



# **Failures of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Unprofessional Police and Unproductive Administration**

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**By**

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## **Abstract**

This research analyzes the role of Police and Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2012. It intends to answer two questions: How do international and local actors donate to the success or failure of Afghanistan Security Sector and Police Reform? How do actors, leadership, and policies within a synchronized mission fail to build professional police? The thesis will argue that lack of shared vision among international actors and absence of potential leadership and capacity in Afghanistan government are critical factors clarifying the failures of post-conflict reconstruction.

This study develops process tracing and case study method of research. It explains donors' efforts within a synchronized mission to reform security sector and police. The theory postulates that Security Sector and Police Reform are the initial steps towards success in post-conflict reconstruction. The theory of post-conflict reconstruction shows that coordination among donors and efficient leadership enhances post-conflict reconstruction efforts to reform security institutions and build professional police. The thesis examines this theory for Afghanistan after 9/11, using qualitative method, particularly process tracing and single case study techniques.

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## **Preface and Acknowledgement**

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## **Dedication**

I dedicate this work to my caring and sympathetic parents for teaching me the honesty, sincerity, loyalty and being philanthropic. You are the greatest personalities in my life.

## List of Acronyms

ABP	Afghanistan Border Police
ACSOR	Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research
AGO	Attorney General Office
ALP	Afghanistan Local Police
ANA	Afghanistan National Army
ANAP	Afghan National Auxiliary Police
ANCOP	Afghanistan National Civil Order Police
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghanistan National Police
ANPS	Afghanistan National Police Strategy
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Force
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
AUCP	Afghanistan Uniform Civilian Police
CNPA	Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan
CTC	Central Training Center
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
EUSR	Office of the European Union Special Representative
GPPO	German Police Project Office
ICPC	Interim Criminal Procedure Code
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (US)
IPCAG	Interagency Police Coordinated Action Group
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board

ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
KIA	Killed in Action
KPA	Kabul Police Academy
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NISS	National Internal Security Strategy
NPP	Norwegian Police Project
NSD	National Security Directorate
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan
PRIME	Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation AG
PAG	Policy Action Group
PRD	Police Reform Directorate
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RTC	Regional Training Centre
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
TIP	Transition Integration Programme
TFP	Task Force Police Directorate
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



## CHAPTER 1: Introduction

This study argues that Security Sector Reform (SSR), particularly policing which is not successful in Afghanistan. This research focuses on police reform and addresses the following research questions to demonstrate failures of SSR process: How do international and local actors donate to the success or failure of Afghanistan Security Sector and Police Reform? How do actors, leadership, and policies within a synchronized mission fail to build professional police? The research will argue that lack of strategic operational initiatives among international actors and absence of potential leadership and capacity in Afghanistan government are critical factors clarifying the failures of post-conflict security sector reform.

Security sector reform, particularly building professional and accountable police is not succeeded in Afghanistan. This study identifies the causes of failures as follows: **1.** Lack of strategic and operational initiatives and effective planning among donors and government (Dennys and Hamilton-Balille 2012: 2; Perito 2009; Friesendorf 2011; DFID 2008; Murray 2007: 108; Wilder 2007; Sedra 2004, 2003). **2.** “Lead donor” approach narrows the scope of reform. Lead nations also lack effective leaderships and resources to manage the issue of training systematically (Kouvo et al. 2009; Bhatia, Lanigan & Wilkinson 2004: 1; Murray 2007; Denny & Hamilton-Baillie 2012). **3.** Lack of effective leadership, capacity and institution-building in Afghanistan government which are essential both to manage its security forces and push the reform agenda (Oxfam 2011: 2; Bhatia, Lanigan & Wilkinson 2004; Kouvo et al. 2009; Sedra 2003, 2004; Dennys and Hamilton-Baillie 2012).

Aftermath of the violent conflict, the great part of international community’s efforts have focused on post conflict reconstruction. One area of international post-conflict program is the “reform” of security sector (SSR) institutions, such as police service and military (Bajraktari et al. 2006: 5; Call 2003; Kouvo et al. 2009; Murray 2007 and Friesendorf 2011). International donors are contributing billions of dollars towards post-conflict police reform; however, the process requires more than just monetary support to

succeed. They should contemplate the social, organizational and political challenges to effective reform. With no effective police, there can be no peace building in post-conflict societies. “Without a police service capable of arresting insecurity and restoring trust, a society will not have the stable and predictable conditions necessary for basic economic, political, and social development.” (Bajraktari et al. 2006: 10). Therefore, this study will argue that the failures of SSR affected on Afghan National Police (ANP). Today, the police forces are not enough professional and accountable to ensure security and prosperity after withdrawal of international forces in 2014.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is an effective and efficient pillar of post-conflict reconstruction. The main aim of SSR is to ensure efficient delivery of security. It decreases the risk of a relapse to war. Police reform is crucial in war-torn societies in order to eradicate the source of insecurity (Friesendorf 2011: 79). SSR is interlinked to develop the performance of police and military institutions. It moves beyond technical aspects of organizations and follows a broad and ambitious agenda of reconstructing the state to serve the population (Jackson 2009; Perito 2009: 3). Since 2001, international community has been spending money into the war and post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, but still the police forces are not professional and accountable. The efforts to professionalize police and reform security sector really began in 2009 (Oxfam 2011: 2). The challenges and shortcomings of security sector reform are immense and considerable in Afghanistan (Kouvo et al. 2009). Despite spending large amount of money over 10 years of police reform in Afghanistan, the investment has not produced a significant result. Among other challenges “A lack of strategic vision and effective planning; and a failure to capitalize on the insights” are key reasons that fail international community to build professional police in Afghanistan (Murray 2007: 108).

Afghanistan’s security sector reform was initiated during the Afghan Interim Authority after Bonn agreement 2001. Indeed, Bonn agreement does not indicate a role for the UN to train Afghan police. The responsibility of security in all over the country rested with Afghan forces. Very soon, International donors adopted a “lead nation” framework at Group of Eight conference (G8) which was held in Geneva in the spring of

2002 (Perito 2009: 2; Kouvo et al. 2009; Murray 2007; Sedra 2004). The security sector reform was divided into five pillars. One lead-donor nation was assigned to each pillar in order to support the process. Germany became the lead on police reform; United States became the lead on military; Italy, the judiciary; Britain, counternarcotics and Japan, DDR. The scheme and framework was to ensure collective efforts, but there was no clear policy and procedure among donor nations to assure coordination. This scheme hinders security sector reform rather than advance the process (Kouvo et. al. 2009: 9; Murray 2007, and Sedra 2004: 2-3). The office of the Afghan National Security Council (ONSC) anticipated having a coordination role for process, but it lacked resources and structures to affirm an efficient oversight and coordination role for the SSR process (DFID 2008: 40; Dennys and Hamilton-Baillie 2012: 2).

The dysfunctions of national police are usually irresistible after the violent conflict. It would be difficult to reconstruct them without monetary and material assistance of donors. The goal of security sector reform in short run, is to professionalize security organizations to provide basic security, while, in the long run, it enhances the aim of reconstructing state's police and military forces ( Peake, Scheye & Hills 2006). Usually, the police force is seen to be “the face of the executive” to the population; therefore, the role of police in successful post-conflict reconstruction and transformation cannot be miscalculated (Meyer 2006: 255).

I have chosen Afghanistan because the declining security situation with an increase in opium cultivation, corruption, inefficiency of national police as a security catastrophe and the lack of progress in governance and rule of law have destabilized the public's perception in the Afghan government ( Kouvo et al.2009: 10; Brookings 2008; The fund for peace in failed states index 2012). Moreover, Constant failure to ensure security and rule of law has weakened Afghans' perception in post-conflict reconstruction efforts of international community. The initial military goals and operational agendas have achieved in Afghanistan, but the long-term goals of post-conflict reconstruction have not been accomplished.

Within the last two decades, particularly after Cold War 116 civil wars have taken place (Kegley 2006: 401). After 1990s, UN has changed the traditional military and diplomatic process of conflict management to broader mandate like nation building, peacebuilding, state building and democratization of post war societies. There is growing number of literature dealing with the effects of multi-dimension peacekeeping missions (Berdal 1993; Jarstad 2008; Uvin 2002; Paris 2004). High numbers of societies have emerged from armed conflicts, international post-conflict reconstruction efforts have also increased. For example, Cambodia, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Namibia, Angola, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, and Afghanistan are the recent examples that international community has exercised key roles (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). According to the World Bank (1995) post conflict reconstruction is “the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society” and the “reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre and Sullivan 2002: 89). Boutros-Ghali (1992, 1995) defined post-conflict reconstruction as peacebuilding in relation to a conflict continuum from pre-conflict prevention to peacemaking and peacekeeping. He conceptualizes peacebuilding as mixed actions to support institutions in order to empower and solidify peace.

There are remarkable debates exist on the actual meaning of post-conflict. This thesis adopts Nkurunziz’s (2008) post-conflict definition. According to his definition there are two events that particularly recognized as the initial period of a post-conflict situation. The first is the time aftermaths of the conflict following a clear victory by either of the conflict parties. The second is the time of signature of a comprehensive accord between the conflict parties to clarify the official termination of a conflict. Other scholars like Francis Fukuyama’s (2004) also defines post-conflict period. He distinguishes post-conflict reconstruction as the first phase of nation-building, which concerns and applies to failed states after violent conflict where international community has to provide security and all essential needs. He also argued other important phases of nation-building as: creation of self-sustaining state institutions as the second phase which starts after completion of first phase. The third phase of nation-building involves enhancing and

supporting of weak states (Fukuyama 2004:135-37). Thus, following Fukuyama's definition of nation-building, post-conflict reconstruction is only needed when the institutions and government of the country is not functioning effectively aftermath of a violent conflict and the international community is dealing with a failed state.

The rest of this introduction will proceed with purpose and research questions of this study, following with a brief overview of the thesis.

### **1.1 Research Purpose and Question**

The purpose of this research is to understand the role of Police and Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan's post-conflict era after 9/11. It intends to investigate the following questions: Why Afghanistan National Police are unprofessional? How do international and local actors donate to the success or failure of Security Sector and Police Reform in Afghanistan? How do actors, leadership, and policies within a synchronized mission failed to build professional police? The thesis will argue that lack of a feasible and meaningful overarching strategy to follow on the ground among international actors and absence of potential leadership and capacity in Afghanistan government are critical factors clarifying the failures of post-conflict reconstruction. As a result, each member of the mission goes ahead with its own agenda in a chaotic manner, which often leaves many urgent issues unaddressed. Throughout the study, I will argue the contributing factors that caused failures in building professional police personnel and its impact on Afghanistan's people.

### **1.2 Overview of the study**

The structure of this thesis is as follow: Chapter two explains the theory of post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform (SSR) and the recent efforts by international community to help societies which are emerging from war. It also describes police reform and role of national police in post-conflict era. Chapter three explores and tests theory of post-conflict reconstruction, particularly police and security sector reform

(SSR) with the leadership and structure of police in Afghanistan. Chapter four details the training programs and a brief history of aids to Afghan National Police. Moreover, it argues the dissonance and dissension between donors in reforming the police forces along its results to population. Chapter five covers the causes of failures and obstacles to reform Afghanistan National Police. At the end, this research discusses the results of this study. Follows with concluding remarks, where the policy recommendations of this study are patented along with the components and areas needing additional research.

### **1.3 Research Methodology**

This chapter developed the hypotheses on failures of post-conflict reconstruction. This study will focus on security pillar and test three hypotheses based on capacity of Afghanistan National Police. **First**, Organizational or institutional challenges of international donors: “The higher number of donors, the higher probability of policy failure.” **Second**, ineffective and inability of leadership in Afghanistan government, particularly in Ministry of Interior: “Lack of efficient leadership in Afghanistan government, especially in MOI, undermined efforts to build professional police.” **Third**, individual and personal related factors, such as illiteracy and ill-disciplined: “The higher rate of illiteracy in police force, the higher probability of human rights abuses and other criminal activities.” Proliferation on number of donors, lack of institutional Reforms in Afghanistan government (Security Sector Reform) and individual behavior of police have significant role in failure of post-conflict reconstruction. Intuitively, leadership or direction, actors and reforms have important impacts on post-conflict reconstruction. A case study and process tracing are employed to test the hypotheses. The remaining part, overviews the qualitative approach then it gives a brief summary.

### **1.3.1. An Overview of Qualitative Method**

Qualitative approach or method has been recognized as one that does not need numbers as a form of measurement. The main stream and source of record is through “in-depth” study and examination of materials/ and different interviews (King, Keohane and Vebra 1994). It approves a- causes-of-effect explanation method through single or small cases (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). The major potencies of qualitative method of research are its skill to give huge amount of data and information for different cases and a single case. Therefore, it makes researcher competent to draw a conclusion in order to describe each cases by causes of an effect approach (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). However; its shortfall is the deficit to simplify for a large number of cases (King, Keohane and Vebra 1994). Generally, qualitative approach and, in particular, the case study method is the choice for majority of scholars and researchers in the field of post-conflict reconstruction (Gerring 2001). The major two reasons for undertaking a qualitative method of research are: 1. the shortcomings and almost unavailability of common and reliable data. More specifically, data on post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan are concealed to researchers due to security tensions. 2. majority of field researchers belief that qualitative approaches are structured to produce more in-depth explanation about internal dynamics which play a significant role in post-conflict reconstruction dilemmas (Herrhausen 2009; Paris and Sisk 2009).

Furthermore, so many mixed and multifaceted characteristics and dynamic of post-conflict reconstruction and its capricious interactions cannot be designed in forms that allow quantitative or statistical testing. Thus, statistical testing is not adequate to capture different volatile dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform (Paris 2004). But there are also some scholars, as Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) who have focused with quantitative method to analyze international peacebuilding of United Nations efforts. However; a large number of qualitative methods of studies have been the primary sources and descriptive tools of post-conflict reconstruction, which is a rigorous trend of the field (Herrhausen 2009; Paris 2006; Stedman et al. 2002). Furthermore; qualitative approaches rarely uncover the causal relationship that describes factors

accommodating to failure or successful post-conflict reconstruction. Numbers of research in the field of post-conflict reconstruction have attempted with qualitative method which are not based on methodological forms of research (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

Generally, most of the qualitative studies have followed some special types or aspects of post-conflict reconstruction, however; they have designed with methodological and systematic practices. Peacebuilding operations through UN has opened a new perspective for employing case studies, these studies are rich in view of description and explanation (Gerring 2007). Qualitative method is the best approach that describes micro-dynamics characterization of post-conflict situations and particularly the security sector reform, single or multiple case studies with employing process tracing or comparison techniques, are granting superior insights (George and Bennet 2005). Nowadays, so many scholars in post-conflict reconstruction are commencing the qualitative method which performs better understanding of multi-faceted situation of the field. To define failures of post-conflict reconstruction causality, there is a great appraise to apply qualitative method organization of the study focused is process tracing and single case study method.

### **1.3.2 Process-Tracing**

The essential practice for examining and exploring causal evolution is process tracing. Process tracing is defined by George and McKeown (1985) as method or practice of within-case analysis focused to observe causal processes. They describe that process tracing explore the decision process by which primary conditions are converted in to outcomes. According George and McKeown “process-tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variable of interest on attention, processing, and behavior” (George and McKeown 1985: 35).

Furthermore; with this thesis we are aiming to uncover the micro-foundations of post-conflict failures in Afghanistan. This is what Brady et al. (2006) pointed that process

tracing decreases difficulties of unobserved variables while it connects hypothesized causes with outcomes. Thus, process tracing, unlike the statistical method, conceptualizes both testing of hypotheses and generating of hypotheses (Brady et al. 2006).

According to George and Bennet (2005: 206) process tracing is a “method that attempts to identify the intervening causal process- the causal chain and causal mechanism-between an independent variable (or variable) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” They define causal mechanisms as “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological process through which agents with causal capacities operate but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities” (George and Bennet 2005: 137).

For this thesis process tracing can uncover causal mechanisms of post-conflict reconstruction. I will use this method to examine pillars of post-conflict reconstruction, different transcripts, and other literatures to see whether the causal mechanism in the theory of post-conflict security sector reform is really manifesting in the string and context of the variables (dependent and independent) in the case studies. With process tracing we can notify the intervening causal processes that are between result of dependent variables and independent variable (Seawright and Gerring 2008). For every steps of causal process or mechanism, process tracing needs large amounts of data, therefore; different techniques of data gathering or collection should be considered (George and Bennett 2005). Process tracing is used as a promising method to uncover the complexity of some political science researches, and obviously connect independent to dependent variables (Mahoney 2010). Thus, process tracing is a significant and useful method to analyze different amounts of data; develop and test the theory too (Gerring 2007). We can use process tracing in both single case and multiple case studies. It allows researchers to generate and analyze data to trace the process of causal mechanism (Goertz 2006).

