries in connection with the Region of Kaliningrad, the importance of this region for the geopolitics and the perspectives for cross-border relations between Poland and Russia⁷.

The second doctor's thesis was prepared by M. Chełminiak. It was admitted at the University of Warsaw in 2005. The title was: "Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation in the changes of European political order"⁸ (Supervisor: A. Żukowski). The author analysed the history of formation of the Region of Kaliningrad and its role in the Cold War. But main analysis is focused on the Russian military interests of the Kaliningrad Region. The author also dealt with the geopolitical role of the Region of Kaliningrad in connection with the interests of the Russian Federation in the Baltic Sea area. The dissertation also contains the analysis of the relationships of the Kaliningrad Region with international organizations and institutions, especially those which play an important role in the region of the Baltic Sea such as NATO, the European Union and other sub regional organizations⁹.

⁷ Description of the thesis in Polish see: <http://nauka-polska.pl/dhtml/raporty/ludzieNauki?rtype=opis&objectId=127753&lang=pl> [accessed 23 August 2013]. The thesis was published in changed and extended form, see: W. T. Modzelewski (2006), *Polska – Obwód Kaliningradzki FR. Polityczne uwarunkowania współpracy transgranicznej*, Instytut Nauk Politycznych UW, Olsztyn, pp. 328.

⁸ Polish title: "Obwód Kaliningradzki Federacji Rosyjskiej w warunkach przemian europejskiego ładu politycznego".

⁹ Description of the thesis in Polish see: <http://nauka-polska.pl/dhtml/raporty/ludzieNauki?rtype=opis&objectId=128079&lang=pl> [accessed 23 August 2013]. The thesis was published in changed and extended form, see: M. Chełminiak

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The next dissertation, which was admitted at the Gdańsk University in 2009, was written by W. Kotowicz. It was entitled “The political life of the Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation: Endo- and exogenous stimulus”¹⁰. The doctor’s thesis consisted not only in analyzing the political life of the Region of Kaliningrad, i.e. its essence, dimension or main characteristics but also the conditions influencing the political life of the region. The fundamental objective of the research boiled down to finding an answer about the role of internal and external factors in determining the political life of the Region of Kaliningrad¹¹.

The fourth doctor’s thesis prepared by K. Żęgota was defended at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn in 2011. The thesis was entitled “The contemporary picture of Polish Diaspora in the Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation”¹². The aim of the research was to show a complete picture of the Polish Diaspora as a national/ethnic community, its origin, determinants of functioning, and different aspects of its activity, especially social and cultural. In the thesis social position of members of the Diaspora and the relationship between the Polish Diaspora and the rest of the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Region as well as contacts with Poland were examined. Also the problem of the professional activity of members of the Polish Diaspora in the community of Kalinin-

(2009), *Obwód Kaliningradzki FR w Europie. Rosyjska enklawa w nowym międzynarodowym ładzie politycznym*, Wydawnictwo Duet, Toruń, pp. 308.

¹⁰ Polish title: “Życie polityczne Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego Federacji Rosyjskiej”.

¹¹ Description of the thesis in Polish see: <http://nauka-polska.pl/dhtml/raporty/ludzieNauki?rtype=opis&objectId=220026&lang=pl> [accessed 23 August 2013]. The thesis was published in changed and extended form, see: W. Kotowicz (2012), *Życie polityczne Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego Federacji Rosyjskiej. Stymulatory endogeniczne i egzogeniczne*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe GRADO, Toruń, pp. 391.

¹² Polish title: “Współczesny obraz diaspory polskiej w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim Federacji Rosyjskiej”.

grad Region and the potential role of the Diaspora in the development of Polish–Russian relations at the regional and local levels were analysed¹³.

For last few years a postdoctoral academic degree (Habilitation) on the Kaliningrad issues qualifying to be an assistant professor have been under way. In 2014 M. Chełminiak acquired at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań such degree for series of scientific articles entitled “The place of the Kaliningrad Region in Russian foreign policy and Polish-Russian inter-governmental and cross-border cooperation after 2004”¹⁴.

The researches on the Kaliningrad issues resulted of preparation of bachelor’s and master’s thesis during the courses in Political Science¹⁵.

¹³ Description of the thesis in Polish see: <http://nauka-polska.pl/dhtml/raporty/ludzieNauki?rtype=opis&objectId=236206&lang=pl> [accessed 23 August 2013]. The thesis was published in changed and extended form, see: K. Żęgota (2014), *Diaspora polska w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Wydawnictwo MADO, Toruń, pp. 417.