Systematically, process tracing clarifies a causal process which joins the variables (dependent and independent), it simplifies the accounts of social dynamics and changes

(Goertz 2006). Thus, theoretically knowledgeable tips are offered by process tracing to map out the causal mechanism in a specific way. Process tracing identifies the operation of causal process or mechanism. One important way to identify key aspects, events, mechanisms, and decisions that link causes with the outcomes, is process tracing (Seawright and Gerring 2008).

### **1.3.3 Case selection**

Several scholars have discussed the extensive advantages of case studies. For qualitative approach, it is the most significant issue to improve the validity of causal inferences. In the qualitative research case selection clarifies the validity of causal inferences (Seawright and Gerring 2008). According to George and Bennet (2005: 19) case studies are useful not only “in testing hypotheses and for theory development”, but also for “achieving high conceptual validity” (George and Bennet 2005: 19).

Case studies also known and defined as an “intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004: 342), however; he is not agree with single case-study if it analyzes one point in time without having unit variance. Gerring adds that it will be a reasonable research design if single unit is evaluated over variance and course of time (e.g. “process tracing”). Single case studies performs in exploratory stages of research to generate and test hypotheses in a “rough-and ready way” when the main aim is to measure causal mechanisms rather than causal effects (Gerring 2004: 3445-50).

Case selection and case analysis are intertwined in qualitative research they would not be separated from each other. In selecting the case for this research has been given to unbiased manner of evaluation that the theory of post-conflict has developed. Qualitative researchers have the option to begin their work by selecting cases where the dependent variable occurs these cases are called “positive” cases or they may want to describe different outcomes (dependent variables). Therefore, they select better cases to explain

these outcomes. Mahoney and Goertz elucidate that majority of qualitative researchers and scholars select positive cases (Mahoney & Goertz 2006).

### **1.3.4 Data Collection**

For measuring the security pillars of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, I consult Brookings Afghanistan Index<sup>1</sup> (Livingston and O'Hanlon 2012) also National Counterterrorism Center<sup>2</sup> (NCTC) Worldwide Incident Tracking. The index presents, Attrition Rates among Afghan National Security forces; Illiteracy rate among police; number of insurgent attacks; and civilian fatalities. In determining the failures of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, I also use failed states index (2007-2012). I am focusing and comparing Afghanistan's trajectory after the intervention to its condition at the start of the intervention. This study will consult data from UNAMA report on protection of civilian in armed conflicts and other reports on civilian casualties of Afghanistan in 2011 & 2012 (UNAMA/UNDP 2012), moreover; I will not compare Afghanistan's post-conflict security and governance to a global standard of security and governance. Therefore; in this thesis, I employ a one fold level of failure. A "Failure" is one in which the international community (all actors) efforts have not achieved security, governance, and political goals. Security and governance are remained unmet and undone.

### **1.4 Measuring Failures of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Afghanistan**

To conceptualize the success and failures of post-conflict reconstruction may lies in how the post-conflict redress the causes of conflict. The UN Security Council defines successful post-conflict reconstruction as actions that focus on strengthening security development, good governance, eradication of poverty and inequalities and respect of human rights. If we adopt the same standards to Afghanistan, we will find that the situation in Afghanistan has not been developed.

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<sup>1</sup> . Available at: [http:// www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex](http://www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex) accessed June, 2012.

<sup>2</sup> . Available at: [http:// www.wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=o](http://www.wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=o)

According to Kanbur (2007) there are three key problems exist with any standard of measuring post conflict success and failure. First, eradicating the main and root causes tends to underline basic understanding of why specific conflicts occur. Second, some specific factors certainly increase a society's vulnerability, particularly in short time frames. Third, some standards are failed to contrast among different types and degrees of failures or to preface one goal than another. Some other scholars measure the success of post-conflict reconstruction with the standard of no renewed violent war or conflict. This standard is the most visible indicator to fuse peace and security. In the case of Afghanistan, significant evidence asserts that peace operation was successful to oust Taliban, but the long-term post conflict policies were failed to address the cause and root of conflict. It has not developed the situation.

The intervention of US-Led international military forces in 2001 began with strikes from aircraft and missiles from US forces. A small number of special operations personnel supported thousands of Northern Alliance before the force strength of "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF). The early priorities were to disrupt the centers of terrorist training camps and destroy Taliban. The main concern throughout this practice was seen as the promotion of security, with the physical presence of professional armed forces capable of providing the secure environment essential for governance, rule of law, human rights and economic and social development ( DFID 2008: 39).

The following chapters will assess to analyze theoretical framework by using Afghanistan's situation where failures are the dominant characteristics of post-conflict reconstructions. The case of Afghanistan has some similarities with other cases, but its outcomes are not convincing to international community.

## **Summary**

The qualitative research in this thesis has been illustrated by this chapter. The approach of process tracing research design will be developed to analyze post-conflict reconstruction. The question will explore the role of different actors and institutions as well as how challenges influence post-conflict policies of Afghanistan. Process tracing is used to evaluate the failures or shortcomings of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. Critical antecedents and critical junctures are used to outline or trace the causal mechanisms of Afghanistan's failures in post-conflict policies.

## **CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Analysis of Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Security Sector and Police Reform**

The number of intra-state or civil wars has increased since end of the Cold War. To rebuild and stabilize these societies, are the key responsibilities of international community. Before the U.S.-led coalition “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) on 7<sup>th</sup> of October 2001 to oust Taliban and destroy centre of terrorism in Afghanistan, there had been bloodshed and warfare since 1979- when Soviet invasion took place. This proxy, inter and intra-state war was exacerbated and worsen with U.S. led international military interventions in 2001. Although, the initial military goals and operational agendas have achieved in Afghanistan, but the long-term goals of post-conflict reconstruction have not been accomplished. Afghanistan’s stabilization and post conflict reconstruction have not been a success. Constant failure to ensure security and rule of law has weakened Afghans’ trust in government and its international partners (Kouvo et al. 2009: 7).

Afghanistan is one of the recent examples of international military interventions which have conducted in a broader mandate. Since the perpetrators (Taliban) can operate from Pakistan and gain support from Iran, NATO and US are improbable and unlikely to defeat militants and terrorist groups decisively (Suhrke 2008: 233). Three decades of war in Afghanistan have expanded the ethnic and tribal tensions; destroyed infrastructures and evaporated the political; security; economic and socio-cultural structures (Kouvo et al. 2009: 7). Since 2001, international community has been spending money into the war and post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, but still the police forces are not professional and accountable. The efforts to professionalize police and reform security sector really began in 2009 (Oxfam 2011: 2). The challenges and shortcomings of security sector reform are immense and considerable in Afghanistan (Kouvo et al. 2009). Thus, renovations of war-torn societies have become essential for international community. Without external support these countries could not be stabilized.

This chapter has three sections. The first presents a literature review on post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform (SSR). The second extends role of police reform in post-conflict era followed by evaluation and measurement of police performance.

## **2.1 Literature Review**

Post-conflict reconstruction embraces four different but interconnected tasks, or “pillars”: Security, Justice and reconciliation, Social and economic well-being and Governance and participation (Hamre and Sullivan 2002: 91). United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan has noted, “All these tasks—humanitarian, military, political, social, and economic—are interconnected, and the people engaged in them need to work closely together.”(UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: 2002). The term “post-conflict” is also conceptualized by the World Bank “Post-conflict reconstruction supports the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of the society” (World Bank 1998:14).

In theoretical analysis of contemporary post-conflict reconstruction, many researchers prefer to focus on United Nations’ missions in post-conflict periods. After the Cold War, peacekeeping mandates are growing and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) assists in larger missions including demobilization, military, humanitarian aids, elections, and promoting the rule of law with economic and social development (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). The essential role of UN in peace and security operations is defined by former UN secretary general Boutros Ghali (1995). He suggests some important activities to strengthen the ability of international system in order to achieve positive results from peace operations. He clarifies that UN has the responsibility to enhance the technical aids in order to transform the dysfunctional national structures and capacities to a new responsive and participatory institutions (Boutros-Ghali 1995). He associates peacebuilding with post-conflict reconstruction and explores that the aims of peacebuilding is to develop the abilities of state institutions (Political, security, economic social and cultural) to intermingle with its citizens, civil society and other political parties (Boutros-Ghali 1995).

Doyle and Sambanis (2006) develop the logic of “Peacebuilding triangle” as follows: the deeper the level of hostility between domestic factions and the lower the level of local capacities for reconstruction, the higher the level and degree of international assistance is needed to succeed in establishing a sustainable peace. They argue that the success of peacebuilding operations interrelated with the level of international community’s assistance to rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-torn countries. Coiler et al. (2008) argue that peace in post-conflict situation is fragile. Half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses. They also find that high expenditures of UN in peacekeeping operations are likely to reduce the threat of renewed war (Coiler et al. 2008: 461).

Furthermore, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) point those UN operations were successful in the shadow of “participatory peacebuilding” than conflict without the UN presence. They conclude that multidimensional peacekeeping missions eradicate the large-scale violence and increase the probability of sustainable developments (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). The only issue with peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction is that peacebuilding have a tendency to lessen state-building efforts. De Soto and Del Castillo (1994) suggest that state-building increases the chance and mechanisms of security consolidation and conflict resolution at national level with carrying legitimacy to the eyes of citizens and foreigners. Justice systems, policing systems are the main mechanisms that can provide credible consequences in order to resolve the conflict nonviolently (De Soto and Castillo 1994: 73-5).

Scholars have discussed and expanded the concept of post-conflict reconstruction. Throughout literatures, post-conflict reconstruction covers security, Governance, economic and social well beings, and reconciliation.

### ***2.1.1 Security***

Security and development are mutually dependent. It is crucial in the early phase of reconstruction in post-conflict countries that security should be understood as the first priority. Without security, other reconstruction efforts, such as, governance reform,

democratization, economic reform and reconciliation, are not feasible. After security, important precedence should be the building of responsive and inclusive governance institutions, participatory, free and fair elections. Likewise, economic stabilization is needed to stimulate market and magnetize investment (Timilsina 2006). Brzoska (2003) points the origins of SSR and gives it the profile of conflict prevention activities. Brzoska (2003) and Lilly et al. (2002) add that the term security sector reform has emerged in recent years. It related with the concepts of “governance”, “public sector reform”, “conflict-prevention” and “peace-building”- it does not mean that the strategies do not exist before- they recognized that security issues cannot be separated from “development strategies” (Lilly et al. 2002: 1 & Brzoska 2003).

Dobbins et al. (2005) argues that presence of international military forces aftermaths of conflict may be significant for peacebuilding. It can reduce the probability of security sector capacity and composition of forces to counter violence (Dobbins et al. 2005). Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) defines security sector reform (SSR) as “authorized to use force for the protection of the state and its population, civil management ....military and paramilitary forces, intelligence services, police forces, border and coast guards as well as prison guards and correction officers” (2003:1). Similarly, DCAF (2009) defines that SSR “refers to the structures, processes, values and attitudes that shape decisions about security and their implementation [it] aims to enhance security sector governance through the effective and efficient delivery of security under conditions of democratic oversight and control. SSR offers a framework for conceptualizing which actors and factors are relevant to security in a given environment” (DCAF 2009: 1).

Post-conflict policing is a subject of increasing importance to the international community in SSR process. Now, many donors, especially the United States, have donated billions of dollars towards post-conflict police reform efforts through the United Nations Police (UNPOL), a division of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other bilateral or multilateral channels. Police reform needs more than just

monetary assistance to succeed (Bajraktari et al. 2006: 5). Also, it requires some important technical and organizational oversights.

Furthermore, many literatures argue that SSR is the necessary phase of post-conflict reconstruction. It is the priority to strengthen rule of law, democratization, promotions of conditions for sustainable development and prevent from renewed conflict (Brzoska & Heinemann-Grunder 2004; Bryden et al. 2005 and Brzoska 2003). Moreover, Law (2006) has undertaken a comparative study about the recent six cases of SSR in post-conflict countries (Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Haiti, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste). He picked up these six cases as representative of 50 post-conflict environments. He assumes that these cases can generate some valid observations about applicable policies, leadership, sources, legitimacy of donors. Moreover, he tests the role of international community in security sector reform and explains their success or failure. He finds that SSR has direct effects on the “violence level, GDP, ethnic relations, democratization and local ownership, and re-integration” (Law 2006: 2-16).

DFID (2002) recognizes SSR as precondition for governance. To enhance governance structures, there should be secure environment. Thus, security is known as primary condition for development and governance (DFID 2002). In this way, SSR is seen as a sensitive phase in post-conflict situation—with armed forces. Successful SSR is beneficial in the state-building process. Nowadays, security is rarely known to be purely military, there can be seen important role of civilians such as, sub-contractors and private companies dealing with security tasks. But private companies are not performing their tasks regularly. We will argue the disadvantages of private companies that were responsible for police training in Afghanistan.

### ***2.1.2 Governance***

Another important phase of post-conflict reconstruction is governance. It is known as the process of shaping democracy, building government, enhancing bureaucratic capabilities, generating mechanisms to develop participation of population in government and reconstruction (Orr 2002). Good governance in post-conflict situation needs to be

interlinked with security, political, social and economic issues. It is not easy to adopt a single approach to fit all. In saying this, there are different perspectives and opportunities. Governance includes holding free and fair election, shaping civil society, and generating transparent and responsive institutions to ensure peace, security and transitional administration.

Similarly, other scholars have tested democratization and transitional governance as important tasks in post-conflict reconstruction. According to their arguments, international community should focus on reconstructing the infrastructure of national administration, bureaucracy and participation in democratic election (Barnett 2006; Caplan 2004; Colin and Roelfsema 2008). Moreover, democratization and elections are significant while higher post-conflict income and faster growth significantly reduce the risk of civil war relapse (Colin and Roelfsema 2008). Orr (2002) points that governance and participation have dichotomy relation while governance is a top-down process and participation is bottom-down process, the population should have dominant role to run both mechanisms (Orr 2002). Thus, participation is crucial for all post-conflict situations to ensure that everything is distributed equally; particularly minority groups had utilized to address their grievances.

Some analysts also focus on transitional governance in post-conflict societies. The main aim of this phase is peace building through security sector structures. World Bank (2000) argues that the main idea of transitional administration is to create legitimacy to the governance to address security, political and economic issues, along with distinguishing aids schedules, expectations and logistic issues which effect on post-conflict phases. It includes both donors and recipients (World Bank 2000). Smith (2003) details standard transition of post-conflict governance. He adds that post-conflict societies should move through phases of conflict, to interim authority, to transitional administration, to elected government. This is what happened in Timor-Leste (Smith 2003).

In post-conflict contexts peacebuilding strategies are undertaken through transitional governance. United Nations also had a plan of conflict prevention which predicts the transformation of socio-economic and political causes of war. The aims of transitional governance are to generate and create peace by predicting that international donors can help to build the bureaucratic and organizational behaviors for responsive, legitimate and efficient government (Dobbins et al. 2005; Boutros-Ghali 1992). Moreover, strengthening good governance is not only facilitating security, economic, justice and social tasks, but also provokes and organizes long-term economic activities such as, energies and extracting natural resources (Orr 2002).

Dobbins et al. (2005) examines the criteria of successful peace-making and peace-keeping operations. They should include factors and facts which sustain institutions to fuse peace. These efforts may include disarmament demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of warring parties, training security personnel (police and military), participation in election, enhancing bureaucratic capacities of governmental institutions and protection of human rights (Boutros-Ghali; Dobbins et al. 2005). De Soto and Del Castillo (1994) suggests the mechanism of consolidating peace and security. It is important to strengthen security and conflict resolution in order to extend legitimacy of state. It includes security sector reform (Policing, army) and justice systems.

Dobbins et al. (2003) observes US-led post-conflict reconstruction or state building efforts after World War II. They acknowledged Germany and Japan as successful cases of state building that adopt standards for post-conflict efforts. They interrelate this success to the fact that Germany and Japan were, developed states with high capacity of state institutions. Both Germany and Japan received high level of economic aids and high numbers of troops were deployed for long period of time. They compare US-led missions (Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq), particularly after World War II and eight United Nations-led missions (Congo, Namibia, Cambodia, Elsalvador, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone and East Timor). They examine that UN-led missions were successful, nowadays, from eight UN-led missions, seven

have achieved sustained peace, whereas of the eight US-led missions, four are not peaceful today (Dobbins et al. 2003).


### ***2.1.3 Economic and Social Well-being***

Scholars also focus on economic perspective of post-conflict reconstruction. De Soto and Castillo (1994) and Kisangani (2006) condemned neoliberal structure of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for lessening state resources and capacities. They observed that post-conflict contexts are fragile and need to enhance state capacities (De Soto and Del Castillo 1994; Kisangani 2006). Coiller (2009) suggests idiosyncratic political and economic policies for post-conflict contexts. He finds that post-conflict societies should focus on creation of jobs for their population (Coiller 2009).