¹⁴ Description of the series of scientific articles in Polish see: <http://nauka-polska.pl/dhtml/raporty/praceBadawcze?rtype=opis&lang=pl&objectId=289686> [accessed 25 August 2014].

¹⁵ An examples of the masters’s thesis: Jan Bogdan (2000), “Wolna Strefa Ekonomiczna »Jantar« i jej kontynuatorka. Samodzielna strefa ekonomiczna”, Supervisor: Prof. Bohdan Kozieńko-Poklewski; Anna Bogdan (2000), “Formy współpracy transgranicznej w regionie północno-wschodnim Polski”, Supervisor: Prof. Arkadiusz Żukowski; Aneta Szydlak (2001), “Obwód Kaliningradzki w polskiej polityce zagranicznej”, Supervisor: Prof. Arkadiusz Żukowski; Anna Gojło (2002), “Status polityczno-prawny współczesnych enklaw na przykładzie Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego”, Supervisor: Prof. Arkadiusz Żukowski; Katarzyna Karpisz (2002), “Przemiany społeczne i narodowościowe w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim w latach 1991–1996”, Supervisor: Prof. Bohdan Kozieńko-Poklewski; Artur Jaśmin (2004), “Zjawisko przemytu granicznego we współczesnej Polsce ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem granicy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z Federacją Rosyjską”, Supervisor: Prof. Selim Chazbijewicz; Krystian B. Dzirba (2005), “Specyfika narodowościowo-et-

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Since last few years at the Institute bachelor's thesis as well master's thesis on the Kaliningrad issues were completed in the framework of the of courses in National Security¹⁶.

The Institute monitors and investigates the researches on the Kaliningrad issues conducted in Poland which resulted unique and comprehensive surveys on the topic (Żukowski, 2004, pp. 9–32; Kotowicz, Żukowski, 2004, pp. 165–182; Kotowicz, Żukowski, 2008, pp. 11–45; Żukowski, 2009, pp. 247–260; Kotowicz, Żukowski, 2011, pp. 109–119; Żukowski 2014, pp. 131–136). The Institute was the first and only one which worked out the full list of the scientific publications on Kaliningrad issues in Pol-

niczna w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim Federacji Rosyjskiej”; Supervisor: Prof. Arkadiusz Żukowski; Kamila E. Rostkowska-Różacka (2005), “Obwód Kaliningradzki Federacji Rosyjskiej na łamach »Gazety Wyborczej« w latach 1991–2004”; Supervisor: Prof. Arkadiusz Żukowski; Krystyna Stefańska (2005), “Obwód Kaliningradzki Federacji Rosyjskiej na łamach »Rzeczypospolitej« w latach 1991–2004”; Supervisor: Prof. Arkadiusz Żukowski; Katarzyna Rochmińska (2006), “Obwód kaliningradzki wobec współczesnych wyzwań międzynarodowych”; Supervisor: Dr. Degefe Kebede Gemechu; Piotr Cichurski (2006), “Szanse i ograniczenia współpracy przygranicznej na przykładzie Bartoszczyka i Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego”; Supervisor: Dr. Zdzisław Kunicki; Adam Samsel (2009), “Znaczenie geopolityczne Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego”; Supervisor: Dr. Adam Hołub.

- ¹⁶ An examples of the bachelor's thesis: Franciszek Czyżyński (2013), “Zabezpieczenie granic z obwodem kaliningradzkim po wejściu do strefy Schengen”; Supervisor: Prof. Marek Jabłonowski; Piotr Skrodzki (2016), “Zadania i obowiązki Służby Celnej w małym ruchu granicznym z Obwodem Kaliningradzkim”; Supervisor: prof. Waldemar Żebrowski. An examples of the masters's thesis: Adrian Stasiński (2015), “Wpływ na bezpieczeństwo Polski instalacji rakiet ISKANDER w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim”; Supervisor: Prof. Marek Jabłonowski; Mateusz Ropiak (2015), “Bezpieczeństwo związane z przestępczością zorganizowaną w kontekście granicy polsko-rosyjskiej województwa warmińsko-mazurskiego i Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego”; Supervisor: Prof. Selim Chazbijewicz.

ish language since 1991 (Chełminiak, Kotowicz, Modzelewski, Żukowski, 2004, pp. 139–176; Chełminiak, Kotowicz, Modzelewski, Żukowski, 2008, pp. 56–106) as well as in Polish web resources (Chełminiak, Modzelewski, 2003, pp. 363–368). Besides this the Institute prepared the precious schedule of contacts between Poland and the Kaliningrad Region in the years 1991–2003 (Chełminiak, Kotowicz, Modzelewski, Żukowski, 2004, pp. 107–138; Chełminiak, Kotowicz, Modzelewski, Żukowski, 2004, pp. 133–152) and in the years 1991–2006 (Chełminiak, Kotowicz, Modzelewski, Żukowski, 2008, pp. 269–307).