Sambanis (2008) details that UN peacebuilding efforts lack a clear strategy to enhance self-sustain economic growth. He asserts that post-conflict countries should strengthen policies in order to increase economic growth. Moreover, Elbadawi et al. (2008) also agreed with this evolution and argue that it would be beneficial for international actors to generate economic reforms in order to achieve self-sustain and economic growth (Elbadawi et al. 2008).

Ultimately, post-conflict governance requires a wide-ranging, integrated approach that combines security, economic and reconciliation tasks. There can be no one single model of state-building or post-conflict reconstruction. Countries are different in terms of cultures, social and political developments. From perspective of security, economies and social issues, a legitimate state can build strong infrastructure for sustainable development with moderating task for international actors. All these phases of post-conflict reconstruction show the relationship between peacebuilding and state building that needs to be fostered.

**Figure: 2.1: Pillars or tasks of Post-Conflict Reconstruction.**



Source: Loosely based on Dobbins (2004), Hambre and Sullivan (2002), and Smith (2004).

The remaining part of this chapter will focus on the role of police in post-conflict reconstruction and obstacles of police reform. Post-conflict policing is a subject of increasing importance to the international community. Moreover, literature on police reform is limited. With regards to post-conflict situations, few lessons can be learned with specific post-conflict police reform, but a systematic research is lacking.

## 2.2 Understanding Police Reform in Post-Conflict Environments

Post-conflict police reform in the context of security sector reform is turning into a debating topic (Hill and Bowman 2006: 55). After 1990s, many donors, especially the United States, have donated billions of dollars towards post-conflict police reform through the United Nations Police (UNPOL), a division of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other bilateral or multilateral channels. Police reform needs more than just monetary assistance to succeed (Bajraktari et al. 2006: 5). Also, it requires some important technical and organizational oversights. In general, police have different responsibilities such as, executing justice, basic law and ensuring order; this could be achieved through combination of local police or security institutions with international actors. Overall, understanding police role is a priority for building citizen's trust in state institutions and sustainable reconstruction process. This is the main debating topic that this thesis will address about Afghanistan's national police.

In post conflict environments, the police should secure the situation for basic law to ensure order in the dynamics of conflict chaos (Meyer 2006:140; Hill & Bowman 2006: 57)<sup>3</sup>. Police are entitled to prevent publics from danger and provide security with order. They should ensure a peaceful environment. If they are unable to do so, UN civilian police can try to fill the vacuum [or intervening countries] (Meyer 2006: 253 & Hill & Bowman 2006). In sum, the police need to be effective and accountable to the public and act as influential authority resolving social tensions under concept of the rule of law.

In the context of post-conflict societies, whenever police forces are not able to perform their function, UN civilian police can take the role of local police. In this way, they may illustrate to local police how democratic police personnel operate (Meyer 2006:257-58). With the replacement of forces and changing positions, population can also feel changes. Stanley (1999) asserts that due to the establishment vacuum in crime

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<sup>3</sup> Hill, Richard & Bowman, Laura. 2006. "Police Reform Programs: Links to Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Social Stability in Violent and Fragile State—Building responsiveness and the connection to local Civilian needs—public security as good governance. Accessed July, 2012  
[http://www.thecornwallisgroup.org/pdf/CXI\\_2006\\_08\\_Hill.pdf](http://www.thecornwallisgroup.org/pdf/CXI_2006_08_Hill.pdf)

rates usually after conflict, it could change to a “climate of impunity”; therefore, police reform is crucial when the governance is weak or failed with no security infrastructures (Stanley 1999: 120-23). In sum, police reform can rebuild citizens’ trust in state institutions.

Furthermore, ensuring security in the aftermaths of conflict and preventing the society to relapse in war are not the only tasks of a police institution. They should enhance the condition towards negative peace and positive peace. The former is understood as *securing reconciliation* while the later is termed as *reconstruction* (Mani 2000: 21). Then, the police will be able to gain good perception within the society. As Stodiek (2006) argues that success in fighting the crimes and eradicating roots of riots can gain the trust of population (Stodiek 2006).

In post-conflict environments, reforming police is facing with immense challenges. The former police forces may be insufficient to provide security, there will be corruption in all levels and the institution might not have the capacity and totally diminished during the war. In this sense, the police are tools for suppression and exploitation rather than providing security and prosperity (Robins 2009). The issues of institutional capacities, salaries; leaderships and personal liabilities should be tackled early on in the reform process. Police forces, trainers and UN police officers in Kosovo have asserted in a survey that low salaries are a factor that has negative impact on the morale of police. Even they have indentified “low salary” the biggest obstacle to police reform process (Stodiek 2006). The second key challenge of police reform was the influence of politicians, followed by lack of trust on new police by the population. Stodiek (2006) also points out the importance of organizational infrastructure and financial situations of Kosovo police (Stodiek 2006). Afghanistan’s national police is facing the same problems. Chapter three and four will address the obstacles of building professional police in Afghanistan..

Firstly, a successful police reform process requires effective human resource management with single strategy to train police forces: How many professional police are needed on the ground? How many new recruits should be trained?

Secondly, the organizational infrastructure and personal capacity also play significant role in rebuilding accountable and responsive police force: How should be the police training procedures? Which organizational culture and shared vision among donors provide best guidance for the reform process?

Another challenge of police reform in post-conflict societies is asserted by Friesendorf (2011). He points out that there is an increasing attempt to establish paramilitarized security forces in peace operations to help fill security gaps. But the practice is problematic form a security sector reform. To promote civilian policing, SSR trends to distinguish between military and police (Friesendorf 2011: 79). Besides Paramilitarization, if donors do not acclimatize and settle their programs in existing police culture there will be a “waste”. International experts should consider their developed police strategies (Ziegler & Nield 2002: 69).

Furthermore, in war-torn countries, paramilitary police are the source of insecurity. To gain citizens trust, de-militarization should be undertaken. According to Friesendorf (2011) the principle of SSR is as follows: “Clear job descriptions; Primacy of civilian policing in internal security; Democratic oversight; Respect for human rights and the minimum use of force; [and] transition from paramilitarized to civilian policing.” (See figure 2.2) (Friesendorf 2011: 83).

**Figure 2.2 Principles of Security Sector Reform**

SSR PRINCIPLES AND PARAMILITARIZING REGULAR POLICE

SSR principle	How the paramilitarization of regular police violates these principles
Clear job descriptions	Overlap with other security forces
Primacy of civilian policing in internal security	Deprives security sector of only actor capable of civilian policing
Democratic oversight	Paramilitarization occurring in emergencies where oversight is neglected
Respect for human rights and the minimum use of force	Emergencies leading to emphasis on stronger, not more accountable, police
Transition from paramilitarized to civilian policing	Difficult to demilitarize paramilitary police

Source: Friesendorf 2011

Countries emerging from civil war should assert their enthusiasm towards police reform. Foreign aids cannot succeed, if the government is not committed in rebuilding of police (Dobbins et al. 2007: 53). The police personnel and high administration officers should welcome the reform process. If any of the mentioned parties are not agree or they known the process as interference and threat to lose their jobs, the cooperation will lack and the success of reform will also be critical. For example, in Mozambique police personnel postponed security sector reform for two years. They fear to lose their jobs (Lala & Francisco 2006: 169). Moreover, security organizations see the change as “direct challenge to their power, livelihood and working practices” (Peake, Scheye & Hills 2006: 252). They point out that there is no clear document and practice which has provided solutions to overcome inter-organizational resistance in security sector institutions. Most of the international strategies are short-term activities and the aids are provided “to do too much too quickly” (Ibid: 252).

A successful police reform process requires long-term commitments to ensure developments (Law 2006). Moreover, short-term commitments and shortcomings in pledged of donor resources are known as obstacle to successful reconstruction (International peace Academy 2003). In post-conflict contexts, all sectors require long-term commitments, but the sensitive police sector always has been forgotten once the

goal of stabilization seems to be achieved in the aftermaths of conflict (Law 2006). When long-term commitment is approved in police reform strategies, however, implementation process of strategies also poses obstacles.

Dobbins et al (2007) criticizes the rapid deployment in unstable post-conflict environments and recruits of new police personnel. As an example, rapid deployment has caused problems in the case of providing training in Iraq. Also, a “fast-track” program to train the recruits for only 8 weeks and left the police insufficiently for the rest of mission is problematic (Dobbins et al. 2007). Currently, this is also the main problem with police in Afghanistan.

Marenin (2000) presents a considerable debate when international donors are facing a “double institutionalization challenge” (2000: 106). First, shape the institution of police itself, secondly, to institutionalize the context which supports and restrain policing (i.e. public thoughts, social education about rights and duties) (Ibid.). In this way, a successful police reform process is not only determined by tasks directly interrelated to the police. Rather, the strategy to rebuild police should address the needs of state, non-state and civil society actors in order to overcome the obstacles.

Usually, in reforming police, there are some diversity between policy prescription and operational reality (Peake, Scheye & Hills 2006). Further, the role of spoilers should not be underestimated to uncover the outcomes of police reform. Marenin points out as follows: “Police reform in transition periods is difficult to organize, hard to implement, and practically impossible to assess. All the same, it must be attempted if peacekeeping is ever to turn into peacebuilding.” (Marenin 2000: 109).

In the next section, this research addresses the importance of police reform in the aftermaths of conflict and evaluation and measurement of police reform. The key research question will be the overcoming of the organizational resistance in the context of post-conflict environments.

### **2.3 Importance and Magnitude of Police Reform**

Police reform in the context of the larger security sector reform has been supported by international community. SSR's concept was initiated in late 1990s (Hill & Bowman 2006: 56). Police reform is a pressing issue in societies emerging from war (Friesendorf 2011: 79). Police reform refers to a "range of objectives [...] covering all security sector institutions" (Brzoska 2006:2). The concept of security sector interrelated with "actors such as the armed forces, judiciary and non-state justice systems" (Hill & Bowman 2006: 56-7). The term "reform" refers to the priority to change the governing principles of internal security organizations (Ibid.). In case of police, reform refers to crime control and preventions with regards to the monopoly of force and addresses professionalism, responsiveness and mechanisms of democratic governance.

Brzoska (2006) argues that security sector reform has three objectives: first, ensuring security which needs a functioning police and army with functioning judicial and prison systems; second, an accountable, responsive and professionalism forces along with norms and regulations; third, the efficiency and accuracy of security institutions (Brzoska 2006). Despite many literatures in post-conflict reconstruction theory, there is no systematic and convincing theory of police reform. International organization and donor nations also did not present convincing doctrine (Ziegler & Nield 2002).

In post-conflict societies usually the UN and bilateral donors help to initiate a successful police reform process. In case of UN peacekeeping operation, the reform can be UN-lead and coordinated by the UN too, as was the case during UN operation in Mozambique (Lala & Francisco 2006). Security sector reform can be implemented together with a lead nation as in the case of Afghanistan (IFD 2009; Sedra 2004; Murray 2009).

Hartz (2000) criticizes donors' assistance in post-conflict countries. They provide their assistance in a fragmented way ranging from training, to institution building, to infrastructure with out vivid strategy or plan. Training and building accountable local

police is long-term activity which needs “more systematic and institutionalized” approaches if the process of reform is to be successful, training the police force may come as independent project at the request of host government. Donors should restructure law enforcement agencies rather than focusing on monitoring role of police forces (Hartz 2000: 32-33).

Usually, security void may be created by utilizing limited resources and poor or rushed training courses for new recruits, which can increase the ineffectiveness of police (Stanely 2000). Therefore, the host government should have a central strategy for police training project and the local police must also show serious commitment. Moreover, Stodiek (2006) asserts that police reform in post-conflict environments requires much time. He does not specify the exact time, but mentioned that police reform can not be implemented within two or three years (Stodiek 2006). Hartz (1999) mentioned five years will be enough time to reform police, without any organizational resistance ( Hartz 1999). To compare with the case of Afghanistan, ANP should be a professional force while international donors have started reform efforts since 2002. Unsurprisingly, ANP lacked the ability and potentials to perform policing tasks.

Besides reforming police, the capacity of judicial and legal institutions needs to be developed. With dysfunctional judicial systems and corrupt prison administration, police cannot perform its duty (Stodiek 2006). Therefore, donors should pay special attention to integrate judicial reform with security sector reconstruction efforts. They should impose extra pressures on host government to implement development policies and provide more facilities for international organizations and other non state actors to participate in post-conflict reconstruction.

Besides donors’ assistance, the local police should be involved in reform process. In a case study of police reform in the Solomon Islands, Dinnen, Mcleod & Peake (2006) found that police reform strategies were inadequately designed to promote participation such as seminars, workshops and conferences (2006: 100). They argue that “engagement gap” could be created by inconsistency of practices between reformers and those

reformed police (Ibid.). When parts of police officers are not engaging in reform process, this can lead to organizational resistance. Some officers and administrators will not welcome the reform, especially if changes threaten their influential roles (Pierson 2000: 262). Thus, to overcome this organizational resistance and turn the reform to successful process, holistic institutional and management reforms are needed.

A successful police reform process requires that officers and administrators are becoming the reform agents. Moreover, “top-down” and “outside-inside” style of reform is known significant (Bayley 2008). People who concerned by reform, will judge the process as a “zero-sum game where they lose and others will gain” (O’Neill 2005). To exclude rank-and-file members of the police, will increase the institutional resistance (Bayley 2008). Police reform is political sensitive task in nature. Its success or failure has different implication and dimension. Overall, the interaction of society can improve reconstruction efforts. According to Mani (2000): “the police interact with the people and enforce the law will delineate the face of peace and justice” (Mani 2000: 22).

## **2.4 Evaluation of police reform: Success, Failure and Limitations**

To measure success or failure of police reform process is a challenging task. It lacks a comprehensive dataset and tools to measure the outcomes of security sector reconstruction and performance of police forces. Up to date, international organizations and other donors have not prepared apparatuses to evaluate security sector reform (Ziegler and Nield 2002). But there are some inclusive and comprehensive propositions from scholars and researchers to measure the performance of security sector reform.

PRIME, which is called Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation, have been developed by Bajraktari et al. to measure success and failure in police performance. Bajraktari et al. argue that PRIME is “forward looking diagnostic tool” it tests outcomes of police reform in a “more comprehensive and systematic way” (Bajraktari et al. 2006: 5). Four dimensions such as, *Performance and Effectiveness*, *Management and oversight*, *community Relations* and *Sustainability* along with 16 indicators are applied (Ibid.).

The PRIME includes 50 interviews in each country case and the researchers match their findings with official reports. Since it released in 2006, has not been used practically by United Nations and other donors. PRIME methodology is not some how difficult to implement, they set lots of tasks in field capacity of donors. Therefore, many reformers continue to implement other methods which are easier to produce output measurements.

David Law (2006) uses seven criteria to evaluate the efficiency of security sector reform. Law's criteria are:

1. the effect of reform on violence levels,
2. the impact on GDP,
3. the effect on ethnic relations,
4. regional integration of former conflict zones,
5. democratization and local ownership,
6. financial or monetary sustainability,

The author has undertaken a comparative study about the recent six cases of SSR in post-conflict countries (Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Haiti, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. He picked up these six cases as representative of 50 post-conflict environments. He assumes that these cases can generate some valid observations about applicable policies, leadership, sources, legitimacy of donors (Law 2006: 2-16). Moreover, he tests the role of international community in security sector reform and explains their success or failure. The author assesses indicators for the three out of seven criteria: Violence levels are measured by crime statistic and by qualitative assessments of reports about development of security situation. GDP is evaluated before and after reform efforts have been started. External funding for reform has been used to measure financial sustainability of host government's budget. The remaining criteria are based on qualitative indicators while there is lack of systematic quantitative data on security sector reform.

To measure the efficiency of new police service on crime and on societal-interactions, there should be standardized observations. A representative survey among the people, security incidents and crimes would enhance imminent for the question to what extent the implemented police reform has been efficient and successful. To determine ambitious methodologies it is practical to overview tangible cases of police reform, particularly Afghanistan's security sector reform.

## **2.5 Measurement**

There is no comprehensive measurement tool to serve as data resource for the failure of police reform in Afghanistan. The amount of data which is available regarding to police reform such as, police officers, vehicle supplied and equipment provided are available from donors. Like other post-conflict countries, Afghanistan does not have the capacity to record crime data. This study will measure failure of Afghanistan police reform through police performance and indicators which influence changes made to Afghanistan National Police (ANP).

As failures of police reform to provide security as well as overall administration capability of host government this research collects influential indicators. Table 2.2 summarizes the set of indicators drawn from three established sources: Afghanistan Brookings Index (2012), the Failed States Index (2007-2012), UNAMA/UNDP: report on protection of civilian in armed conflicts (2011) and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Worldwide Incident Tracking System data.