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The cooperation of the Institute in science and education on Kaliningrad issues is realized primarily through contacts with the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad. Initially, this cooperation was not formalized and not much intense due mainly to the scarcity of financial resources, despite numerous attempts to obtain scientific grants, domestic and international. In the end, the Institute succeeded in receiving different grants. Most of them were implemented together with the partner from Kaliningrad. Cooperation with the university from Kaliningrad is focused around: the exchange of experiences of research, scientific queries, joint conferences and symposia, exchange of staff and students (scholarships, internships, cultural events) and preparation of joint research projects.

On the scientific and educational ground the Institute collaborates with other partners from Kaliningrad. Since 2011, such activity is conducted with the Kaliningrad Branch of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации. Калининградского филиал in Russian). The activity includes joint publications, guest lectures, conferences). The worker of the Academy Dr. Viktor Romanovskij

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as a “visiting professor” every academic year leads classes on topics of Euroregions and cross-border cooperation at the Institute. Owing to an initiative of the Institute the cooperation agreement between the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn and the Kaliningrad Branch of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation was signed in 2012 for 5 years¹⁷.

Another and quite a special partner of the Institute is the Election Commission of the Kaliningrad Region (Избирательная комиссия Калининградской области in Russian). The co-operation concerned electoral education of the younger generation. The Institute together with the Commission submitted a joint EU grant entitled “Electoral education in civil society: challenges and perspectives of cooperation on Polish-Russian borderland” but did not succeed. Similarly as was above mentioned, owing to an initiative of the Institute the cooperation agreement between the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn and the Election Commission of the Kaliningrad Region was signed in 2011 also for 5 years¹⁸. For last years, in fact, the cooperation does not exist.

The Institute was also undertaken scientific cooperation with the Kaliningrad NGO Centre for European Partnership (Центр европейского партнерства in Russian). An indication of this cooperation was the preparation in July 2006 a joint research project entitled “Factors of development of local democracy in the Warmia and Mazury Region and the Kaliningrad Region”, whose aim was to examine the functioning of local governments on both sides of the borderland, in particular in relations of office-citizen. The project was prepared under the Neighbourhood Programme Lithuania, Poland, Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federa-

¹⁷ http://www.uwm.edu.pl/bwz/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Tabela_Umowy-17.5.2016.pdf [accessed 25 March 2015].

¹⁸ http://www.uwm.edu.pl/bwz/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Tabela_Umowy-17.5.2016.pdf [accessed 25 March 2015].

tion INTERREG IIIA/TACIS but have not been definitively certified to financing.

The Institute, since 2001, actively cooperates with the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland situated in Kaliningrad, especially with the General Consuls.

* * *

The Institute not only continues the existing forms of cooperation with partners from Kaliningrad Region, but formulates targets for strategic cooperation over a longer period of time. The intention of the Institute is to conduct research with the partners from Kaliningrad in a broader context – the Baltic Sea Region and the Euro-Asia. An example is a fact that the staff of the Institute takes part in the activity of the Baltic Sea Region University Network (BSRUN) which the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn is a member¹⁹.

In the era of fastening and deepening globalization and regionalization, undertaking joint cross-border projects, also in a sphere of research and education is particularly needed and justified. Only through mutual understanding and the development of contacts, it is possible to overcome various barriers resulting from the existence of the border. It is particularly important to overcome mutual distrust and negative stereotypes and to build confidence and make deeper the social integration of the Polish-Russian borderland and the Baltic Sea Region in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and sustainability. The activities of the Institute, besides strictly scientific and educational goals, want to enter into these processes. The similarity of problems and research interests result-

¹⁹ The Institute assisted to organise the International Joint Conference entitled: “History, culture and nature of the Baltic Sea Region” (23–24 October 2014, Olsztyn, Poland) where two panels on Kaliningrad issues took place.

ing from living in the trans-border region, additionally motivated to take this neighbourly cooperation.

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ON KALININGRAD ISSUES PREPARED BY
THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF WARMIA AND MAZURY
IN OLSZTYN, POLAND (ACADEMIC STAFF,
BA, MA, PHD STUDENTS AND ALUMNI)

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