**Figure 2.3 Indicators of Failures in Afghanistan National Police Reform**

<i>Name of Index</i>	<i>Selected Indicator</i>
➤ Afghanistan Brooking Index and report on progress toward security (2012)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Afghanistan National Police Fatalities 2007-2011</li> <li>2. Literacy rates and training of police forces</li> <li>3. Attrition rate among selected police forces</li> <li>4. ANP End-Strength (2011-2012)</li> <li>5. Corruption among ANP</li> </ol>
➤ National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Terrorist/ Security Incident</li> <li>7. Insurgents, hostages and wounded in Afghanistan 2005-2011</li> </ol>
UNAMA/UNDP: Report on protection of civilian in armed conflicts.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. Civilian Deaths by year 2007-2011</li> <li>9. Break out of Security Incidents by Region</li> <li>10. Estimate of total Terrorists Attack in Afghanistan</li> </ol>

**Summary**

By analyzing above indicators and theoretical analysis of police reform, the efforts with regards to Afghanistan’s national police will be measured and explained in the coming chapters. All these sources are dominant tools to evaluate the outcome of police capacity in Afghanistan. Their evaluation tools are also based on different methodological approaches. After reviewing history of Afghanistan in the coming chapter, cornerstone of security sector efforts will be introduced.

## **CHAPTER 3: Security Sector and Police Reform in Afghanistan**

“Security is the sine qua non of the stabilization and reconstruction process – the thing without which nothing else can happen” (Their 2009: 7).

The success of SSR in Afghanistan depends on several conditions, particularly a minimum degree of security, leadership, and capacity which are lacked in context of Afghanistan government. The process of reforming police in Afghanistan has dominated by different international actors, but the wide disparity in operational initiatives, resources, training and equipping has generated an essential discrepancy in the SSR process. Contributor nations follow different concepts of policing. Some focus on training of ANP and community policing, while others focus on survival techniques and paramilitary structures. Overall, lack of a common and shared strategic vision creates ANP not proper for the current security threat.

This chapter argues that lead nation approach in reforming ANP, coupled with lack of institutions capacity and minimum degree of shared vision among actors, have created a weak groundwork for SSR agendas. In this way, reform process will not generate accountable, transparent and effective security sector (Police Force). This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part provides an overview of conflict and policing in Afghanistan. The second part contextualizes the shortcomings of international and bilateral actors in relation to Afghan National Police (ANP) reform process. The third section points out policing in Afghanistan. In the fourth and fifth sections, model of growth and professionalization of ANP and the failed efforts to address the shortcomings of ANP will be addressed.

### **3.1 A Brief History of Conflict in Afghanistan**

Afghanistan is a mountainous southern Asian state with the 647,000 square kilometers. It has share borders with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, China, Iran and Pakistan (Maloney 2006). Historically, Afghanistan has existed as a state of suspense and convulsion (Allan 2003: 193). Ahmad Shah Durrani founded a Pashtun confederation

in 1747, power was granted by the agreement of *Jirgas* or tribal councils. He expanded his power by conquering non-Pashtun areas. Later, ethnicity was a tool to leverage power, such as Abdul Rahman's "Afghanisation policy" of the 1880s and 1890s, where rival co-ethnic factions were splintered and rival ethnic power foundations disordered through forced migration (Saikal 2004). The colonial rule of Britain, beginning in 1828, engaged three Anglo-Afghan wars, from 1839-1842, from 1878 to 1880, finally, in 1919 independent Afghanistan has established (DFID 2008: 26). In 19<sup>th</sup> century, foreign invasions guided to political turmoil and turbulence. Armed militias and tribal had the power to guard the sovereignty. The reluctant to share power among other ethnics led to a period of continuous convulsion.

Governance with exclusive authority of Pashtun leaders has prolonged through 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Soviet invasion in 1979, has felled apart the dynastic tradition, but left nothing to replace it. From 1979 to 1989, a collection of ethnic and tribal militias, with support of the US, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, disputed and successfully resulted to the withdrawal of Soviets army. When the Soviet disrupted, Afghanistan was without an external backup for the first time in 150 years (Saltmarshe and Mehdi 2011). The ensuing power struggle and chaos led to civil war between all ethnic groups from 1992 to 1996 which ended with eventual seizure of power by the Taliban. Within 90s it became the heaven of terrorists (Al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani network and Hizb-e- Islami). Taliban imposed rigid interpretation of Islam and succeeded to control majority of Afghanistan aside from the Panjshir province.

Tracing the history of Afghanistan exposes irrational leadership of Pashtuns and many catastrophes (Allan 2003). After terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US began Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001 to outset Taliban regime and destroy Al Qaeda (Perito 2009; DFID 2008: 39). A decade after the fall of Taliban, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world (ranking 155<sup>th</sup> on the United Nation's Human Development Index). International community is pouring money

to the conflict since 2001; Afghanistan is still dependent on international aid for years to come (UN's Human Development Index 2011<sup>4</sup>).

### **3.2 Pillars of SSR According to Bonn Agreement and G8 Meeting in Geneva 2002**


Afghanistan's security sector reform was initiated during the Afghan Interim Authority after Bonn agreement 2001. Indeed, Bonn agreement does not indicate a role for the UN to train Afghan police. The responsibility of security in all over the country rested with Afghan forces. Very soon, International donors adopted a "lead nation" framework at Group of Eight conference (G8) which was held in Geneva in the spring of 2002 (Perito 2009: 2; Kouvo et al. 2009; Murray 2007; Sedra 2004).

The security sector reform was divided into five pillars (see figure 3.1). One lead-donor nation was assigned to each pillar in order to support the process. Germany became the lead on police reform; United States became the lead on military; Italy, the judiciary; Britain, counternarcotics and Japan, DDR. The idea and framework was to ensure collective efforts, but there was no clear policy and procedure among donor nations to assure coordination. This idea hinders security sector reform rather than advance the process (Kouvo et. al. 2009: 9; Murray 2007, and Sedra 2004: 2-3). The office of the Afghan National Security Council (ONSC) anticipated having a coordination role for process, but it lacked resources and structures to affirm an efficient oversight and coordination role for the SSR process (DFID 2008: 40; Bhatia, Lanigan & Wilkinson 2004: 3).

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<sup>4</sup> More detail at <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG.html> (accessed 9 June 2012).

**Figure 3.1 Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan**



Source: (Caldwell IV & Finny 2010: 123)

The lead nation approach narrows the process of security sector reform. Donor-driven approach replaced the effective and efficient notion of SSR. For example, the lead nations, Germany and U.S had different approaches in reforming the security sector. Germany approach has focused on extensive training for fewer police and the US has focused on short trainings for many (Wilder 2007; Bhatia, Lanigan & Wilkinson 2004; International Crisis Group 2007).

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is an effective and efficient pillar of post-conflict reconstruction. The main aim of SSR is to ensure efficient delivery of security. It decreases the risk of a relapse to war. Police reform is crucial task of SSR in war-torn societies to eradicate the source of insecurity (Friesendorf 2011: 79). SSR is interlinked to develop the performance of police and military institutions. It moves beyond technical aspects of organizations and follows a broad and ambitious agenda of reconstructing the state to serve the population (Jackson 2009; Perito 2009: 3). Since 2001, international community has been spending money into the war and post-conflict reconstruction in

Afghanistan, but still the police forces are not professional and accountable. The efforts to professionalize police and reform security sector really began in 2009 (Oxfam 2011: 2).

The challenges and shortcomings of security sector reform are immense and considerable in Afghanistan (Kouvo et al. 2009). Despite spending large amount of money over 10 years of police reform in Afghanistan, the investment has not produced a significant result. Among other challenges “A lack of strategic vision and effective planning; and a failure to capitalize on the insights” are key reasons that fail international community to build professional police in Afghanistan (Murray 2007: 108).

### **3.3 Policing in Afghanistan**

Historically, Afghanistan has never had strong civilian police (Wilder 2007: 3; Cordesman 2010: 125). Whatever development was made in building a civilian police during 1960s and 1970s was lost by three decades of war that followed. The police forces were built on the European policing model by Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (Amnesty International 2003; Wilder 2007).

In 1980s, during soviet period, (KhaD) or state intelligence and information services took the control of criminal investigation and police procedures. The KhaD became the leading organization of state control, supported and trained by KGB. Ministry of interior had its own army and engaged in armed clashes with the KhaD. It was center of struggle between Parchami<sup>5</sup> and Khalq factions of the ruling peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (Rasanayagam 2003 in: Murray 2007: 2). Thus the police were characterized as a coercive instrument of the state not public servant. Henceforward, police disintegration and corrosion among citizens began.

Following withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, new effort was made to establish police, and training academy was built in Kabul by the Germans. But

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<sup>5</sup> Although shifting alliances at different times blurred the distinction, the Khalqis were mainly from Pashtun and the Parchamis of mainly Tajik ethnicity.

the attempt was failed when the civil war began in Kabul with succession of Taliban to rule the country. Henceforth, no organized civilian police built until 2002 (Murray 2007: 3 International Amnesty 2003).

After ouster of Taliban in 2001, the concept of a police service that should serve the community not the state was founded. Despite spending large amount of money over 10 years in police-building, the investment has not produced a significant result. Among other challenges “A lack of strategic vision and effective planning; and a failure to capitalize on the insights” are key reasons that fail international community to build professional police in Afghanistan (Murray 2007: 108). Today, majority of police lack discipline, public trust, equipment, literacy and sense of community representative. They operate ineffectively or out of human rights standards. Still, Afghanistan does not have the police forces that operate in line with human rights standards, perform with typical operating procedures along with non-discriminatory service.

### ***3.3.1 Bilateral and International efforts to reform ANP after 2001***

From Bonn agreement in December 2001 to December 2011, seven non-Afghan institutions have been created by international donors to support Afghan National Police (Caldwell & Finney 2010: 121). Initially, Germany was the leading nation for police reform in 2002. But German effort was not enough, and in 2003 the US stepped up its own support with different vision from Germany. In 2006, the Afghanistan Compact which was signed by international community in London put an end to the lead nation approach and former lead nations were now introduced as “key partners” (Kouva et al. 2009: 10). Thus, Germany has focused on quality of ANP forces rather than quantity, while US prefer quantity than quality. The lack of unity and operational initiatives among these organizations and bilateral donors created obstructions to reconstruct police forces (Dennys and Hamilton-Baillie 2012: 1; Caldwell & Finney 2010: 121; DFID 2008: 40; International Crisis Group 2007; Wilder 2007).

The rest of this chapter will argue the inefficiency of bilateral programs of Germany and U.S. to reform police sector after the ouster of Taliban from 2001 to 2007, and the multilateral or synchronized efforts of international community from 2007 to 2012 in reforming Afghan National Police. These programs are provided to the government of Afghanistan without any coordination and cooperative agreements of International Police Coordination Board (IPCB). Thus, contributor nations follow different concepts of policing. Some focus on training of ANP and community policing, while others focus on survival techniques. Overall, lack of a common and shared strategic vision creates ANP not proper for the current security threat. After pointing out to the efforts of police reform in from 2002-2012, this chapter will present the shape and size of Afghan National Police (ANP).

**3.3.2 German Police Project Office (GPPO):** Following Bonn agreement, Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan was divided in 2002 into five ‘pillars’. Given the historical associations between Afghanistan and Germany, the Interim Authority of Afghanistan requested Germany to be the lead nation in reforming the police. Germany pledged 10 million Euros for renovation of the police academy, reconstruction of police stations in Kabul, training officers, provision of vehicles and help with police building and coordination of donor activities; moreover, German government carried out a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan. They presented their field findings to a group of nations and international organizations at a meeting in Berlin in 2002 (Murray 2007: 108; Caldwell and Finney 2010: 122; DFID 2008; Wilder 2007). A team of German police officers arrived in Kabul and established the German Police Project Office (GPPO), after second donor meetings in mid-March the police training at the Police Academy started (German Federal Foreign Office 2006). This would be known as significant task, as Taliban dispersed any police compositions that existed during the Afghan internal war of the 1990s.

GPPO intended to “start with backbone that is why we are started with the leaders”, (International Crisis Group 2007) but it was understood that reform did not reach the rank

and file in contact with the civilian population. It is most likely driven by shortcomings of funds for training the ANP (Cordesman, Mausner & Kasten 2009).

The UN Security Council Resolution 1401 created the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). It authorized to lead international resources and efforts to reconstruct the country, including police. Furthermore, United Nations Development program (UNDP) established the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to direct multilateral aid to the police. The fund's key objectives were to deliver the monthly payment police, revitalize police facilities; acquire and obtain nonlethal equipment, train police, and enhance law enforcement capacity across the country (Murray 2007: 111).

The ISAF also recognized the priority to train local police. Through the procedures of military-civilian provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), ISAF also took part in training police. Their contribution was during the joint patrols. This mechanism allowed other countries to provide resources and monetary aids for PRT to include professional police officers to train local police like firearms. Due to a few number of police in PRTs with tactical nature of their role, their impact is largely local with no affection to overall reform of the ANP (Murray 2007).

Germany's expenditures in reforming ANP were quite moderate compared with the costs of the German ISAF militaries (close to 500 million Euros per year) and development cooperation (about 120 million Euros per year). Germany had planned to build up the ANP with strength of 62,000 between 2002 and 2007, Germany spent a total of 12 million Euros in bilateral aid per annum plus contribution of 7 million Euros to the Law and Order Trust Fund administered by United Nations Development Program for the extending and implementation of rank-and-pay (Brzoska 2009: 247).

**3.3.3 The U.S. Police Assistance Program:** In 2003, United States also made contribution to expedite the process of professional police service. U.S. start the program "in-service training". It provided \$ 24.6 million for a new training center in Kabul, called Central Training Center (CTC); it aims the training of 7,000 officers in Kabul—3,000 at

the basic level and 4,000 classified as already in service—over one year. Moreover, a \$160 million for building seven other regional centers (Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, Paktia, Kandahar, Jalalabad) and two more in Bamyan and HERAT were planned for reconstruction in 2004. The training programs focus on basic policing techniques and human rights. The U. S police trainers contracted with Dyncorp Company to train ANP.

The training programs for illiterate police were four weeks and for those who have some preliminary education was eight weeks of training with a fifteen day of transition (UNAMA 2003). The quality of the training received by the graduates of U.S. Police Assistance Program was problematic. Contract instructors faced immense challenges. Trainees had no or little previous experience of classroom. The classrooms were cold in winter and baked in summer. They were listening to the trainers who spoke in English and the translators were not experts with the police and administrative terminology. A few American instructors were professional police trainer the rest of trainers has no experience and almost 70% of Afghan trainees were illiterate, they received training only the fifteen days program (Perito 2009: 4).

German police project together with the U.S. set the objectives to train 50,000 officers and 12,000 border police over a three-year period, to be completed by end of 2005. As May of 2004, the Kabul Police Academy had trained 5,000 commissioned and non-commissioned officers and the U.S. had completed the training of 18,000 rank-and-file officers. Despite these efforts, the training process has been slowed and problematic with many factors, communication, equipment, transportation, corruption, and infrastructures (Sedra 2004: 7).

In March-April 2004, at donors' conference in Berlin, Ministry of Interior asserted that the progress of police training and reform had been slower. The identified reasons were shortcomings of donor contributions, deteriorating security situations, corruption at all levels of police, and coordination among Afghan government and international donors. Berlin conference adds some guiding principles to implement the current reform process. These principles were achieving security in Kabul before extending the reform

to other provinces; develop police force as symbol of national identity; provide trainings to improve morale; human rights, and discipline; to enhance capabilities for law enforcement; and recognize the factors which are problematic like narcotics and terrorism. In addition to these principles, a ‘renewed commitment and common strategic vision’ which includes restructuring of MOI, chain of command and reform of intelligence service (Murray 2007: 112). Another conference was organized by the government of Germany, Afghanistan and Qatar in Doha in 2006 to attract financial support of Middle East, neighboring states and countries that are already involved in reforming process of Afghan National Police.

**3.3.4 The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A):** Beside Germany which has been the leading nation for police reform from 2002- June 2007, U.S. was also the largest donor. Initially, the US Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) was managing the US assistance for restructuring Afghanistan’s national police. In 2005, the US government shifted its responsibility of supporting Afghan police to the Department of Defense’s Central Command (CENTCOM). The Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) became responsible for implementation of police reform (Wilder 2007: 20). Within CSTC-A, Task Force Police Directorate had the responsibility for training, while Police Reform Directorate had the responsibility for reforming the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Although CSTC-A was assigned for overall US assistance to Afghan police, State/INL held contract management authority for police training, mentoring, MOI reform and provided civilian trainers and advisers for police training through its contract with DynCorp company (Perito 2009: 5; Wilder 2007: 21) Thus, In 2005, the institutional reform process was implemented in MOI—focusing on police forces, revision of the police Tashkil, payroll reform, and pay rank reform. Figure 3.1 shows the U.S. funding from 2002 to 2007.

In December 2006, the Inspectors General of the State and Defense Department reported that the training of Afghan National Police was not consistent with the standards and the Afghan police forces are incapable of enforcing routine law, ill-disciplined, and

ill-equipped. The report noted that US training program faced with shortage of professional trainers and American managers do not have confidence on Afghan police officers. The report also mentioned that the figure of 70,000 trained Police officers was inflated and that only 30,000 were actually on the duty. Despite the \$1.1 billion that the US had invested and spent on police reform in Afghanistan to that date, the US program to assist Afghan National police was unproductive, ineffective, poorly planned and supervised ( Inspector General, U.S. Department of State and U.S Department Defense: 2006).

To correct the CSTC-A deficiencies, the U.S police training assistance initiated Focused District Development (FDD) in late 2007 as a new mechanism of training, which aimed “to train, reconstitute, mentor and develop the AUP on a district by district basis” (U.S. Plan for Sustaining the ANSF 2008)<sup>6</sup>. This program was designed to enhance the capacity of police and train all police forces of a district at once in a single unit. This program was designed in order to increase the trust and perception of local citizens towards police forces. While all police from a single district joined the training other skilled Afghan National Civil Order Police replaced them. In this sense, the ineffectiveness of the previous approach will be eliminated under which newly skilled police returned to their previous duty stations to serve under unskilled and untrained officers. The length of the training was seven weeks of instruction in military tactics and one week of training in basic police responsibilities (Perito 2009: 5-6).

International mentors were predicted to stay for two months in order to evaluate their work, but the mentor teams left the area as soon as they finished their trainings. A year later, 52 of 350 districts have undergone the FDD process. Later, in all 52 districts the FDD process was not significant. After one year, the police was not able to take over their full roles without oversight. In addition, CSTC-A lacked capacity to add 1,500 military support, security trainers and mentors in order to complete the training of all

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<sup>6</sup> United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces”, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2008, p. 23.

Afghan police by the target date of December 2010 ( International Crisis Group 2008: 12).

**3.3.5 The European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL):** on June 2007, European Union initiated their police mission in Afghanistan. EUPOL Afghanistan replaced Germany as lead partner concerning the police reform and builds on the efforts of the EU member states and other international actors in the field of police and the rule of law. On 18 May, 2010, the Council of the European Union has extended the EUPOL Mission's mandate for a period of three years, until 31 May 2013 (EUPOL 2012). EUPOL had problems with NATO-led ISAF since its founding. All members of EUPOL were not agreed about their security service in Afghanistan. The state members also have diverse goals with different commitments. Moreover, the deployment of EUPOL mission was really slow at the beginning (Sedra 2009 in: Perito 2009:10).

Establishing a civilian law enforcement organization through monitoring, mentoring and advising was the main objectives of EUPOL's mission in Afghanistan rather than training police personnel. Headquarter of EUPOL has located in the Ministry of Interior in Kabul and with provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in other provinces (EUPOL 2012). Lack of infrastructure such as, building, organization materials and "force protection" underlined EUPOL to expand its mandate into areas where security situation is worse (Perito 2009: 10). Furthermore, the strength of EUPOL's mission was authorized to have 400 members. Now, it has only 350 international members and 200 locals on the ground (EUPOL 2012).

Overall, the impact of EUPOL was limited through its mandate. Since EUPOL does not have comprehensive and long-term commitments towards institutional reform in security sector organizations, there are many concerns that EUPOL will also fail to contribute for establishing "Law enforcement police" without a functioning judicial system. However, European Commission had donated judicial sector since security sector reform began in Afghanistan (Wilder 2007: 21). Thus, focusing a lot on equipping and

training police forces in Afghanistan like other bilateral institutions, EUPOL will also miss the opportunity to build an accountable and responsive police force for Afghanistan.

The efforts and supports of international community without shared goals and cooperative agreements among lead nations was failed to build strong police forces to counter the insurgents and threats. There was no strong coordination among all international organizations to train and reform police forces. EUPOL was established in 2007 to cooperate and coordinate European national efforts. This was built by German Police Project Office. On the other hand, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan-lead by US, was built in 2006, in conjunction with German police to reform ANP ( Caldwell & Finney 2010: 123).

**3.3.6 International Police Coordination Board (IPCB):** In 2007, the Afghan government, United Nations, European Union and United States established International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) to direct the efforts on the right way. It coordinates the diffuse and disperses efforts of countries which are contributing to reforming the Afghan National Police and Ministry of Interior. Until 2009, the IPCB lacked enough capacity to coordinate among contributing countries. Every donor headed its own strategic vision and implemented its own agendas. Still international donors and MOI operate beyond the authority of ICPB and agreed structures. To resolve the shortcoming, coordination gap, and lack of timely progress in the efforts to reform police led to the creation of another command, the NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM—A) (CIGI 2009).

**3.3.7 NATO's Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A):** This organization, was initiated on 21 November 2009 to facilitate NATO and national or bilateral training efforts. The organization consists of military and police professional from 37 nations. It cooperates with Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. It collaborates with European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and the European Gendarmerie Force (NTM-A 2012).

The NTM-A support the improvement of self-sustaining institution to enhance the capacity of ANP and enforces laws to protect the country in the future (NTM-A 2009). In this way, it was the first time to bring some changes to develop best unity of effort. NTM-A established a “C3 relationship”: Cooperation, collaboration, and coordination for the improvement of the ANP. To implement this, NTM-A has concentrated on strategy that includes two phases: development and transition. At the first, NTM-A focused on all actors’ efforts to develop both quantity and quality in the ANP, until they are capable of coercive force in all over the country without support of coalition forces. This phase will embrace the role of police as civilian servant, provide rule of law, order, protecting the people, and eradicate source of insecurity within the border. The Transition phase is belonging to the government of Afghanistan to develop sustainable training and policies to bring changes in ANP. When this occurs, the international community can withdrawal and play an advisory role, allowing Afghans to lead the security of their country (Caldwell & Finney 2010: 125).

Under NTM-A’s command, training and mentoring of Afghan National Security Forces is carried out by NATO’s Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police OMLTs (POMLTs). Now, POMLTs are composed of 15-20 personnel from one or several countries. Nations contributing full POMLTs, as of 20 January 2012, are:

Croatia: 2	Italy: 4	Poland: 8
Denmark: 1	Lithuania: 1	Spain: 3
France: 5	Netherlands: 6	Turkey: 1
Germany (PMTs): 2 <sup>7</sup>	Norway: 1	United Kingdom: 12
		United States (PMTs): 279 <sup>8</sup>

Source: (NTM-A: Public Diplomacy Division: Feb, 2012).

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<sup>7</sup> For legal reasons, the German Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) Cooperate with ISAF but are not under ISAFs Command.


<sup>8</sup> US provides Police Mentoring either through PMTs or via partnering units

### **3.4 Model of Growth and Professionalization of Police**

Until 2009, ISAF's growth and professionalization model for the development of ANP was Recruit-Assign model that was in place since the beginning of the reform efforts. This model 'recruit a new policeman, then assign him to a police district with the intention to train him at some future point'- (Caldwell 2011). Therefore, thousands of police personnel, who were recruited during the period of 2002-2009, have not received little and basic training in policing, criminal procedures, the Afghan constitution, and human rights standards (Inspector General, U.S. DoD: 2011: 1). The previous training program was heavily military. Those who were trained in such programs emerged with a little or no knowledge of policing. Only one week out of eight were assigned to the civilian policing functions of investigating crimes and enforcing rule of law (Friesendorf 2011).

The NTM-A and MOI have planned five priorities in order to generate the police force of quantity with quality which has the ability to secure the situation. In this way, NTM-A and Afghan Ministry of Interior build up a new concept to train and reform ANP, comprised of Recruit- Train- Assign model, pay, partnering, predictability, and leader development (Caldwell and Finney 2010: 126). First, NTM-A initiated the foundation of Recruit-Train- Assign model (See figure 3.2). This new model replaces the previous model of Recruit- Assign-intended to be train.

**Figure 3.2 Recruit-Train- Assign Model of ANP**



Source: Caldwell and Finney 2010

NTM-A changed the basic training period and extended the training day to reduce the overall length of the course by 2 weeks. Extra day training was necessary to widen the quantity of ANP. To enlarge the quality, the new 6-week course keeps the previous curriculum while adding 64 hours extra of compulsory literacy instruction for every police officer. To train 95,000 already recruited and assigned ANP, who lacked training during the preceding seven years, was really challenging efforts. The result of failing to manage the mission regularly was a police force that lacked the quality of professional policing tasks.

Furthermore, NTM-A undertook some measurements to increase the coordination of bilateral attempts among the following institutions:

- National Police Academy in Kabul-headed by the Germans.
- German police Training Centers in Mazar-e-Sharif, Fayzabad and Kunduz
- Czech police training center in Logar
- Turkish police training center in Wardak
- Dutch police training center in Tarin Kowt
- British police training center in Helmand
- French officer candidate school a the regional logistics center in Mazar-e-Sharif

“Together with the national heads of delegation from each country, NTM-A focused each of these sites to create interoperable programs of instruction to increase quality and to create police officers more quickly to meet growth goals”( Caldwell and Finney 2010: 127). In fact, this was the first reaction to coordinate disparate training throughout the country after seven years.


#### **3.4.1 The Shape and Size of Police Forces**

The Afghan National Police have developed in recent years, particularly after 2009, but this growth and development has been ineffective than the amount of resource and money that international community has allocated to reform ANP. Still, the majority of the ANP did not receive enough training and had considerable challenges with drug use, retention, equipment, literacy and corruption.

The trends in police manning are presented in figure 3.3. By any standard, the ANP has grown slow to improve and expand. The goal for ANP was 60,000 in February 2006. It increased to 82,000 in May 2007, and then to 86,800 in April 2009 and 96,800 in June 2009. CSTC-A reported that the ANP strength in Oct. 2009 was 94,000, with the goal of 109,000 by October 2010. In April 2010 the strength of ANP was reported at 104,500. It is planned to grow the total force strength to 134,000 by Oct. 2011 (Cordesman 2010: 125, NTM-A 2010). In this way, the attrition rate among new recruits remain 67 percent and annual attrition in the fielded force or on the ground is 20 percent per year, the police must find 43,921 recruits in order to compensate the attrition level. These numbers are

only the presence of personnel, therefore, points nothing about the quality, excellence and management (Cordesman 2010:125).

**Figure 3.3: Strength of ANP from Feb 2006-Nov, 2012**




Source: (Cordesman 2010: 125, NTM-A 2010)

### 3.5 Types of Police Forces

The 2010 National Police Strategy identifies four ‘main pillars’ of the ANP: Figure 3.4 Strength and type of ANP. The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Uniformed Civilian Police (AUP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police. Afghan Local Police (ALP) is identified as sub-pillar of the ANP (GoIRA 2010: 23).

**Figure 3.4 strength and types of ANP as March 2012**



Types	Number
ANCOP	17,442
AUP	85,434
ABP	24,927
CNPA	2,695

Source: Report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan 2012, NTM-A 2010).

**Afghan National Civil Order Police** (ANCOP) is the leading police organization in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations it operates in large-scale operations. All over the country, it works together with military forces as needed. As of March 2012, the overall strength for the ANCOP was 17,442 personnel. Many preventive measurements have taken to decrease the high attrition rate of ANCOP. Still, ANCOP suffers from high rate of attrition, averaging 1.9 % over the past half year (Report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan 2012: 31).

**Afghan Uniform Police** (AUP) is the largest organization of current police forces, they are responsible of policing and maintaining order, security, preventing crime, arresting suspects and strengthen public service in order to enhance rule of law throughout democratic community-based policing. Overall, the strength of AUP as March 2012 was 85,434 personnel. AUP will increase to grow 85,532 forces by November 2012. Beside other pillars of ANP, AUP is also suffering from shortage of sustainable logistic procedure and untrained personnel. Almost 20 percent untrained patrolmen remained in

AUP and attrition levels are 1.0 percent per month which is the lowest among all police pillars (Reports on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan 2012: 32).

*Afghan Border Police* (ABP) the responsibility of ABP is to safeguard and secure Afghanistan's borders and airports. The core functions of ABP are to provide border security, including the prevention of smuggling, cross border movement of perpetrators and trafficking of drugs and humans (Wilder 2007: 12).

Overall, as March 2012, the strength of ABP was 24,927 personnel. The attrition level is 1.5 percent monthly during the period of October 2011 through March 2012. Nowadays, ABP has significant challenges within the training of its personnel and institutional arrangements. The training of its "Blue Border Mission (defined as rule of law enforcement at Border Crossing Points and Air and Rail Ports of Entry ) as opposed to the Green Border mission (defined as patrolling borders between the points of entry)" (Report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan 2012: 32). At the present, there are immense challenges with Border Coordination Centers, Operational Coordination Centers, training equipments and leaderships. With existing of such challenges, the ABP is not capable to secure and control Afghanistan's borders.

*Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan* (CNPA) the main duty of CNPA is to investigate and enforce counter-narcotics measures. This branch of ANP is reporting to Deputy Minister for Counter Narcotics. Beside the CNPA is the Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force, a paramilitary force that report direct to the president and Minister of Interior. The counter narcotic police along with other institutions have a Central Eradication Planning Cell which contributes for providing information to eradicate opium poppy (Wilder 2007: 13). The challenges and problems of CNPA are immense, by 2004; opium cultivation was expanded to all 32 provinces in Afghanistan. By 2006, Afghanistan has become the world's largest producer of opium with 92 percent of global production (Perito 2009: 6). As March 2010, the strength of CNPA was 2,695 (NTM-A 2010).

### **3.6 Failed Efforts to Address ANP Shortcomings**

Founding the Afghan Auxiliary Police, Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) and Afghan Local Police (ALP), with community defense initiatives, are because of the failure and poor performance of ANP, which does not have adequate potency to provide security across the whole country. The programs were initiated and supported by US. On the other hand, not only the establishment of these programs was inappropriate and failed in all cases to provide security around the country, but also “have absorbed existing militia with almost no vetting or training of recruits, and have generally been feared by the communities they are supposed to protect” (Oxfam 2011: 8).

#### **3.6.1 Afghan Auxiliary Police (ANAP)**

In late 2006, the U.S. launched the creation of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) to help address the growing insurgency in southern Afghanistan. The strength of ANAP forces were 11,271 and the recruits are done locally in 124 districts. Initially, a ten days of training were programmed for ANAP—five days of classroom instruction and five days of range firing (Wilder 2007:13).

The function of ANAP was to man the checkpoints and do community policing task. The ANAP was a temporary force and recruits were for one year. The role of ANAP was blurred between community policing and a paramilitary force to counter-insurgency. CSTC-A representatives also denied the role of ANAP as paramilitary force. Members of ANAP locally recruited through the strongmen; therefore, it was factional and vulnerable within different operation. ANAP were loyal to their local and provincial warlords rather than state. ANAP was criticized widely for its inconsistent and diverse effects on the 2005 Disband Illegal Armed Groups Program, which disarmed and demobilized mercenary groups that supplied local warlords by reconstructing tribal and factional militias. These forces do not have allegiances to the government. ANAP was an ineffective, incompetence, and unproductive force. It was dispersed in May 2008 (Perito 2009: 9, Wilder 2007:14). Thus, ANAP was an improper indication. In reality, it was

legitimizing existing militias and mercenaries. It also disbands DDR efforts in which international community has spent millions of dollars from 2002 to 2005.

### **3.6.2 The Afghan Public Protection Force Program (AP3)**

In early 2009, after the failure of ANAP, the idea of “village self-defense” forces was launched to form the Afghanistan Public Protection Force Program. Member of this forces are also recruited by tribal Shuras (council or community leadership structure) to protect their villages from Taliban perpetrators. This program was implemented and logistically supported by CSTC-A with two weeks of training by the United States Special Forces. The participants received \$ 100 per month plus \$ 25 for food (Perito 2009).

In practice, the AP3 was between the following parties: “Coalition forces (both battle space owners and special forces, who train the guardians); the GIRoA, to include the Governor, MOI and the ANP; [and] the people of a district” (Cordesman et al. 2010: 178). According to the Department of Defense report (2010) on Afghanistan: “The AP3’s mission is to enhance security and stability, strengthen community development, and extend the legitimate governance of the GIRoA to designated districts in key provinces through community-based security forces” (DoD report on Afghanistan 2010: 294).

Local elders initiated the recruitment process and select with their personal criteria. The AP3 members are assigned to participate three-week training, drug screening, biometrics upload and some basic police techniques. The personnel are paid \$170 per month with a one-year contract (Cordesman et al. 2010: 180).

Since the members of AP3 are selected and recruited by village elders, this raises the question about allegiance and loyalty to GIRoA versus loyalty to local elders. Moreover, it affected the performance of ANP negatively. In this way, it prolonged the institutional resistance in MOI chain of command (Cordesman et al. 2010). The government of Afghanistan also criticized the AP3 program, many representatives from parliament

asserted that delivering resources to AP3 were undermining efforts to build a professional ANP (Perito 2009). Tracing contemporary history of Afghanistan, especially during the Soviet invasion local militias was so strong. The Soviets had also created village self-defense forces that were difficult and disastrous for all over the country.

### **3.6.3 Afghan Local Police (ALP)**

ALP was established due to the insufficient strength of Afghan National Police in order to provide security across the country, and the members of society are able to provide some first layer defense. Like other series of community initiatives including the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, the Local Defense Initiative and the Afghan Public Protection Program. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was initiated and supported by US. Not only the establishment of these programs was inappropriate and failed in all cases to provide security around the country, but also “have absorbed existing militia with almost no vetting or training of recruits, and have generally been feared by the communities they are supposed to protect” (Oxfam 2011: 8).

In late 2010, ALP was established due to the failings of earlier initiative programs. It recruits through Shura (Council or community leadership structures). The members of Shuras are all former local commanders and warlords. In many cases, these local commanders used ALP as an instrument through Shuras to grant their own militias with salaries. For most of the people, ALP is seen as local militias (arbakai) who maneuver in some villages, where is not formally recognized as ALP sites. Majority of people, have had vicious experiences with militias, and usually difficult to distinguish between the former arbakai and new ALP (Oxfam 2011: 8).

ALP was a temporary and transitional program which will absorb into the main pillars of the Afghan National Police. In the present, the strength of ALP is 5,000 recruits, in 34 ‘validated’ sites. Soon, it extends into 63 sites—with further expansion to 30,000 recruits (UNAMA 2011). In practice, there is a severe risk that with increase, the problem of

guaranteeing common accountability and vetting, and the risk of program being destabilized in the welfare of local powerbrokers, will be badly exacerbated.

## **Summary**

The majority of challenges faced by the ANP were founded by a proliferation in the number of countries contributing in the international police assistance program and lack of strategic directions. On June, 2007, the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) replaced Germany as the “key partner”. Still, there is a gap between United States and its allies in reforming ANP. Each donor group tends to promote the policies of its own government.

The Afghan government also lacks capacity, and vision to divide the tasks and work with donor groups to achieve what is best for the country. During the whole reform process after 2001, there were two different models of policing were undertaken. The Germans view U.S. efforts to militarize the ANP as a mistake. Germany and EU are attempting to alter the U.S. militarization of the ANP by providing training in civilian tasks. European model of policing is to create professional law enforcement agency that control crime and secure Afghanistan. They also see police as face of execution and important factor by which the government can expand its legitimacy in the eye of its own people. They recognized the role of police to counter insurgency, but not when they are trained and equipped as military soldiers.

## **CHAPTER 4: Failings of the ANP: Causes and Consequences**

### **4.1 Causes of ANP Failings**

Building a professional, accountable, effective and rights respecting police force is complicated under the best of circumstances. The duty tackling ANP reformers after the ouster of the Taliban in 2001 was frightening. Nonetheless, despite eleven year of international assistance, billions of dollars invested, and several reform agendas, the dividends have been negligible. This study identifies personal factor, donors approach and organizational problem as key causes of ANP failings. This chapter will address the following hypothesis: **1.**Lack of strategic and operational initiatives and effective planning among donors and government (Dennys and Hamilton-Balille 2012: 2; Perito 2009; Friesendorf 2011; DFID 2008; Murray 2007: 108; Wilder 2007; Sedra 2004, 2003). **2.** Lead nations also lack effective leaderships and resources to manage the issue of police training systematically (Kouvo et al. 2009; Bhatia, Lanigan &Wilkinson 2004: 1; Murray 2007; Denny & Hamilton-Baillie 2012). **3.** Lack of effective leadership, capacity and institution-building in Afghanistan government to manage its security forces and pushes the reform agenda (Oxfam 2011: 2; Bhatia, Lanigan & Wilkinson 2004; Kouvo et al. 2009; Sedra 2003, 2004; Dennys and Hamilton-Baillie 2012).

Tracing causes of ANP failings, this research has divided the causes of ANP into three sections. First, individual factors argue the individual problems of the ANP personnel. Second, the vision of Germany, US and government of Afghanistan towards police reform and the third section will point out to the dominant organizational shortcomings. The last part of this chapter presents the consequences of ANP failings with recommendation and conclusion remarks of the thesis.

## **4.2 Individual Factors**

ANP are accused of violating human rights, criminal activities including kidnapping, extortion and drug trafficking (Wilder 2007: 1; International Crisis Group 2008: 6, 2007). They are ill-equipped, ill-trained, uncountable, unprofessional and unable to protect Afghan citizens (Oxfam 2011; Perito 2009; Murray 2007; International Crisis Group 2007, 2008; Wilder 2007; Amnesty International 2003). Unfortunately, the high rate of drug use among ANP is also problematic. One in five ANP recruits test positive for drug (Nordland 2010).<sup>9</sup> A British Official estimated that 60 percent of the police in Helmand province were drug users, while other U.S. sources put the drug use rate at 25 percent (Australian Broadcasting News: “60pc of Helmand Police Use Drugs February, 18, 2009”<sup>10</sup>). According to Wikileaks (2010) published document on ANP and ANA, ‘in 2008, an unidentified Afghan police officer was in public shower smoking hashish when two Afghan army officers walked in. The police officer felt threatened and a firefright broke out, in which one army officer was killed and the other wounded. The police officer fled the scene but was later apprehended’ (Wikileaks 2010). Overall, unprofessional, uncountable, human rights abuser, and drug addicted individuals are sources of insecurity. They can not perform the task of policing.

The remaining part of this chapter will present the individual factors which contributed to ANP failings. First, the ANP high illiteracy and then the unfaithfulness and disloyalty of ANP to central government will be argued in this chapter.

### **4.2.1 High Rates of Illiteracy among ANP**

One of the comprehensive causes of ANP failings is the existence of high illiteracy rate. It was one of the reasons which undermined the reform efforts. Apparently, remains a fundamental problem for the ANP. The main objective of GPPO program in Kabul was to train new recruits and rebuild the Kabul Police Academy (KPA), which trains

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<sup>9</sup> Nordland, Rod. 2010. With Raw Recruits, Afghan Police Buildup Falter. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/world/asia/03afghan.html?pagewanted=all> accessed July, 2012.

<sup>10</sup> Australian Broadcasting News: “60pc of Helmand Police Use Drugs February, 18, 2009. available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-02-18/60pc-of-helmand-police-use-drugs-official/300600> accessed July, 2012.

commissioned officers in a three-year course, and non-commissioned officers in a nine-month course (Wilder 2007: 30). High rates of illiteracy among ANP are identified as the greatest challenge and key obstacle for reform process. According to US Department of Defense and Department of State “The five-week basic course is inadequate to prepare an ANP recruit for assignment to anything resembling traditional western police duties. Illiterate ANP recruits can only be expected to perform supplementary or ancillary police duties, such as security functions, guard duty, and checkpoint security” (Inspector General, Interagency Assessment 2006: 64). Senior ANP officers also questioned the efficiency of the training for illiterate recruits (Wilder 2007: 31).

Up to date, less than 30 percent of the ANP personnel can read and write (Inspector General, Interagency Assessment 2006: 19). Karen Hall, Manager of State Department in police program in Afghanistan, estimates that the ANP has 75 percent illiteracy rate, which impacts not only on the effectiveness of training, but officers’ abilities to conduct even the most basic of policing duties, such as writing reports or communicating to other justice sector officials effectively (Hall 2009). Literacy is a vital force enabler and force multiplier for the ANP. Literacy enables ANP to learn required skills at professional schools, enhances training on human rights, and supports term sustainability of the force as well as civilian service and law enforcement opportunities.

Figure 4.1 shows the literacy development of ANSF. “Level 3 literacy is required for ANSF personnel to attend professional military and branch schools, as it allows students to learn technical information and skills. Increasing the number of ANSF personnel at level 3 literacy will have significant positive impact on improving the logistics and other technical capabilities of the ANSF” (Report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan 2012).

As of March 31, 2012, about 2,958 full-time Afghan literacy teachers were teaching 112,045 soldiers and patrolmen, up from 89,297 as of September 2011. Additionally, there are currently 11,235 ANA personnel at Level 3 literacy and 16,559 ANP personnel at level 3 (Ibid).

**Figure 4.1 ANSF Literacy developments**

Passed Literacy Test	NOV 2009 – OCT 2010	NOV 2010 – SEP 2011	OCT 2011 – MAR 2012	Total
Level 1	16,591	58,962	52,194	127,747
Level 2	8,783	20,016	13,845	42,644
Level 3	4,530	12,045	11,219	27,794
Total	29,904	91,023	77,258	198,185
As of March 31, 2012, 112,045 personnel were in literacy instruction.				

Source: Report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan 2012

If we measure the literacy rate of ANP based on Level 3 literacy, we see that only 16,559 out of 136,000 up to date are enrolled in level 3 literacy. Therefore, it shows that the literacy is quite low.

Literacy and vocational training strengthen efforts to professionalize the ANP. Therefore, the framework is divided into three grades and really started since November 2009: *Figure 4.2 shows the strength of ANP in different grades.*

Literacy Training	Graduated 1 <sup>st</sup> Grade	Graduated 2 <sup>nd</sup> Grade	Graduated 3 <sup>rd</sup> Grade
Total	33,264	20,018	11,002

Source: NTM-A Information Paper 2011

Overall, efforts to accelerate training of ANP are not enough compared to the number of new recruits. The programs which enhance the capacity of ANP were really begun on November 2009. Currently, there are approximately 20,000 untrained ANP brought into service during Recruit-Assign-Train phase. Untrained police force will destabilize rule of law, violate human rights, and become sources of insecurity and criminal activities.

#### **4.2.2 Unfaithfulness and disloyalty**

The efficiency of human capitals that shaped ANP since 2001, have been questioned since the beginning of reform process. After fall of the Taliban, powerbrokers and warlords occupied the newly created ANP, unilaterally, grabbing titles of police officer and general that was later dignified by the government. Consequently, police forces were composed of local militias and fighters with no police disciplines (Wilder 2007: 7). Militiamen won't be capable to perform the task of civilian police forces; they have

operated for their private militias rather than enforcing law, order and protecting the citizens.

Unsurprisingly, a number of the ANP are human rights abusers. In 2006, the Human Rights Watch called on president Karzai to prevent appointing human rights abusers as ANP officials. Ignoring the calls from different international actors in police reform, Karzai 'seriously undermined the crucial process of reforming Afghanistan's police by appointing several [human rights abusers]....' in 2008, the UN was also calling for the Afghan government to stop the culture of impunity and take more crucial action to bring human rights abuser within police as well as other state institutions, to justice (Burch 2008). The existence of human rights abusers and local militias who have brought turmoil to the country, have seriously destabilized the trust and faith of civilians in police force.

Furthermore, loyalty remains a hard topic within ANP. Presence of local militias, the dominance unrepresentative of community, caused those police officers proven themselves less loyal to government of Afghanistan. According to UNHRC, "the police do not truly represent the interests or diversity of the community. They are drawn dominantly from the members of the one tribe or the followers of one commander. For ordinary Afghans, this means that police function not as enforcers of law and order, but as promoters of the interests of a specific tribe or commander" (UNHRC in Alston: 24).

Particularly, in the south warlords formed the private militias from their own funds. In many cases, the ANP are not simply apathetic to the government, but loyal the insurgency (Gopal 2009). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the recruitments through elder shuras (council) also undermined the loyalty of police to the government. Thus, police are more faithful to the local militias and powerbrokers rather than the national government.

#### **4.3 Dissonance among Donors and Afghan Government**

In addition to other challenges with training, reform and logistical aspects, the police reforming process suffered from lack of unity on overall strategic objectives and coordination between the U.S. and German programs, as well as poor management and

planning initiatives of Afghanistan Interior Ministry. Therefore, lack of strategic and operational initiatives and effective planning among donors and government lead the international police assistance programs to the failure (Dennys and Hamilton-Balille 2012: 2; Perito 2009; Friesendorf 2011; DFID 2008; Murray 2007: 108; Wilder 2007; Sedra 2004, 2003). Thus, every international donor heads with its own strategies; the government also lacks ability to establish a shared vision among donors.

#### **4.3.1 The German Approach**

Germany was leading the police reform following the division of responsibilities for security sector reform from 2002 to 2007. They were building ANP as a civilian law, order and justice—not an insurgency or paramilitary approach (Perito 2009: 3; Oxfam 2011: 10). The U.S. stepped up its own support for the police in 2003. German officials asserted their concerns that the role of army and police are being blurred, they mentioned in a document which has been published by the German Embassy in Kabul in November 2006:

*“Germany acknowledges the need for additional police (Afghan National Auxiliary Police, ANAP) on a temporary basis assigned to the most vulnerable provinces..... Nevertheless, we are firm that in the medium and long term the dividing line between the military tasks of the ANA and the civilian task of the ANP (including the ANAP) must not be blurred. The police have to continue to exercise policing functions and should not be altered into a paramilitary force”* (German Embassy 2006). Thus, the concept of Germany was to train and re-build the ANP on European model to be a civilian law and order force, not a paramilitary force. EUPOL mission replaced GPPO in the summer of 2007.

#### **4.3.2 The US Approach**

The US stepped in to support ANP in 2003 under the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Later, the US Department of Defense took over from the INL through NTM-A/CSTC-A, for US support and police training along with institutional building (Oxfam 2011: 10). Unlike the German approach

to build ANP as a civilian force, the US approach was to make the ANP as an important security or paramilitary force with counter-insurgency characters (Wilder 2007: 44; Friesendorf 2011). According to the Inspector General Office of US Departments of State and Defense (2006):

*“..the report recognize the diversity of missions assigned to the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANP’s first mission was to conduct democratic and community policing at an international standard. Currently, the ANP is viewed as a key player in the overall counter-insurgency mission. The ANP’s role today is different/expanded and may require different training expertise, and equipment”* (Inspector General 2006: 93).

Other ISAF contributing nations also helped US in supporting the development of paramilitary capabilities within Afghan National Police in southern Afghanistan, where the need for additional forces to fight COIN operation (Wilder 2007: 46). Thus, lack of strategic and shared operational initiatives between Germany and US programs created a big gap within international police assistance efforts in Afghanistan.

#### **4.3.3 The Government without Approach**

The role of ANP whether to be paramilitary personnel or a civilian force is unclear in Afghan government. However, the national police strategy has divided the police pillars as follows: The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Uniformed Civilian Police (AUP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police, and Afghan Local Police (ALP) is identified as sub-pillar of the ANP (GoIRA 2010: 23). In general, the role of police is blurred with army.

Due to institutional resistance within the MOI and unclear strategy of government, officials seek to keep the ‘status quo’. The high ranking officials of Afghan government and political leaders benefit from maintaining the ANP loyal to factional and local leaders rather than central government. These officials want ANP continues to protect Afghanistan’s narcotics-based economy (Wilder 2007: 47). Lack of strategic incentives

and clear approach of the Afghan government, more than 10 years of police reform programming has failed to achieve its objectives and stabilize the country. Up to date, ANP is unprofessional, unable and ineffective to protect Afghan citizens and repel the security threats.

#### **4.4 Organizational Factors**

Organizational factors have a key role in the failings of the ANP beside the individual problem. Lack of effective planning is a huge problem in all police agencies all over the country. The organization problems in the ANP begin with leadership, recruitment procedures, and continue with training, oversight, and accountability. Therefore, Lack of effective leadership, capacity and institution-building in Afghan government also affected its security forces, particularly the ANP to manage the reforms agenda (Oxfam 2011: 2; Bhatia, Lanigan & Wilkinson 2004; Kouvo et al. 2009; Sedra 2003, 2004; Dennys and Hamilton-Baillie 2012). In the coming section, this chapter will illustrate some of the key organizational problems that cause failings within police reform process.

##### **4.4.1 Lack of Efficient Leadership in MOI**

Leadership influences organizations behavior and interactions. Underdal (1994) asserts that leadership is as an instrumental relationship of influence where one or more players direct others to obtain the objectives. Therefore, members of an organization obey from a leadership they identify it legitimate and neutral (Underdal 1994). In Afghanistan, police administrators have a dominant role on the efficiency of police sector. The police law specifies: “The police shall constitute part of the organization of the ministry of interior, operating in the form of contingents and units in the capital, provinces and districts” (Police Law Article 3). The police law in article 4 indicates that: “The police shall perform their duties under the leadership of the minister of interior in the capital and under the guidance of the [provincial] governors and district chiefs in the provinces and districts respectively (Police Law Article 4). The police chain of command flows from the

Minister of Interior, to the Deputy Minister for Security Affairs, to the Regional Commands, down to local police chiefs. But the authority of police chiefs are restricted by the governor in the provinces and district governor in the districts of Afghanistan and other influential actors in the country such as, member of parliament, courts, provincial councils, charismatic and religious leaders have some types of influence on ANP. As mentioned in the previous chapter that the recruitments of ALP is organized through the local shuras (council).

In practice, the police fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. MOI lacks the capacity of building, training, and mentoring of the ANP. Moreover, it does not have the potentials and appropriate command discipline and force distribution (Cordesman et al. 2010: 136-37). The process of reform was slow and the major accomplishment of the Interior Ministry reform process started in 2006 with the initiation of a reform of rank and pay structures of ANP (Ibid).

In 2008, CSTC-A observed that the Interior Ministry lacked a clear organizational and institutional structure, chain of command, and lines of authority; the ability to achieve fundamental administration functions, particularly in personnel, procurement, and logistics; and an overall strategy for police operations and development. Ministry of Interior also suffered from endemic corruption, low accountability, and reduced organizational capability at all levels. Institutional reform efforts, which began in 2005, were consistently opposed by political interference, often from the top officials of the Afghan government. In December 2008, CSTC-A, foremost donors, and Interior Ministry Officials arranged a plan for reformation of the ministry to develop competence and reduce corruption, but accomplishment of the plan was overdue by political resistance through the spring of 2009. Ministry reform also suffered from a lack of coordination between international donors and advisers. Senior ministry execution received diverse recommendation and advice from counselor form different countries. A diagram to coordinate the task of international advisers was approved in January 2009, but implementation proved challenging (Policing Afghanistan: USIP 2009). Moreover, in July 2010, identified MOI as one of the three most corrupt ministries in Afghanistan

(Londono 2010: A8). Thus, lack of clear vision, accountability, capacity, endemic corruption, administration and loyalty in MOI caused key challenges toward restructuring and reforming efforts of the ANP.

#### **4.4.2 Paramilitary Structure of ANP**

International police assistance programs have faced darkness to reform police forces of Afghanistan. They rely on military components and private companies whose capabilities were imperfect to assist ANP as civilian and effective force. Private security companies, such as DynCorp lacks the accountability and characterization to build professional public police institutions to enforce law. On the other hand, blurring the police tasks with military is also counterproductive and ironic in vision of primary police goal.

Paramilitarized forces are those who have both the military features and, de facto or de jure characterizations of policing command (Perito 2004: 46). Overall, the main criteria of these forces are gendarmeries, formed police sections, and SWAT (special weapons and tactics), it includes various responsibilities from maintaining order to operation against terrorists and organizational crime collections, and their guns are also different from shields to machine guns (Andreas and Price 2001: 35). Kraska (2007) has developed the balance for assessing the altering feature of police personnel. He recognizes material indicators (military weaponry and technology); cultural indicators; organizational indicators and operational indicators (Kraska 2007: 504).

In Afghanistan, international actors adapt Kraska's balance, initially through FDD, have paramilitarized ANP units. International donors equipped with weaponry, such as AK-47, 9 mm pistols, light machine guns and rockets. In 2010, the US also provided armoured vehicle and more military weaponry (US Department of State 2010: 122).

Overall, FDD were equipped with military cultures, operational indicators and Paramilitarization structures. The military tactics were seven weeks out of eight weeks in

FDD curriculum while one week was devoted for basic police skills. Therefore, ANP officers learned little about policing tactics, criminal procedures, human rights and constitution of Afghanistan (Cordesman 2010: 6). Paramilitarization has negatively affected the process of civilian policing and undermined accountability and oversight. It also neglected the features of democratic governance in Afghanistan (Friesendorf 2011: 89).


Furthermore, assigning the military tasks to ANP caused that most of the citizens did not trust the police: according to a 2009 survey half of the interviewees had said they would fear encountering and meeting ANP officers (Asia Foundation 2009: 37). Paramilitarization has also weakened the profile of ANP to international actors. The regional chief of a European development agency said that '[t]he ANP is the last institution I would turn to' (Friesendorf 2011: 89). Thus, the US-sponsored paramilitarization of ANP is counter-productive policing program. The conflicting vision between US and EU had arisen in 2009; for example, 'the US is teaching the ANP how to shoot. Europe is teaching the ANP when not to shoot' (Ibid: 88) and the role of ANP is blurred in counter-insurgency with Afghan National Army. Therefore, paramilitarization of police force in Afghanistan has enlarged and boosted the darkness of Afghan security sector.

#### **4.4.3 Low ANP Recruitment Standards**

According to DoD's report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan in April 2012, '[The] progress was not uniform across all sections of the ANP, some units, such as the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), are now highly effective, frequently partnering with ISAF forces in successful operations. Progress has been less rapid in other areas, such as the development of ANP logistics capabilities or the development of the Afghan Border Police' (DoD report on progress toward security and stability 2012: 28-9). Beside other organizational factors, frequently, recruitment and selection process of ANP personnel have also failed. After 2001, majority of the local militias, drug addicted, criminals, illiterates and corrupt individuals who proves faith and

favor to their own tribe and faction, had been recruited on the bases of tribal, family and ethnic bases. Major Randy Schmeling, an American police mentoring team in Ghazni province quoted ‘Right now, there is no meritocracy here’ (Oppel and Rahimi: 2009). The endorsed ‘end-strength’ for the ANP is 157,000 personnel by October 2012. Currently, the ANP personnel level attained 149,642 personnel. See figure 4.3 the end-strength of ANP. It includes 25,195 officers, 39,943 NCOs, 77,653 patrolmen, and 6,851 initial entry trainees (DoD report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan 2012: 28-30).

**Figure 4.3: ANP End-Strength (March 2011-March 2012)**



Source: (DoD report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan April, 2012: 30)

At this time, there are so many shortcomings, such as number of NCO, untrained patrolmen and imbalances in rank and location. Attrition levels in the ANP remained so high, averaging 1.2 percent (DoD report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan 2012). The number of ANP personnel has increased significantly, but the quality of forces, particularly the training capacities and policing skills are open to question.

Furthermore, recruitment standards were so low and have never been implemented since 2001. The main criteria and standards of ANP recruits are: *age, height, health, and education* which are not adequate for police force. Among all, education standards are so low; particularly for Satunkai no formal education is required. Satanman require secondary or nine years of education and Saran twelve years. In the light of Afghanistan's war and history a minimum degree of efforts and attention were centered on personal history of recruits and their backgrounds (Rusi 2009: 104). In a country like Afghanistan with more than three decades of war, existence of regional spoilers, ethnic clashes, with complete impunity for war criminals, it is tough to select right individuals as loyal and free of past crimes for police recruits.

Up to date, less than 30 percent of the ANP personnel can read and write (Inspector General, Interagency Assessment 2006: 19). Karen Hall, Manager of State Department in police program in Afghanistan, estimates that the ANP has 75 percent illiteracy rates, which impacts not only on the effectiveness of training, but officers' abilities to conduct even the most basic of policing duties such as writing reports or communicating to other justice sector officials effectively (Hall 2009). Consequently, the recruitment of ANP is not sufficient and merit-based. Tribal, ethnic and local reliabilities play prominent role in police recruitment that undermines process of police reform.


#### **4.4.4 High Rates of Corruption among ANP**

Unfortunately, one of the prominent causes of police failures and source of insecurity is the existence of high rates of corruption among ANP. Empirical surveys among Afghan civilians encompass little trust on police. Generally corruption has become widespread, entrenched and pervasive in Afghan government. The country's ranking in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index dropped from 117<sup>th</sup> out of 159 countries covered in 2005 to 172<sup>nd</sup> of 180 countries in 2007 and subsequently to 176<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries in 2008 (i.e. fifth-worst in the world). Finally, Afghanistan has

positioned 180<sup>th</sup> out of 182 countries in 2011 (Transparency International 2005; 2011). Therefore, high rates of corruption exist among ANP, ANA and NDS.

Corruption among ANP ranges from ‘pity corruption’ on checkpoints, such as bribery, theft, kickback, to ‘grand corruption’ in high ministerial officials of government such as drug trafficking, illegal and criminal based trades ( Wilder 2007: 52). It is not surprising that the rates of corruption among ANP are reported 60 percent by a survey conducted by the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), the second position after existence of 85 percent corruption among government civil servants ( ACSOR 2010: 15). See Figure 4.4 existing of corruption rate among ANP. Similar to other governmental institutions, ANP also remains dysfunctional, uncountable and unprofessional, because of widespread corruption.

*Figure 4.4 Existing Corruption among ANP*



Source: (ACSOR 2010: 15)

Consequently, the nuisance of corruption has links to a mass of vices. Its roots are linked to injustice, mistrust, suspicion, extremism and terrorist activities. It creates a sense of insecurity, aggravates poverty and adds to the calamity of the vulnerable

segments of the society. Corruption among ANP also instills a sense of hopelessness and misery and threatens the potency of police reform process which has been established over the past years.

#### **4.4.5 Lack of Efficient Training for ANP Forces**

Beside other organizational factors, one of the key causes of unprofessional ANP is lack of adequate trainings with professional mentors and lack of coordination among contributing nations (Germany and US). In 2002, Federal Republic of Germany has built the National Police Academy (NPA) in Kabul to train and educate ANP personnel with three to five years of training program (Perito 2009: 3). Rebuilding ANP is more challenging task for international community than other post-conflict reconstruction pillars. Given the geographical size and population of Afghanistan the German approach would have taken decades to train 62,000 personnel in the initial Tashkil (composition) of ANP in 2002 (Wilder 2007: 7), the endorsed ‘end-strength’ for the ANP is 157,000 personnel by October 2012. Currently, the ANP personnel level attained 149,642 personnel. . It includes 25,195 officers, 39,943 NCOs, 77,653 patrolmen, and 6,851 entry trainees (DoD report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan 2012: 28-30).

In 2003, the US also started “in-service training” program for those police forces that are currently in service in capital. Later, the US has expanded ‘in-service training’ program to other seven regional training centers in all over of Afghanistan. The US courses of trainings included eight weeks in basic police skills for literate, noncommissioned and patrolmen, a five-week training for illiterate patrolmen, and a fifteen days transition integration program for policemen with extensive experience. It was inadequate to build professional police in eight weeks; however, it increased the quantity of police significantly, but the quality of the training was problematic (Perito 2009: 4).

Majority of trainers have only operational experiences while these knowledge and experiences are 'essential for transferring policing techniques [but] are not sufficient to achieve reform'. ANP training has disrupted by unproductive training programs, poor learning materials, pitiable facilities, and even outdated information (RUSI 2009: 90).

Today, under NTM-A's command, training and mentoring of Afghan National Security Forces is carried out by NATO's Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police OMLTs (POMLTs). Now, POMLTs are composed of 15-20 personnel from one or several countries. Nations contributing full POMLTs, as of 20 January 2012, are:

Croatia: 2	Italy: 4	Poland: 8
Denmark: 1	Lithuania: 1	Spain: 3
France: 5	Netherlands: 6	Turkey: 1
Germany (PMTs): 2 <sup>11</sup>	Norway: 1	United Kingdom: 12
		United States (PMTs): 279 <sup>12</sup>

Source: (NTM-A: Public Diplomacy Division: Feb, 2012).

In 2009, NTM-A initiated 'Recruit-Train-Assign' model and changed the basic training period and extended the training day to reduce the overall length of the course by 2 weeks. Extra day training was necessary in order to widen the quality of ANP. To enlarge the quality, the new 6-week course keeps the previous curriculum while adding 64 hours extra of compulsory literacy instruction for every police officer (Caldwell and Finney 2010: 126). Since most of the ANP personnel are illiterate, drug user, local militias, and villagers, with any circumstances, six weeks of training is inadequate to teach them how to read and write and train policing task too.

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<sup>11</sup> For legal reasons, the German Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) Cooperate with ISAF but are not under ISAFs Command.

<sup>12</sup> US provides Police Mentoring either through PMTs or via partnering units


#### **4.5 Consequences of Unprofessional ANP**

The consequences of ANP failings affect all aspects of Afghan citizens. Lack of professional police forces diminishes development. Professionalizing and training security forces remains one of the crucial pillars of post-conflict reconstruction. It is vital to achieve the security first. In the case of Afghanistan, the failings and unprofessional ANP resulted in insecurity, human rights abuses, high rates of civilian casualties, Narcotic Trafficking, high level of police fatalities, and destabilized socioeconomic developments.

##### **4.5.1 Unprofessional ANP are Unable to Repel Terrorists and Security Incidents**

International community has been pouring money into security sector in order to reform ANP since 2002, but the efforts were failed to professionalize national police. Security forces are not qualified personnel to maintain prosperity and the security of the country. They lack institutional capacity to ensure accountability (Oxfam 2011: 2; Murray 2007:108). Despite billions of dollars invested in security sector reform over the last ten years, the intensity of insecurity has not only deteriorated but has stretched from the border with Pakistan to entirely south, southeast and east with increasing infringement into the nonviolent north, west and the central region around Kabul (DFID 2008: 4).

*Figure 4.5 Break out of Security Incidents in Afghanistan by Region.*




Source: UNDP, Afghanistan Annual Report, 2011; Protection of civilians in Armed Conflict.

The center of Taliban is the south whereas insecurity in other regions, especially in the east is manipulated by Haqqani Network, Hizb-e-Islami and other AOGs. The northern and western regions of Afghanistan are suffering from the remobilization and occasional attacks of Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami, the Haqqani Network and other AOGs. Thus, Afghan National Security forces, particularly ANP is unable to repel the terrorists and security incidents.


Figure 4.6 shows the total security incidents of 2009-2011. Statistics compiled from UNDP/UNAMA indicate that the increase of violence and insecurity overall the country, 68 percent, between 2009 and 2010. The total number of security incidents between 2010 and 2011 increased 18 percent.

**Figure 4.6 UNDP/UNAMA Estimates of Total Security Incidents in Afghanistan 2009-2011.**



Source: UNDP, Afghanistan Annual Report, 2011; protection of civilians in Armed Conflict, January 2012.

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) also estimate the total Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan. See figure 4.7 shows the estimate of total “Terrorist” Attack from 2005 to 2011. The numbers of terrorist attacks are high. **Figure 4.7 Estimate of Total terrorist Attack from 2005- 2011**



Source: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) data, accessed March 20, 2012. Available at: <https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0>

ANP is identified as the main agency to enforce law. Article 5 of the police law indicates that police should take protective measures against crime, determine crimes on time and detain suspects (Police Law 2005: 3). Overall, the police forces, as the main agency, have been failed to maintain and lacked professional policing tactics to achieve security goals. Due to unavailability of other crime records, this study only rely on failures of ANP to take preventive measures, determine and discover terrorist attacks.


#### **4.5.2 High Rates of Civilian Casualties**

Civilian casualties remain significant failings of ANSF, particularly ANP. Civilians are being killed and wounded by both insurgent-emplaced IEDs and ISAF, ANSF operations. All parties—Afghan National Security Forces, International Military forces, and non-State armed groups have been obliged under international law to protect civilians. Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 indicates standards that parties, including State and non-State actors shall respect in non-international armed conflict. Afghanistan is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to additional Protocol II 1977. These legal documents avoid attacks against civilians and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilians (UNAMA 2012:3).

Unfortunately, the parties in Afghanistan do not distinguish between combatants and civilians. UNAMA recognizes civilians as individuals who are not members of any party (military/paramilitary groups) in armed conflict. In the case of Afghanistan, the attacks against individuals who are not taking a direct part in hostilities including civil servants, medical workers, political personnel, NGOs worker and private office holders. Anti-government Elements/Taliban targeted numerous killings of civilian, such as government officials, tribal elders, contractors, interpreters, drivers and influential individuals since beginning of the insurgency operations which is violation of international humanitarian law (UNAMA 2012: 5). On the other hand, the ANSF, particularly ANP does not have professional policing knowledge to take preventive measures or establish a strong investigating mechanism to discover terrorists and IEDs attacks. See figure 4.8 Civilian Deaths by year from 2007 to 2011.

Since 2001, the conflict in Afghanistan incurred a greater human cost in 2011 than in previous years. 3,021 civilian deaths in 2011, an increased of 8 percent over 2010 (2,790) and a 25 percent increase from 2009 (2,412 civilian deaths).

*Figure 4.8 Civilian Deaths by year (2007-2011)*



Source: UNAMA 2012: 1).

“Anti-Government Elements caused 2,332 conflict-related deaths of Afghan civilians in 2011, up 14 percent from 2010. 77 percent of all conflict-related civilian deaths in 2011 were attributed to Anti-Government Elements” (UNAMA 2012: 1).

#### **4.5.3 Unprofessional ANP Abuses Human Rights**

The data regarding abusive conduct of ANP is difficult to acquire. It lacks a systematic mechanism of reporting, but the occurrence of human rights violation is higher than the reporting suggests. Usually, the government does not count the number of human rights abuses which is dishonored by ANP. There are serious allegations of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of forces during detention. In survey of AIHRC between 2006 and 2008, covering 398 detainees being held by all components of the security forces, 98.5 percent said that they had been abused (AIHRC 2009: 25). Beside ANP, Afghan Local Police which is a sub pillar of police forces in Afghanistan, have been accused of killed and raped civilians, stolen land and carried out other abuses against the Afghan citizens they are charged with protecting (Human Rights Watch 2011).

Afghan Local Police (ALP) recruits, who are trained and financed by the US, have criminal histories. Now, ALP units are themselves engaged in violation of international human rights and humanitarian law. Researches in Herat, Kunduz and Baghlan explain that the gangs are recruited in ALP. In Herat, the level of fear was such that men were 'arming themselves against the ALP'. Former commanders of Hizb-e-Islami have been recruited into ALP in Baghlan, who have violated and abused human rights and accused of 'robbing and beating villagers, breaking into homes at night and carrying out revenge arrests and even killings' (Oxfam 2011: 14).


The police training programs which have been preformed by international actors (especially eight weeks of training courses by US) are not adequate enough for ANP to learn professional and basic skills of democratic policing (Perito 2009, Caldwell and Finney 2010). Moreover, the trainers had operational experience, but they were not professional trainers. The facilities of materials in training programs were also low (ineffective training method, poor learning materials, bad examples and sometimes outdated information). Furthermore, ANP also lacked the mechanisms to conform police with rule of law standards in order to ensure transparency and accountability to the civil authority and to citizens (Murray 2007: 21-2). All of these tasks accomplish and serve as yardstick for discipline and restraint. When the ANP still suffers from high rates of attrition, illiteracy, drug use and disloyalty, it indicates that there is no standard mechanism to ensure accountability and transparency to the citizens.

#### **4.5.4 Unprofessional ANP Forces Incur High Rates of Fatalities**

By 2012, international actors still sketch to raise the number of ANP. Yet, because police forces have not been proficient to grant security with respect to counter narcotics, law enforcement, civil order, and border areas. Afghanistan's national police are being ineffective, unprofessional, using torture to force confessions and being involved in corruption and criminal activities (Berglund 2008).

Aside from their poor police training, ANP forces were ill-equipped and weakly managed. They were used improperly as a warfare force in opposition to heavily equipped insurgent (Jalali 2009: 28). The cost of using police in a combat role for which they were never intended was extremely high. According to the U.S Defense Department the fatalities of ANP is so high. Some 3,400 Afghanistan’s national police were killed or wounded between January 2007 and March 2009. Police combat losses during 2008 were three times larger than those of the ANA, with the police suffering an average of 56 officers killed per month (Perito 2009: 8). See figure 4.9 ANP fatalities in security incidents.

**Figure 4.9 Fatalities of ANA and ANP (January 2007- December 2011)**



Source: Brookings Afghanistan Index June 20, 2012

Despite lack of sufficient training, ineffective paramilitary structure of ANP cause those police forces are being killed by armed insurgents. A Canadian Officer exemplified the Afghan Police as ‘Cannon fodder’ in the war against the Taliban because they were placed in vulnerable positions without proper training equipment or force protection (Wilder 2007).

#### **4.5.5 Unprofessional ANP Increases Narcotic Trafficking**

Besides increasing civilian casualties, human rights violation, deteriorating insecurity and ANP fatalities; narcotic trafficking is also the result of ANP failures. Lack of professionalism and failing of ANP in counter-narcotic is vivid.

By 2004, cultivation of opium had been widened in thirty-two provinces of Afghanistan. By 2006, opium production rates of Afghanistan have been increasingly reached 92 percent of global production. The illicit income of opium for farmers, processors, and drug exporters were two-thirds of the Afghanistan’s legal GDP. The opium income financed criminal networks and insurgency which is enlarged in Pakistan. High rates of opium production has supported the illicit power of local militias, ancestral and tribal leaders, warlords, anti-governmental elements ( Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Hizb-e-Islami) and other extremist groups ( UNODC and Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics 2006).

In October, 2003 narcotics control law had been endorsed. Under the ‘lead nation’ approach, Great Britain guided the of counternarcotics movements. Form the beginning, British efforts was counterproductive and beard from limited funding and lack of experience (Perito 2009). A side from the donors’ mistakes, the inability and existence of corrupt ANP officers in Ministry of Interior, particularly in provincial police offices opium production accelerated insecurity and corruption. In provincial level, due to the endemic corruption among ANP officers, Interior Ministry officials agreed to existence of large bribes for protecting drug traffickers (Jones et al. 2009). Thus, disloyalty to central government links to local militias group, unprofessionalism, and insufficient

knowledge of policing added to failures of ANP to decrease narcotic trafficking in Afghanistan.

#### **4.5.6 Unprofessional ANP Increases Mistrust /Obliterates Public's Perception on Police**

Police sector is known as the main law enforcement agency in Afghanistan (Police Law 2005: Article 5). Indeed, the reform process of ANP is faced a ramshackle and military instrument of state oppression manned by illiterate, villagers, local militias, poorly trained, and drug addicted (RUSI 2009: 6). As mentioned before, prevalence of human rights abusers, loyalty to tribal leaders, high rates of illiteracy, existence of endemic corruption, lack of sufficient trainings, and ineffective leadership within the ANP, increased the gap and mistrust of citizens regarding Afghanistan's national police.

The current effort of United States to build Afghan Local Police (ALP) is ineffective because most of the local militias are armed through this program. According to RUSI (2009) "Militias are bad for nation-building. It is a gamble the Afghan people and the international community cannot afford to take" (RUSI 2009: 132). Now, ALP recruits are accused of human rights abuses (Human rights Watch 2011).

To measure the success and failures of police forces, the central issue is the public surveys on perceptions of the police. To improve the public safety is identified as the core and fundamental basis of police achievements. Unsurprisingly, the ANP is failed to provide public safety across the country. Therefore, ANP forces were seen as voracious and a greater source of insecurity rather than a solution. For many people, the police were identified with weights for "bribes, illegal taxes, and various kinds of human rights violations" (Perito 2009: 7).

The ANP is known as dysfunctional institution in Afghanistan government. They are not performing effectively; therefore, the public safety is not provided by ANP and people do not trust Afghanistan's national police. The relationship between police and people is generating the trust and enhance efficiency of ANP measures to prevent from

crimes and terrorists incidents (RUSI 2009: 16). Thus, ANP should assume strategies which are rooted to village, towns and cities to detect anti-governmental elements; they can identify insurgents, gain public's faith and increase public safety.

### **Summary**

After one decade of efforts to reform ANP, the professionalism, capability, and accountability of forces remain diminutive. Civilian casualties, human rights violation, and security incidents statistics of conflict in Afghanistan is getting worse each year (See Brookings Afghanistan Index 2012, Failed states Index 2012, UNAMA 2012).

In addition to personal factors and organizational problems, the police-building process suffered from lack of unity in strategic objectives and coordination between U.S. and Germany's police-building programs, and poor planning initiatives of Afghanistan Interior Ministry. Moreover, police-building efforts have suffered from lack of attention by international community, "knowledge" and "implementation gap" (Murray 2007).

## Conclusion

Since 2001, international forces have been increased gradually in Afghanistan. As of May 2012, the number of troops committed to NATO's International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) is 129,469 from different countries (Brookings: Afghanistan Index 2012). Afghanistan is governed with a failed and corrupt government, a narcotic-led economy, and a dangerous insurgency. In post-invaded Afghanistan civilian police has not developed significantly, it is a challenging task because a state with a long history of tribal, dictatorial and autocratic approaches cannot easily recognize the role of democratic police forces.

Police forces have two distinct, but interlinked functions in democratic societies: (1) police sector must have an independent position to the center of power and must be responsible towards providing security, the needs of citizens, and responsive to law and regulations; and (2) police must abide by standards of law and human rights (Bayley 2001). Currently, these conditions have only been appeared in Afghanistan, but the challenges persevere and persist. Most conspicuously, ANP forces are targeted by insurgents to destabilize security situations and the fatalities of forces are three-times higher than other security forces. The efforts to stabilize security, political, economic and social well-beings have faced obstacles and led to failures. Lack of professional police forces and responsive security sectors in post-Taliban Afghanistan emerge as considerable failure of international community and Afghanistan government.

After 2001, Contradictory visions and policies are taken to serve the ANP from the military, to afford them with non-military uniforms and to organize international civilian police mentors. More distinctly, it believes that "security can only be assured by military means, and that providing policing and social services to civil populations does not contribute to the restoration of peace and stability". If such an approach were to succeed just military answers for security sector reform would be considered, and Afghanistan would be caught in a vicious circle of using force against force without employing other approaches to secure stability and peace. A multi-faceted approach for ending insurgency and terrorism is likely to yield more results than a military approach (Murray 2007: 122).

The process of police reform has not produce significant changes, while there is a lack of coherence in reforms. The first matter is entailing attention is deciding whether the ANP is a civilian or military force. Then this should approve a clear vision in order to be the focus of reform tasks. This is an important decision which needs to be taken by international actors (Germany and US) and government of Afghanistan. A strategic and shared plan with a vivid approach, supported on discussion with all of the stakeholders, could supply the direction, strength, consistency and coherence needed for efficient police building. Good planning could thus optimize intangible resources such as thoughts, intellectual, perceptions, power and compassion to ensure that tangible resources are used to achieve superior outcomes.

The training efforts should focus on community-based, democratic and civilian policing. Since the transition period has started in 2011, security forces will assume responsibility for the protection of the population. They are expected to perform this in a competent, professional and outstanding manner, based on the democratic standards and Afghanistan's laws.

Over all, Lack of strategic and operational initiatives and effective planning among donors and government (Dennys and Hamilton-Balille 2012: 2; Perito 2009; Friesendorf 2011; DFID 2008; Murray 2007: 108; Wilder 2007; Sedra 2004, 2003). Lack of sufficient leadership from lead nations to manage the issue of police training systematically (Kouvo et al. 2009; Bhatia, Lanigan & Wilkinson 2004: 1; Murray 2007; Denny & Hamilton-Baillie 2012) coupled with lack of effective leadership, capacity and institution-building in Afghanistan government to manage its security forces (Oxfam 2011: 2; Bhatia, Lanigan & Wilkinson 2004; Kouvo et al. 2009; Sedra 2003, 2004; Dennys and Hamilton-Baillie 2012) have established unprofessional police forces that one in five ANP recruits tests positive for drug (Nordland 2010), with 75 percent of illiteracy rate (Hall 2009), high rates of attrition 1.2 percent per month (DoD report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan 2012), 60 percent corruption among ANP (ACSOR 2010), and majority of ANP recruits are human rights abusers (Human Rights Watch 2011; AIHRC 2009).

## **Recommendations**

As mentioned above, all members of international community have supported police forces in post-Taliban Afghanistan, but they were failed to build right respected, community-based, accountable, and professional police. All international actors have moral and legal obligation to dignify civilian impairment and harm incurred during military operations. To fulfill the failings and deficiency of Afghanistan's national police, this research recommends the following:

### **To the Afghan Government and international donors: Especially after 2014**

In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the main causes of conflict have not been addressed by the international community. Throughout history, governance has not been balanced between central and regional on one hand, and the movement to modernize against efforts to keep customary systems on the other. Poverty, instability and lack of education have further worsened efforts to establish a centralized government. In contemporary history of Afghanistan, these internal apprehensions which often evident themselves along regional, ethnic, and tribal lines, have been more compounded and manipulated by external actors. Afghanistan's relationship with its neighbors, and especially the controversy and storm over the Durand Line, is a continuing source of instability, insecurity and conflict. Afghanistan has been the center and battleground of several conflicts which are international and regional, including Cold War and the recent War on Terror. (Kouvo et al. 2009: 8). Thus for building a strong system of governance and successful post-conflict efforts in Afghanistan, international community should take measures to address the above mentioned problems seriously. The conflicting issues between Afghanistan and its neighbors have distressed post-conflict Security Sector and Police reform.

## **1. Ensure that the mechanism of authority and responsibility among various organizations and nations developing ANP is not blurred**

Develop a well-structured body (such as monitoring and collaborating police reform efforts) to enhance the efficiency of ANP reform process and respond to uncoordinated, disparate, and unrelated efforts of various donors support the ANP. Currently, one of the key reasons of ANP failings is the convoluting and blurring role of international donors. Every country proceeds and heads with its own policy. Two distinct notions of policing are being developed in Afghanistan police sector, the European system is perceived by the Germans and other European nations, while the U.S. and other international donors are conveying common law policing system at the constable level. These two different systems have distinct perceptions on policing tasks. The notion of EU policing system is to serve the state while the common law policing principles serve the local communities. Currently, there is no approach among these actors and government of Afghanistan to reconcile such dissimilar and contradictory principles. Government of Afghanistan should establish and undertake policies to take the role of efforts coordinator among supporting nations. Otherwise, high rates of illiteracy, drug use, human rights violation, attrition, disloyalty and unaccountability remain as spontaneous portrayal of Afghanistan's national police.

## **2. Improve the quality of training for ANP**

According to the 2010 National Police Strategy training for ANP should be on “human rights, the legal rights of citizens and how to behave in an ethical manner”, and the Ministry of Interior should be supported to undertake this commitments. The curriculum of police training programs needs to be standardized by focusing on community-based policing, the rule of law, human rights; and democratic governance.

Special emphasizes should be taken on civilian police skills and the relationship between ANP and their communities. All international actors, including EUPOL should adopt a single training curriculum for ANP. Fighting insurgency is not the task of police. It is a task for the military forces. The job of the police is to hold and generate

relationship with citizens. In this way, the police will play their crucial role in controlling crime, protecting civilians and increasing the legitimacy of Afghan government. Therefore, if the role of police is blurred with military, it will be difficult to gain people's trust. Sending police as backup to ANA and coalition forces will decrease the probability of restoring peace and security in Afghanistan.

**3. Stop precedent security sector design, militaristic perceptions of policing** to comprise democratic and community-policing attempts that create relationship between police and community members. The U.S. military perceives the ANP as assisting security personnel rather than an enforcer of the law and regulation. The ANP is not yet ready to play the role of military forces, with 961 insurgency-related police deaths in 2010 and 830 in 2011. Militaristic perceptions also discount that organized crime, infringements of rule and violations of human right lounge at the heart of instability and insecurity. International donors, particularly US neglects democratic notion of governance and develops paramilitary structures of ANP which resulted in an increase in hostility and insecurity.

#### **4. Enhance Technical capacity building:**

##### ***Biometric Technology***

To avoid from high rates of attrition biometric technology should be used. In this way, the regular payments of salaries will be managed too. There are disillusion among civilians with the exact number of ANP. Therefore, a geographical reorientation of the police coupled with presence of the police on the borders is recommended.

##### ***Focus on ANP Quality not only Quantity***

Merit-based standards of recruitments should be practiced to increase the efficiency, and professionalism of forces. The process of nomination and recruitments of ALP and ANP through shuras, tribal or any ethnic bias should be prevented. Instead, Afghan civil society institutions should consult the actors regarding the personnel history, and

reputations of recruits. Recruitments through local shuras promote a sense of loyalty to the local powerbrokers rather than the central government.

### ***Prevent short term force creation***

Creating short term forces and structures in the composition of police sector is known as a mistake. The structures are: Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), The Afghanistan Public Protection Force Program. And some other short-term decision at the time of election in 2009 to train and recruit special personnel—for example, ‘pyramid schemes’ with recruitments of 35,000. These short terms invention of forces should be averted.

## **5. Reform Ministry of Interior**

Without better capacity and leadership skills in MOI, Afghanistan’s national police cannot be professional, accountable, and effective forces. To reduce duplication of efforts, officials of MOI should be capable of extensive mentoring and oversight. MOI should create an internal system of supervision to enhance accountability, responsiveness, and professionalism of the ANP. Therefore, a clear description of authority and responsibility can mitigate reform process. Lack of efficient leadership in MOI has failed reform efforts to build professional police forces.

## **6. Enhance efforts to improve oversight and accountability**

MOI should create an independent institution to monitor, investigate and oversight the misconduct of police forces. International community should provide the necessary technical and advisory recommendations to MOI. With a systematic mechanism of oversight and monitoring, MOI can eradicate endemic corruption and misconduct of ANP. The responsible body for accountability and oversight must be democratized and includes external police complaints authority to receive improper and illegal complaints. According to the complaints, MOI can increase resources and generate strategies to respond for vulnerable areas which need more efforts and concentrations to be reformed.

## **7. Reform the Criminal Justice Sector**

Criminal justice sector has effective and essential influence on sufficient performance of police personnel. Afghanistan criminal justice should be reconstructed. In the last years, capacity-building and infrastructure was not adequate. The process should be undertaken in all geographical locations, such as villages, districts, and provinces. The ability and efficiency of judges and courts have lagged behind the massive expenditures on developing the police. Reform process should be extended to prison and the Attorney General's Office. Extensive training programs should be generated for all criminal justice sectors as whole. The dysfunctional, weak, and unfriendly relationships should be replaced with co-operation via trust-building activities. Afghanistan National Development Strategy indicates reforming of justice institutions, but the link between justice and police should be seen as a priority and initial step towards rule of law.

Furthermore, accountable, transparent, and long-standing jurisdiction of courts can eliminate informal and tribal system of justice in Afghanistan. At the present, majority of people in the villages resolve their disputes through informal and non-state courts. Reform efforts should eradicate the informal system, while enhancing the strength and features of formal justice system based on Afghanistan constitution or international law, through workshops and extensive training courses.

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